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ABSTRACT

SPRAWL, EQUITY AND FIRE DEPARTMENT RESPONSE TIMES ACROSS
THE U.S.
Matin Katirai
February 24, 2009

This dissertation is an examination of fire department response times in
eight major cities of the United States including Houston, TX, Charlotte, NC, St.
Paul, MN, Portland, OR, Seattle, WA, Louisville, KY, San Francisco, CA and
Miami, FL. This study investigates and analyzes fire protection as an urban
service as measured by response times, first through proportional access by
looking at socio-economic status (SES), and secondly through spatial access by
examining several different aspects of urban sprawl. Response times were
regressed as the main dependent variable with SES and urban sprawl variables
in the quantitative portion of the study. Results indicated that response times did
vary by the SES nature of the fire district and that sprawl did affected response
times. The quantitative results were followed by a qualitative study which
examined the quantitative results from 3 local fire chiefs.
This dissertation is divided into 5 chapters. Chapter one gives an overview
of the dissertation along with stating the hypothesis, and significance of this
dissertation. Chapter two is an overview of the literature which focuses on urban
v

service provision, fire protection as an urban service, response times, the
locations of fire stations, fire districts, urban sprawl, and the measurement of
equity and sprawl. The literature is used as a guide in framing the study. Chapter
3 is the methodology section which discusses the data and how the variables
were selected. In chapter 3 there is also a description of the statistical models
and how the models were derived. Chapter 4 is the results section and provides
an analysis of the descriptive statistics, regression results, and an spatial
analysis of data for four cities. The results section also includes the qualitative
section which has interview data from 3 fire chiefs in Louisville-Jefferson County.
In chapter 5 I discuss the results, make recommendations, and list possible
limitations to this study and areas for future research.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Fire emergencies demand an immediate response by fire departments so
that precious lives may be saved. Fire departments provide a critical public
service to city residents. How those services are distributed in a city will have a
tremendous impact upon how timely residents will receive a response.

Robert

Lineberry (1977) argued that services such as fire provision were not distributed
in a discriminatory fashion, while others such as Rich (1982), and Duncombe
(1991) believed that services were distributed in a manner that was unfavorable
to people in lower socio-economic classes within a city. Others such as Drier,
Mollenkompf and Swanstrom (2004) have made the argument that "place
matters" and where one lives in an urban area will have a major impact upon the
quality of life and the services that are received. Urban sprawl, the pervasive
development pattern of the United States, is also a part of this place matter
argument. The issue of service provision in sprawled metropolitan areas creates
social justice and inequity concerns with those in declining inner cities receiving
inadequate services. Sprawl creates inefficiencies in service provision and has
negative externalities, such as congestion, which also impact public safety.
In this dissertation I will investigate and analyze fire protection as an urban
service, first through proportional access by looking at various socio economic
factors, and secondly, through spatial access by examining several different
1

effects of urban sprawl. I believe where one lives in a city will have a significant
impact on how a fire department responds to an emergency. The inspiration of
this study comes from the response to Hurricane Katrina. The first goal was to
investigate if there was any level of institutional discrimination within the fire
rescue system, and second to examine the impact of the landscape and the
characteristics associated with it on response. More specifically in this
dissertation I will analyze the response times of fire departments as a measure of
service provision at the fire district level by using spatial and socio-economic
characteristics within eight major US cities including Louisville, Ky., Houston, Tx.,
San Francisco, Ca., Miami, Fl., Seattle, Wa., Portland, Or., Charlotte, N.C. and
St. Paul, Mn.
Two main research questions will be addressed in this dissertation. The
first research question will examine if there is equity and proportional access to
fire protective services. Socioeconomic characteristics will be used to determine
if differences exist in response times at the fire district level. The next research
question will examine access to services from a spatial perspective. Specifically
the influence of urban sprawl on response times will be addressed. In order to
investigate the influence of urban sprawl on response times many facets of urban
sprawl will be considered, such as: density, mix of land uses, street configuration,
dependence upon the automobile, commuting times and distance from the center
of the city. Quantitative and qualitative analyses will be used in an examination of
cities and their fire districts.

2

1.1 Hypothesis
Several scholars have argued that people in lower socio-economic groups
are marginalized when it comes to resource distribution and services provision,
while others believed that this is not the case. I hypothesize that that there is
discrimination when it comes to resource allotment, and that the poor will be
underserved, especially with a service like fire provision. Where people live in a
city will have a major determination on what sort of fire protection services they
receive. I also hypothesize that sprawl will also have a major detrimental effect
on a service such as fire provision by lengthening response times.

1. Response times will vary by the socioeconomic characteristics of the
people living in the fire district.

a. This question will measure if there is equity and proportional access
to fire services through response times. Factors to be examined
include: race, poverty status, housing tenure, property values,
property taxes, and household income.

2. Fire districts that have a greater degree of urban sprawl will have longer
response times when compared to fire districts that are less sprawled.

a. This question will measure if there is access to fire services through
response times from a spatial perspective. Sprawl for the purpose
of this study will be identified by several factors including densities,
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street access, segregated land uses, vehicle ownership, commute
times and distance from the center of the city.
1.2 Importance of Study

This study is important because it examines the service equity of critical
life and property saving services of fire fighters and their departments. This study
scrutinizes how critical life-saving city services are distributed, either on a needand-actual-Ioss basis or a potential loss basis. If fire services are distributed on a
need basis than theoretically the underprivileged should have better access to
fire protection services and therefore quicker response times. It is critical that the
underprivileged within inner cities have better access to fire protective services
because fire follows poverty. If fire services are distributed based on potential
loss, then areas with greater property values will have better access to fire
protection services and quicker response times. This means that people in
poorer areas will experience inequality in receiving fire protection services. If this
is the case, then cities and fire departments need to change the methodology in
which they decide where to place new fire stations so that the underprivileged
would be better served.
Sprawl has been the dominant force in shaping the American landscape
for several decades. There are several different reasons why urban sprawl has
become the predominant settlement pattern in American cities. Policies at the
national level, such as the Interstate Highway Act, to local policies, such as
zoning laws and fire codes, have been responsible for promoting low-density
developments on the periphery of cities. Services cost more to provide in
4

sprawled areas, and some cities will attempt to minimize their costs by limiting
services. Many have also argued that urban sprawl takes away resources from
those living within inner cities. Cities that are sprawled will have to spread their
resource geographically to be able to cover all their residents within a city. This
study has great importance because it critically examines empirically fire
protective services and sprawl. This study also could add further evidence that
sprawl jeopardizes the quality of life of individuals who live in these types of
developments because of slower response times for critical-life saving services.
One of the many causes of sprawl has been state and local regulations that
mandate low-density housing and wide streets to accommodate fire trucks and
equipment. The low density housing and wide streets caused by these
regulations are typical of urban sprawl and may have ultimately been
counterproductive because they cause fire protective services to be spread thin
across a city. Sprawl also will contribute to increased traffic and congestion due
to the car-friendly nature of the development patterns; however, lower densities
counteract congestion. This study will examine the relationship between fire
protective services and urban sprawl and determine if slower response times are
typical in sprawled areas, which should be considered as an additional cost of
living in such an area.
1.3 Contribution of this Study
This study contributes to the existing knowledge base in several manners.
First, I am using a rich data set with information from eight different cities across
the country. Second, the unit of analysis that I am proposing to use in this study
5

is the fire district and has not been used in a national assessment of response
times. My analysis contributes to the field of sprawl and service provision from
the perspective of fire protection services, as measured in response times. This
study also examines if there is proportional access to fire protective services for
underprivileged groups.
1.4 Organization of the Study

Chapter two will be a comprehensive examination of the literature in the
field. Sections in literature review include: urban service provision, fire protection,
response times, fire station locations, fire districts, fire codes, urban sprawl and
the measurement of urban sprawl and equity. The literature will then be
summarized and existing gaps in the research will be identified. Chapter three
discusses the methodology of the study by providing a detailed description of the
data, quantitative analysis used to test the hypothesis, description of dependent
and independent variables, and qualitative analysis. Chapter four will list the
results from the quantitative analysis, the qualitative case studies and a spatial
analysis of maps. Chapter five will be an in-depth discussion of the findings along
with policy recommendations for areas of future research and the conclusions
from findings.

6

CHAPTER 2
L1TRATURE REVIEW
2.1 Urban Service Provision

City governments are charged with providing a safe environment for their
citizens. Public safety, such as police, fire and emergency medical services
(EMS), are key services needed within urban centers to ensure that everyday life
and business can operate routinely. Urban service delivery is a hotly contested
issue because it has a direct impact upon the population's wellbeing, especially
services such as police and fire. One reason for this controversy in service
provision as identified by the literature is due to how a city's resources are
distributed (Lineberry, 1977). Service provision also has been contentious
because it relates to discrimination in city policies that affect service provision
(DeHoog, 1997). The significance of race as a factor in policy decisions in
service distribution may have diminished, but racism has not disappeared when it
comes to the allotment of scarce resources at the city level (Bullard 2000). Cities
have limited budgets and where the funding is allocated makes a significant
difference in the daily lives of individuals and this is especially true with a service
such as fire protection. If there is racism and inequality in resource allotment
pertaining to fire protection this will directly bring harm to those who were not
provided with an adequate share of fire protective services. It is in a city's interest
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to operate as efficiently as possible and this efficiency has a delicate balance
between taxes and services (Peterson, 1981). In an effort to be efficient cities will
attempt to provide the minimum with respect to service provision in order to find
that balance between taxes and services that Peterson discusses, and many feel
that it is the poor and underprivileged that suffer and not the wealthy especially
when it comes to public safety.
Lineberry (1978) identified several areas of major concerns with respect to
the study of service distribution and urban public policy. These issues were
about the size of the jurisdiction providing a service and how large should a
service provision unit be so that responsiveness, equity, and efficiency are
maximized (Lineberry, 1978). There are several reasons why this is important to
this study, first, because fire services are distributed through fire districts which
are special jurisdictions that have the sole responsibility of providing one
particular service. Second, responsiveness, equity and efficiency are extremely
relevant to fire protection. Responsiveness is important to fire protection because
it is absolutely necessary to respond to fire emergencies as quickly as possible.
Efficiency is critical because the services provided are so expensive and
because fire protection is a capital intensive service (stations, vehicles, etc.).
Equity is important because fire protection is a service that needs to be equitably
distributed.
Cities are separated into socia-economic and spatial groupings that are
influenced by government policies, distribution of wealth, racial and economic
discrimination, real estate practices, access to housing, the job market, zoning,
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suburban incorporations, transportation networks, along with many other factors
(Lineberry 1977; Dreier et aI., 2004). Many of these factors negatively affect the
underprivileged, and because of this, people may have the perception that there
is a lack of responsiveness, equity and efficiency when it comes to providing
public safety.
Equity is a term that has been mentioned several times, but before there is
any further discussion about the term, there needs to be a description of what
equity means. Equity has been described as a normative concept that is different
from equality, which is an empirical term and can be tangibly verified (Chang,
2002). Equity is normative in nature because there are judgmental and moral
tones especially about the distribution of resources (Braveman and Gruskin,
2003).Braveman and Gruskin (2003) assert that equality should be evaluated
based on specified measurable outcomes that leave out the judgment factor.
There has been a considerable amount of research within the field of health on
the term of equity and access to health care that can readily be applied to public
services, and especially a service such as fire protection. Equity within the health
field has been associated with the distribution of resources, expenditures,
utilization, and access to services (Waters, 2000). A lack of access to health
resource within deprived communities has been identified as a primary source of
poor health status and inequity (Pearce et. ai, 2007). With respect to fire
protection a lack of access to resources would mean greater loss associated with
fire, both a loss of life and property. All residents within a community should be
regarded as equals to every other resident within the community, and should
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have similar access to services, however, the issue is that people are not able to
live equidistant from services and new facilities shQuld be built so that equal
access is attained (Lucy et aI., 1977). People who Ilive the closest to a fire station
will receive better service, with respect to response times, when compared to
those who live further away.
Measuring equality in service distribution is a challenging concept. The
first reason why equality is a challenging notion to quantify is that there are
questions of how equality should be, in fact, measured, and second, there is also
a lack of clearness as to which group (s) should be focused on that are defined
by race, income, gender, etc (Oliver, Healey, and l,.eGrand, 2002). Another
reason as to why equality is a potentially difficult concept to measure is that the
service needs from different regions within a city will vary considerably and by
providing the exactly equal services to unequal consumers will result in severe
inequalities (Rich, 1977). Equality and who gets what share of a city's services is
extremely relevant to fire protection as certain groUlps will require the services
more than other groups. In most cases inner cities have populations who are
service dependent because of age, illness, and a lack of income (Wolch, 1979).
The poor, elderly, and racial minorities who live in substandard housing in the
inner cities are disproportionally affected by fires, and therefore depend on fire
protective services more than other people (Lineb$rry 1977; Jennings 1999).
Rich (1982) identified that service provision is not equal across an urban area
and some citizens will receive more or better public services than others. Fire
protection is one service that is likely to vary significantly across communities
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with respect to income and taxes (Duncombe, 199 1).
1

The literature has identified that certain groljJps and certain areas within
cities will receive varying levels of fire services; some are better off while others
are not. Cingranelli (1981) was able to identify that: African-American
neighborhoods did receive lower levels of fire service than comparable white
neighborhoods, and that fire expenditure was higher in areas with industrial and
commercial activity. These areas with the higher levels of expenditure should in
theory have better levels of services. Individuals who live in certain
neighborhoods will receive advantages that come along from living in such
settings, while others will live in areas that pose

m~jor

disadvantages because

the quality of public services are inferior as there is a great variation in the fiscal
capacity of poor and wealthy municipalities (Swan$trom et al. 2002; Dreier, et al.
2004). There also will be variations of services that are supplied between one
community and another community because of fiscal capacity, the cost of
supplying the service, and the demand for the service (Peterson, 1981). Cities
also face vulnerability from budget uncertainty as the economic environment can
change quickly from year to year, which will influence how public services are
demanded and provided (Dumcombe, 1991). In today's tough economic climate
where cities are facing major budgetary problems and are trying to find ways to
reduce their budgets this is especially the case.
It is commonly believed by many that the underprivileged receive inferior
quality of services in a discriminatory fashion. However, Lineberry (1977) was
able to demonstrate that the urban "underclass th~ory", which states that

11

services will be distributed in a manner that is discriminatory against minorities
and low-income people, is incorrect and that underprivileged do not generally
receive the poorest public services. In New York City it was found that both
wealthy and underprivileged income groups were receiving superior police and
fire protective services, and that the middle class fared the worst (Sanger, 1982).
This may be related to the fact that New York city redeployed its fire companies
because of union demands for balanced workloads so high incident fire areas
received more personnel and fire equipment(Viteritti, 1982}. Interestingly, this is a
situation where the union plays a role in deciding where services should be
provided rather the fire department self determinin9 that there was a greater
need in those particular areas.
Urban services are delivered in several different ways. Services can be
delivered "through its own employees in house or in one of several alternative
quasi-market mechanisms, such as contracting out, franchising, service
shedding, volunteers, vouchers, coprovision, or coproduction" (DeHoog, 1997:
7). In some instances public services will be contracted out to private firms to
provide particular services. Cities seeking to lower their cost burden because of
lower tax revenues and diminishing state and federal funding may seek to reduce
their costs by privatizing fire services (Guardino, Haarmeyer, and Poole, 1993).
Previously there was limited contracting of public safety such as police or fire
suppression (ICMA, 1989). More recently however, there have been a greater
number of communities that have opted to use privatized fire services especially
in the south and west (Guardino, Haarmeyer, and Poole, 1993). Arizona is a

12

prime example of state where several of its communities utilize privatized fire
protection services.
The literature in this section has been key in indentifying that service
provision will vary at the community level and this is extremely pertinent to fire
protection as any variation in this particular service at the community level will
have potentially harmful consequences. The services will vary because of
several factors such as cost of providing the service, how the service is
distributed, and the demand of that service that is affected by the population that
utilizes that service. As service provision varies at the community level certain
groups, such as the poor and racial minorities, may be negatively affected when
it comes to resource allocation. However, the literature also has identified that
this is not always the case and that the poor are not always worse off.

2.2 Fire Protection
Fire protection is a critical urban public service that cities provide. Fire
protection is essential and ensures the safety and welfare of individuals who live
and work in cities. Fire protection is an important urban public service because
fires have the ability to wreak major havoc upon cities as witnessed in the major
conflagration of Chicago in 1871 and the fire following the San Francisco
earthquake of 1906 (PiaU, 1999). Fire departments have more responsibilities
than just extinguishing fires, such as providing emergency medical assistance,
conducting search-and-rescue operations and dealing with hazardous material
accidents. Fire departments played major roles in search-and-rescue operations
after the 9/11 aUacks and in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans.
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Unlike many other western nations where there is a strong role for the nationstate to respond to emergencies, the United States is highly decentralized and
the first line of responsibility for public protection lies with local government, and
this usually falls to police and fire men and women (Drabek, 1985). Fire fighters
also provide specialty services of swift-water rescue, along with urban search
and rescue and are professionals who have had training in search-and-rescue
techniques and will respond to emergency events (Dynes, 1970). Fire
departments also playa role in the ensuring that development meets safety
standards. The other, and main, role that fire departments provide is protection
against fires. Fires exact a major social and economic toll upon cities (see Table
1). Several thousand individuals die each year and billions of dollars of damage
accrue.
Table 1: Fire Loss in the U.S

Year
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Source:

Direct Dollar
Adjusted Dollar
Loss*
Deaths Injuries Loss In Millions
Fires
23,100
$8,629,000,000 $10,976,410,000
1,755,000
4,035
3,570
21,875 $10,024,000,000 $12,475,370,000
1,823,000
1,708,000
4,045
22,350 $11,207,000,000 $13,494,090,000
20,300 $10,583,000,000 $12,390,180,000
1,734,500
3,745
18,425 $10,337,000,000 $11,913,810,000
1,687,500
3,380
3,925
18,125 $12,307,000,000 $13,868,250,000
1,584,500
$9,794,000,000 $10,750,170,000
17,875
1,550,500
3,900
3,675
17,925 $10,672,000,000 $11,330,020,000
1,602,000
3,245
16,400 $11,307,000,000 $11,629,050,000
1,642,500
17,675 $14,639,000,000 $14,639,000,000
1,557,500
3,430
..
U.S. Fire Administration, 2008: U.S. National Fire Statistics. Adjusted to 2007 Dollars.
Fire protection takes up a considerable portion of city budgets. Table 2

displays the budgets for fire departments for 28 cities and the overall budgets.
Spending ranges from a low of 10 percent to high of nearly 30 percent of overall
14

city budgets. Cities spend more on fire protection than on any other service, with
the exception of policing and road construction (Lineberry, 1977). Large portions
of fire expenditures go toward the salaries of fire fighters and equipment.
Table 2: City Fire Expenditure
2005
City Name
Population
Franklin, IN
19,463
98,359
Davenport, IA
Mount Vernon,
14,375
21,981
Ashland, KY
Paducah, KY
26,307
Helena. MT
25,780
Montpelier, VT
8,035
540,828
Charlotte, NC
2,016,585
Houston, TX
Redlands, CA
63,591
Hattiesburg, MS
44,779
Tampa, FL
303,447
22,542
Elizabethtown.
Cheyenne, WY
53,011
Annapolis. MD
35,838
102,743
Berkeley, CA
Twin Falls, ID
34,469
362,470
Miami, FL
198,915
Mobile, AL
96,650
Charleston, SC
Palm Springs, CA
42,807
64,249
Portland, OR
Gatlinburg, TN
3,382
6,703
International Falls,
719,077
San Francisco, CA
265,000
Louisville, KY
24,164
Xenia,OH
193,556
Tacoma, WA
SOURCE: 2005 City Budgets, DPI Project.

Total Fire
Expenditure
$3,467,127
$11,069,000
$2,416,713
$4,192,082
$4,951,000
$2,441,000
$1,587,018
$70,328,127
$293,242,005
$10,032,886
$5,776,985
$50,428,886
$3,260,000
$7,962,640
$8,339,580
$18,111,000
$3,237,624
$76,487,399
$24,162,331
$13,676,485
$6,831,000
$15,193,000
$2,305,353
$530,808
$224,715,517
$45,298,500
$1,350,000
$34,901,000
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City Budget
$11,790,254
$39,926,512
$8,749,563
$18,070,826
$24,331,520
$12,177,317
$7,921,736
$363,133,000
$1,561,544,400
$55,521,115
$32,075,797
$300,999,479
$19,698,463
$48,431,616
$52,920,640
$115,114,006
$21,202,362
$512,507,527
$173,461,646
$98,340,943
$51,603,943
$117,437,236
$17,961,315
$4,263,981
$1,967,808,000
$437,232,800
$13,719,604
$356,106,650

%of
Total
Budget
29.41%
27.72%
27.62%
23.20%
20.35%
20.05%
20.03%
19.37%
18.78%
18.07%
18.01%
16.75%
16.55%
16.44%
15.76%
15.73%
15.27%
14.92%
13.93%
13.91%
13.24%
12.94%
12.84%
12.45%
11.42%
10.36%
9.84%
9.80%

Other major expenses for fire departments, regardless of size, include fire
vehicles, such as engines or pumper trucks, and training (Compton and Granito,
2002). As cities come under budgetary pressures they will seek to reduce staffing
and will close stations to save money (Scawthron, O'Rourke and Blackburn,
2006). Cost is major consideration in providing fire safety, and fire departments
are encouraged to improve cost effectiveness which is a struggle to find the right
balance between cost and an acceptable level of service provision
(Puchovsky, 1996). As fire protection takes up a considerable portion of a city's
budget, the key question should be: where will the staff reductions take place,
and what stations will be closed? Is staffing reduced equally across the board, or
are certain areas affected disproportionately by these decisions on where to
provide fewer services? The ideal situation would be to reduce the services
provided in areas that have ttle least need for the service and not areas that
make considerable use of the service.
Not all cities across the nation will be in similar financial situations; some
are experiencing financial distress while others may be experiencing prosperity,
so some fire departments may expand while others might experience declines in
staffing that will affect the level of services that are provided. Decisions by cities
to reduce funding in times of fiscal distress will often impact services such as fire
protection and will most assuredly have an impact on providing an adequate
response. In a local example of this, in 2008 the City of Louisville faced a $20
million budget short-fall and Mayor Jerry Abramson closed one of the city's
downtown fire stations to save $500,000 (Halladay, 2009). The result of the
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station closure will be that those who lived in close proximity to the fire station will
now have longer response times in waiting for fire services.
The fire department provides a public good that helps maintain the
preferred state of reducing fire loss for a community, and the benefits will be
confined to the residents of that community (Ostrom, Tiebout and Warren, 1961).
Ostrom et al. (1961) assert that by viewing a public good that maintains the
preferred state, such as the reduction a loss from fire, will allow for a degree of
quantification and measurability criteria at the metropolitan level, which is
important for this study because the goal is to take fire protection as a service
and quantify the service and use this measurability criterion provided through
response times to examine differences that exist at the metropolitan area.

2.3 Response Time
In this study, response times are the major dependent variable of service
provision for the fire department. The National Fire Protection Agency (NFPA)
defines response time as "the time that begins when units are en route to the
emergency incident and ends when units arrive at the scene (NFPA, 2004:24)."
The NFPA is the major national authority on fires, electrical, and building safety
in the United States. The NFPA was formed for the purpose of standardizing
th

sprinkler systems in buildings in Northeast states at the end of the 19 Century
(Kaplan, 2003). The NFPA standard for response time is four minutes for the
arrival of the first engine company at a fire-suppression incident and or 8 minutes
or less for the first full assignment at the incident.
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The NFPA also requires that fire departments across the country to
establish a 90 percent compliance with response time objectives and that an
annual review of service delivery and response time objectives should take place
for each geographic area. The Boston Globe in a national examination of
response times was able to find that just 58 percent of fire departments in 2005
were meeting national response time standards, and this figure had fallen from a
high of 75 percent in 1986 (Dedman, 2005). A few fire departments across the
country have adopted the NFPA standards, and many communities do not even
keep track of response times (Dedman, 2005). Limits on response times are put
into place so that a specified time period will not lapse before a response can
occur to any fire (Toregas and Swain, 1971). Having a rapid response time is
critical within urban areas as the close proximity of buildings and higher
population densities may potentially lead to major fire losses (Ganito, 1986).
The medical emergencies that fire departments respond to also require
immediate attention as survival rates will most definitely be dependent upon swift
medical attention by trained emergency professionals (Cote, 2003). In the United
States, average response times for emergency medical services in 2002 were
6.51 minutes for urban fatal crashes (Lambert and Meyer, 2006). Response
times in a station's response area can be from 2 minutes up (Cote, 2003). A
recent study of fire departments by the Boston Globe found that response times
where growing longer especially within suburban areas of Boston and other
major American cities as there has been major growth in these suburban areas
but staffing had been reduced (Dedman, 2005).
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Time is the most critical element when any emergency incident is
reported, especially ones that deal with fire, as fire growth may expand at a rate
of many times per volume and the time between fire ignition and fire suppression
has a direct relationship with fire loss (Cote, 2003). Fires spread fast, and for fire
departments to be minimally effective in suppressing a fire the first responding
fire fighting vehicle must reach the scene within 10 minutes of the alarm (Ganito,
1986). Any delay in the response could be the cause of loss of life or property.
There are several factors that will have a considerable impact upon
response times and should be taken into consideration when planning to reduce
response time. One of the most important factors that affects response time is
travel distance, which is the distance that the fire vehicle has to travel from the
station to the location of the fire, and the total number of fire stations in an area
(Halpern, 1979). Other critical factors that have been found to influence response
times include sprinklered vs. nonsprinklered, commercial vs. residential, and
multifamily vs. single-family residential (Cote, 2003). Many of these factors will be
affected by a city's fire code requirements.
Response time is an ideal indicator that can be used to gauge a level
service provision that is provided by the fire department. Achieving a level of
service equity with response times as an indicator would usually mean that all
areas should have roughly similar responses and that resources would have to
be disseminated on the basis of calls rather than population (Lucy et aI., 1977).
Areas with higher needs should therefore be allocated more resources to reduce
response times. However, if parity is sought out through population rather than
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need, then equity cannot be achieved in an indicator such as mean fire loss
(Lucy, 1981).
There is a clear case of who has the highest need, and consequently
quicker response time, for fire protection services. Jennings (1999) in his
comprehensive literature review of socioeconomic indicators of fire incidence in
residential areas identified poverty, owner occupation, sub-standard housing,
population density, overcrowding, lack of supervision for children, drug and
alcohol abuse, missing smoke alarms, poor heating, and immigrants, as
characteristics of areas with high fire incidence. Areas with all these
characteristics would have a greater need for fire protective services and quicker
response times. It is more than likely that these areas are found within inner
cities. It is also these demographic characteristics of the population that will affect
the frequency of fire occurrences, which will have an impact upon response times
(Ganito, 1986). Areas where different conditions exist, such as better insurance
policies, improved heating, parental supervision of children, sprinkler systems in
homes, will have less of need for fire protective services when compared to their
inner city counter parts.
There have been a very few studies that have critically examined
response times of the fire department as a measure of service equity. One study
by Gomersall (2002) of the Cincinnati Fire Department was able to demonstrate
that the fire department responded equitably without regard to socioeconomic
characteristics of the neighborhood. Gomersall (2002) also found that straight
line distances were not an important factor in response times, but that the
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number of corners that a fire truck had to turn was the major influence on
response times.

2.4 Fire Station Location
Response times will be greatly affected by where a community decides to
place fire stations. Fire stations are a part of the overall package of fire service
provision as fire engines and fire fighters are dispatched from the fire station to
respond to an emergency. According to the International City/County
Management Association's (ICMA) (2002) Managing Fire and Rescue Services,
basic deployment concept calls for fire stations to be located in such a way to
create an orderly network of stations from which emergency services are
delivered in a timely manner. Therefore, communities with higher population
densities and heavy traffic should have a greater number of fire stations.
Communities that also want to have narrower streets and want to reduce
response times should have a greater number of fire stations so that they can
meet the demand of their respective areas that they are responsible for (Ewing,
Stevens and Brown, 2007). However, the selection of fire stations sites becomes
complicated sometimes because of standards. The siting of fire stations has
been highly influenced by the Insurance Services Offices (ISO) guidelines
(ReVelle, 1991). These guidelines and standards demand that fire stations be
placed in close proximity to highly insured and expensive public and private
buildings because of potential for loss (Lucy, 1981). These standards are
detrimental to the poor, racial minorities and those who live in substandard
housing because response times will be higher for these groups and lower for
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those such as businesses that are located close to a fire station. Both Cingranelli
(1981) and Sanger (1982) were able to confirm that allocation of fire services
favored areas with commercial activity. These standards are biased because
they are based on potential loss, rather than actual loss. Areas that have higher
actual loss and need should in have a greater number of facilities.
Several aspects are considered by fire departments when deciding where
to build a fire station, such as operating costs, practicality, public reaction,
environmental consideration, design, support, and the most important aspect
which is providing the best possible protection to the area (Rosenhan, 1986;
Owen and Daskin, 1998; Compton and Granito, 2002). In the Fire Chiefs
Handbook, Coleman (2003) indicates that response times are an important
consideration for site selection of fire stations and that it is essential that any site
meet response time criteria set out by the department or national standards.
Excessive response times translate into increased risk from an emergency
(Compton and Granito, 2002). Response time can be reduced by selecting fire
station locations based on the amount of time that it takes to travel from station to
incident scene (Cote, 2003). Both social and geographic characteristics of an
area that are to be protected by a fire station are critical elements in the planning
of where to build a fire-station, such as waterways, mountains, valleys, highways,
one-way streets, and railroad crossings that may limit response routes and times
(Rosenhan, 1986). In the NFPA's Fire Protection Handbook, Roshenhan (1986)
identified that some areas in a community will be higher risk than other areas for
fires because of the types of facilities that are located within those areas, such as
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industrial, institutional, mercantile, and multifamily dwellings, and that it would be
undesirable to locate a station within those areas. Areas that usually have
multifamily dwellings are located within inner cities where the poor and minorities
are located. If these areas that have multifamily dwellings are undesirable for fire
stations, then these people are disadvantaged with regards to response time
because they have the greater need for the service, and therefore stations
should be placed in these areas.
2.5 Fire Districts
The fire district is the unit of analysis of this study. The fire district is a
special unit of government that provides the specialized service of fire protection.
A fire district is a special district or jurisdiction unit of government. These special
districts perform local governmental functions within a specified geographical
boundary with powers of taxation, issuing debt, and appropriating private land for
public use (Burns, 1994). The fire district is an important concept for this study
because fire protective services are distributed at fire-district level, and statistics,
such as response times, are collected at the fire-district level.
Cities in the United States are responsible for providing many services
and take on a considerable portion of financial burden unlike many other Western
nations. Services are primarily funded through property taxes, payroll taxes and
other fees. The fire department is one of these services that receive its funding
from the general budget of a city funded by local taxes. However, because of
competition among cities within metropolitan areas, many municipalities will be
hesitant to raise fees and taxes to provide better services because wealthier
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citizens may leave and move to a lower-cost areas (Peterson 1981; Swanstrom
et aI., 2002). Disparity in funding between different areas within a city will lead to
varying levels of service provision. Some fire districts will have more man-power
and better response times than other fire districts. It is this variation in the level of
service provision in fire districts that makes them the ideal unit of analysis for
measuring equality among the different inhabitants of the districts, and especially
the groups identified in the literature such as the poor and minorities. Another
primary justification for comparing various units of government, such as cities or
special districts, is that all elected officials and decision makers are subject to
similar groups of pressures and competing interests (Peterson, 1981).
Many large cities across the United States are increasingly reliant on the
use of special governmental districts to provide service and tax differentiation
and to provide local citizens with an array of choices (Baer and Marando, 2001).
In many instances individuals will seek out communities that best satisfy their
preferences for those specific public goods (Tiebout, 1956). Each community or
jurisdiction will be entitled to a level of spending that is directly proportional to the
taxes that are paid (Boyne, Powel and Ashworth, 2001). An example of this
would be a household that opts to live in an area with its own private police force
as response times and service from smaller police departments tend to be faster
when compared to a larger police force (Ostrom, 2000). Over the past 50 years,
the majority of new governments have been special districts (Burns, 1994). Table
3 illustrates the dramatic increase in special-district governments over that time.
Table 3 also indicates that the population served per district has also decreased
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by 35% of the past 50 years. This could possible indicate an improvement in
services. In the last Census of governments there were a total of 5,743 fire
protection districts, or 16,2 percent of the total number of special unit districts
across the country.

T a bl e 3 - SipeCla
'I U nlSO
't f G overnmen t'In th e US
..
# of Special District
Population
Year Governments
12,340 151,325,798
1952
18,323 179,325,176
1962
23,885 203,211,926
1972
28,078 226,545,805
1982
33,131 248,709,873
1992

Population/District
12,263
9,787
8,508
8,068
7,507

35,356 281,421,906
2002
., .
..
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Governments DIvIsion. List of Governments 2002 Edition .

7,960

2.6 Fire Codes
Fire codes are safety standards that are established by various groups to
protect buildings and individuals from fires. Fire codes are meant to impact the
landscape by making it easier for fire departments to respond to emergencies
that should help reduce response times. Fire codes also provide building
standards to make them more likely to withstand fires. The NFPA is one
organization that establishes fire codes that cities and states adopt. Fire codes
have come about as a result of tragic events, such as the Chicago fire of 1871,
the San Francisco earthquake and fire of 1906, the 1903 Iroquois Theatre fire in
Chicago, and the 1911 Triangles Shirtwaist Factory Fire in New York City
(Kaplan, 2003).
According to Duany, Plater-Zyber and Speck (2000) fire departments and
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fire codes will have a considerable impact upon street layout and urban sprawl
because of requirements needed for response. In order to reduce response times
fire departments will have standards that require wider streets so that large fire
trucks can maneuver (Duany et aI., 2000). The NFPA has several different
guidelines and general requirements that impact street widths and the location of
structures. For example, the NFPA (1993) has requirements that include: road
width should be at least 24 feet wide, turns should have a minimum radius of 100
feet, fire lanes should be at least 20 feet in width from the road edge to the
structure, and structures with greater than 1000 square feet of floor area shall not
be set back more than 50 feet from street and have at least 14 feet of clearance
over the width of the street.
These standards that dictate road widths and similar design elements,
according to Ewing et al. (2007), are the biggest obstacle to having skinny streets
as state and local fire codes will most likely follow these national standards.
These road width standards which should allow for quicker access for the fire
department contribute to urban sprawl and create problems, including an
increase in major car accidents, a reduction in pedestrian-friendly areas, and
encouraging people to drive faster, which will create traffic congestion and lead
to an increase in response times for the fire department (Duany et aI., 2000).
According to Saar (1996), another manner in which fire regulations and codes
have contributed to sprawl is the limitation of the construction of multifamily
dwellings. The limitation of development of multifamily dwellings began to
happen as early as in the 1890's when cities, such as Philadelphia and Chicago,
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began to use fire codes to prevent the construction of buildings more than four
stories (Baar, 1996).

2.7 Sprawl
Urban sprawl should be an important topic of consideration for fire
departments and emergency response because the location of stations and the
ability of fire engines to navigate will be highly influenced by the pattern and
layout of the landscape. Duany et al. (2000), Ewing et al. (2007), and Baar
(1996) all indicated that fire codes have contributed to sprawl for various reasons
such as street layout, the discouragement of multifamily dwellings and affects on
traffic. Sprawl is also an important topic because it will also affect how services
are distributed within a community. Sprawl has also been identified as creating
fiscal disparities between communities which leads to inequality (Squires, 2002).
No discussion of sprawl would be adequate without attempting to define the term.
Within the body of literature there are no common definitions, and there have
even been a few attempts to operationally define sprawl (Galster, Hanson,
Ratcliffe, Coleman, and Freihage, 2001). One of the more robust definitions of
sprawl was characterized by Galster et aL (2001: 5) where they define sprawl as
"a pattern of land use in an urban area that exhibits low levels of some
combination of eight distinct dimensions: density, continuity, concentration,
compactness, centrality, nuclearity, diversity, and proximity". Their definition is
more tangible that others because their eight dimensions of sprawl allow for it to
be easily operationalized.
Another useful definition of sprawl is provided by Burchell et al. (1998) in
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the book, The Cost of Sprawl-Revisited. Burchell et al. (1998) characterize
sprawl as low density, unlimited, noncontiguous growth and consumption of
agricultural lands that creates a total reliance upon the automobile. Millions of
Americans spend a considerable portion of their day commuting in their
automobiles to work in downtown cores from suburban neighborhoods.
Development, both residential and commercial, that usually takes place in a
sprawled environment is highly segregated and land uses are not mixed
(Burchell et ai, 2005). Sprawl has been fueled by the automobile, and our
overabundant reliance on this mode of transportation (Burchell et aI., 2005).
Automobiles are needed to travel between homes and commercial areas
because of this highly segregated pattern of land use.
Bruegmann (2005), in his work Sprawl, a Compact History concedes that
sprawl is this infinitely complex term, which accurately defines an attitude rather
than any particular condition. Never- the-less, Bruegmann (2005) defines sprawl
as urban development that is scattered, without systematic public planning at
low-densities. Sprawl is not a new occurrence but rather it is one that has been
around for quite a long time, and the aspect of sprawl that is rather new (within
past century), is that sprawl has become a mass phenomenon made available by
improvements in modern technology such as the automobile (Bruegmann, 2005).
Duany et al. (2000) in Suburban Nation describe sprawl as an outgrowth
of modern problem solving and a system for living. Their definition for sprawl is
slightly different than the other definitions mentioned above. In Suburban Nation
sprawl is characterized by five different components that are strictly isolated from
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one another and include: housing subdivision, shopping centers, office parks,
civic institutions, and roadways. Roadways are the arteries that are essential in
connecting the four disassociated components with one another and the
automobile is the main choice of transportation for those roadways (Duany, et al.
2000). The high reliance on single occupied automobile results in higher than
normal traffic load, even in smaller sparsely populated areas, according to Duany
et al (2000).
Urban sprawl has been fueled by several factors that have highly
contributed to the suburbanization of the country. The factors include a
substantial gain in population, high rates of crime in central cities, racial
composition of urban areas, technological advancements, availability of land,
rising affluence, and consumer inclinations for low-density living (Nivola, 1999;
Gordon and Richardson, 1997; Bruegmann, 2005). The largest contributor to
urban sprawl, that has had more of a substantial impact than any other factor, is
the impact of governmental policies. Most of these policies are federal in nature.
Many experts in the field point to policies such as the Federal Interstate
Highway and Defense act of 1956 that acted as catalysts to make the automobile
and highways the primary route and mode of transportation in the United States
today (Drier et ai, 2004; Savitch, 2000). The Federal Interstate Highway and
Defense act was largely a national-security strategy that occurred during the
Cold War and would help facilitate the decentralization of cities to minimize the
damage from a nuclear strike. The Federal Interstate Highway and Defense Act
was coupled with other policies such as the Highway Trust Fund. The Highway

29

Trust Fund is a self-propagating mechanism that provides a constant allocation
of funding for road construction through the collection of taxes from gasoline
(Nivola, 1999). The highway trust fund system was used to build approximately
41,000 square miles of roadways, and levels of spending were in the vicinity of
$20.5 billion in 1997 on an annual basis (Drier et ai, 2004). Funding in the United
States for transportation is heavily biased in the favor of highway construction as
roadways receive close to 84 percent of the total output of federal spending, and
this is mainly due to its funding apparatus (Savitch, 2000). Others have disputed
this argument, that funding is biased towards highway construction, and in fact
claim that on a per passenger mile basis public transit is much more heavily
funded (Gordon and Richardson, 1997). The argument of Gordon and
Richardson is flawed, however, as they fail to consider additional costs of
pollution, congestion, and parking that should be considered into the pricing of
fuel as it is in Europe (Ewing, 1997).
The US system of taxation also bears a great deal of responsibility for
promoting urban sprawl. Levels of taxation on gasoline in the United States are
the lowest in the developed world and prices in Europe are approximately three
times as high (Ewing, 1997). The minimal tax rate helps explain the phenomena
of American consumers driving larger automobiles and with more frequency than
the Europeans and Japanese (Nivola, 1999). Sales taxes on automobiles are
approximately 37 times higher in Denmark and 9 times as high in the
Netherlands when compared to the United States (Nivola, 1999). This
combination of low taxes on both fuel and the automobile encourages Americans
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to drive without considering all subsidies that are provided. If individuals had to
bear the full brunt of the costs they might opt to live in neighborhoods that were
not so heavily reliant on the automobile.
Not all the blame can be placed entirely upon national policies for creating
urban sprawl. Policies at the city level also bear some of the responsibility for
creating this phenomenon of sprawl. Cities are limited in the types of policies that
they can pursue and in many instances in the United States, cities are placed in
competition with one another for attracting business and, will opt for policy
decisions that enhance the local economy and bring in greater tax revenue and
increase property values through development (Peterson, 1981). Land
developers, real estate interest, and local politicians will seek to enhance the
value of land by attracting capital investment, tourism and other types of
economic activates to regions (Savitch and Kantor, 2002). Making the land
accessible via transportation is one way to add value to land, and it is this
practice of making the land reachable by means of rapid transportation that has
resulted in the pattern of sprawl that exemplifies most US cities (Gonzalez,
2005). One other example of how local policies will exacerbate sprawl is that
many cities will utilize zoning laws to mandate low density, high cost homes, at
the periphery of cities. These types of developments will generate a significant
amount of property taxes.
There have been several commonalities in the aspects of sprawl that were
defined by the literature. One of the most consistent terms that appeared was
low density. "Density of a place refers to the quantity of people, households, or
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employment distributed over a unit of area such as an acre, square kilometer, or
square mile". (Frumkin, Frank, and Jackson, 2004: 6) In an area that is
considered to be sprawled, densities will be low in population and the number
housing units per square mile. Although it should be noted that the term low
density is relative to the specific area, because what may be considered to be a
low population density in Europe may considered to be a high density in America.
Transportation patterns and automobile use were also synonymous with
definitions of sprawl. Specifically, sprawled cities have a very high dependency
on the automobile for a mode of transportation. This high dependency on the
automobile in sprawled suburban areas has created a major externality, and
perhaps the greatest complaint about sprawl, which is traffic congestion (Burchell
et aI., 2005). Traffic congestion should be of great concern to emergency
response. Congestion on the roadways will reduce the ability of a fire
department to respond in a timely manner.
Sprawl has a great impact on how resources are distributed in cities.
Sprawled developments end up costing cities more in providing services. The
cost of infrastructure will be more in sprawled developments because each yard
of liner infrastructure, such as water or sewer, will serve fewer households
(Burchell et aI., 2005). Other services, such protective ones like policing and fire,
will have escalating costs as cities that have populations and economic activities
spread apart across the region and in low density suburbs (Stephens and
Wikstrom, 2000). The reasons for the high cost of protective services are similar
to the reasons for the high cost of infrastructure; similar types of resources are
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needed to provide safety to fewer households. Suburban sprawled developments
have a high ratio of public to private expenditure which makes these areas
difficult to pay for even at modest rates of taxation (Duany, et al. 2000).
2.8 Measurement of Equality
The measurement of equitable resources distribution is a difficult task. The
health care field has been quite progressive in the measurement of access to
health care resources, especially to underprivileged populations. This study can
apply some of concepts that have been used in the analysis of access to health
care resources for underprivileged populations. Need is an important concept in
the measurement of access to health care resources. Need of a certain resource
will be determined by the behavior, environment, and characteristics of the
population such as age, gender, culture, and economic status (McLafferty, 2003).
Equity within the healthcare sector has been calculated by using models
that examine health status, distribution of resources, expenditures, utilization,
and access (Waters, 2000). Expenditure and the distribution of resources
(stations) are widely available information that fire departments keep track off,
which will be very useful for this study. Access to health care services will vary
due to the fact that the supply of where health care resources locate and where
people live are not homogeneously distributed (Luo and Wang, 2003). Access to
health care can be directly related to fire fighting services, as where people live
and the location of fire stations may not be uniformly distributed.
The use of GIS has been quite prevalent in the analysis of access to
health care resources. Demonstrating a lack of access in health care can be
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accomplished by overlaying areas of outcomes of health on political boundaries
along with various socioeconomic factors (Phillips, Kinman, Schnitzer, Lindbloom
and Ewingman, 2000). Bravemen and Gruskin (2003) identified this as
measuring equality based on outcomes. In this study the outcome of health is
the response time, because the longer the response time the more detrimental it
is to the populations health, and the political boundary is the fire district, which
can be accomplished through using multiple layers of information through a GIS.
The literature has been helpful in identifying socio-economic factors that can be
used to measure along with response times. Race was mentioned several times
by the likes of Lineberry (1977), Jennings (1999), Cingranelli (1981), and Bullard
(2000) as an important feature in service provision. This will be one of the factors
that is measured along with response times. Other important socioeconomic
factors identified in the literature that can be quantified include income, taxes,
housing, and poverty by Duncombe (1991), Lineberry (1977), Oliver, Healy and
Legrand (2002).
2.9 Existing Gaps in Research Area
The literature has shown that there will be a variation of services that are
provided within cities and between cities. Bullard (2000), Peterson (1981), Rich
(1977), Duncomb (1991), Drier et al (2004) each indicated that service
distribution within cities is not likely to favor the poor, and service provision will
vary based on the fiscal capacity of the city. Cingranelli (1981) identified that
blacks received inferior fire service when compared to their white counterparts.
Lineberry (1977) argued that the poor were not underserved when it comes to
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service distribution within cities. Sanger (1982) was able to demonstrate that the
underprivileged did not receive the poorest level of fire service in New York City.
The question is who is actually right? Are the poor and underprivileged underserved, or are they not? The literature indicates that socially disadvantaged
groups, such as the poor, racial minorities, elderly, and single parents have the
highest need for fire protection. These groups have the highest rates of actual
loss. Reville (1991) indicated that the insurance industry has some pull as to
where fire stations should be located. The insurance industry recommends that
fire stations be built close to areas with higher valuation, and both Cingranelli
(1981) and Sanger (1982) found this to be true. The standards by the ISO are
based on potential loss rather than actually loss and this would indicate that fire
services are not equitably distributed. The major literature within the fire-fighting
field that discuss the placement of fire stations such as the ICMA's Managing
Fire and Rescue Services, the NFPA's Fire Protection Handbook, and the Fire
Chief's Handbook, all indicated that stations should be placed in a manner which
reduces response times. However, in the Fire Chiefs Handbook it was also
stated that some areas may be undesirable locations for placement of fire
stations. Many of these undesirable locations, such as near industry or
multifamily dwellings, are locations where the poor live. The question that arises
is who has the greater need for these services? Is it the poor in the inner cities,
or the wealthy who are well insured?
We know that it is in a city's interest to maximize efficiency. Sprawl
reduces a city's ability to be efficient because service costs remain the same for
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fewer numbers of individuals. Sprawled developments are ideal for fire
departments because they have wider streets and low-density development
partly because of city, state and national fire codes. Do these requirements hurt
the ability to fight fires in a timely manner because of the sprawl aspect and
traffic congestion? It is in the city's interest to reduce its cost burden. Does this
affect how services are provided, especially an important service like fire rescue
as measured by response times? Many cities experience fiscal crisis and
downturns in the economy and may opt to cut back fire services because it takes
up a considerable portion of a city's budget. Will the poor be the first ones to lose
a fire station or will it be in the suburbs? Very few studies have looked at
response times of fire departments. Gomersoll's (2003) study was an individual
case study of Cincinnati which attributed the response time of the fire department
to the number of corners an emergency vehicle must take. Urban sprawl along
with the distribution of fire stations was not considered in Gomersoll's analysis.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY
3.1 Data
Response time data at the fire district level for the 2006 time period were
retrieved from eight different fire departments across the United States. I was
personally involved with the team that devised a method for the selection of cities
developed for a National Science Foundation project entitled "Measuring Cross
Community Disaster Preparedness." The first step in the city selection process
was developing a disaster exposure model. The objective of this selection
process was to allow cities to be identified based on two variables, hazard
experience and population size. It was determined that only larger cities should
be selected for this study, based on the availability of GIS data, and that larger
cities were more likely to have fire districts. Another reason for opting to use
larger cities over smaller ones was that large cities experience a heightened
degree of social, economic and political fracturing especially in areas of income,
race and political affiliation (Solecki 1999).
In terms of hazard experience there is research that describes a "disaster
subculture" (Wenger, 1978) in communities that have more and continuous
experience with hazards. These communities are expected to have different
perspectives on hazards than cities that experience hazards as well as a different
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financial investment in preparedness activities. The hazard exposure was
determined by the use of the Spatial Hazard Events and Losses Database for the
United States (SHELDUS) managed by the Hazards and Vulnerability Research
Institute at the University of South Carolina (Hazards & Vulnerability Research
Institute, 2007). The hazard exposure of cities was ranked high, medium, or low,
was based on the total of disasters in the last 20 years from the SHELUDUS
database. The high, medium and low exposure rank was determined by using
the natural breaks/jenks method in ESRI's ArcGIS 9.2 software package. The
SHELDUS database was the best option to help identify the hazard experience
for each city in the United States. SHELDUS was created from various
governmental sources including the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) and the
National Climatic Data Center (Cutter and Emrich, 2005). Prior to SHELDUS, the
United States did not have any organized central inventory of disaster events and
losses associated with disaster events (Cutter and Emrich, 2005). SHELDUS is a
county-level hazard data set covering 18 different natural hazard events types
that include thunderstorms, hurricanes, floods, wildfires, and tornados. Each
hazard event in the database includes the beginning date, location (county and
state), property losses, crop losses, injuries, and fatalities that affected each
county. Based on the data available to define hazard experience an assumption
was made that if the city is within the county that has experienced the event then
the city has also and this was another reason that I opted to use larger cities as
this is a valid assumption for the larger cities.
The SHELDUS database was queried to identify hazard exposure at the
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county level. Specifically, the database was queried to identify total number of all
hazard events in the U.S. by county. This data was then divided into three
categories by using the natural breaks/jenks methodology from ArcGIS to
determine high, medium, low hazard exposure. Jenks or a natural break grouping
determines the most adequate arrangement of values into classifications by
comparing the sum of squared differences of values from the means of their
classes (BioMedware, 2005).
A city shapefile layer (a point file for every major populated place in the
United States) in GIS was overlaid on top of the county hazard exposure layer.
The first step was to break down the city layer into three different city shapefiles,
one for cities with high exposure, one for cities with medium exposure and one
for cities with low exposure. This was accomplished by using the select by
location feature in ArcGIS. First counties with greater than or equal to 50 hazard
events were selected for the highest hazard exposure category. Then the selectby-location menu was chosen; features (cities) were selected from the city layer
that had their centroid in the county hazard exposure layer using the selected
features (highest exposure) from the county hazard exposure. This was then
repeated for medium and low exposure cities. Cities were then selected to get
varying degrees of hazard exposure (please see, Table 4).
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Table 4 - City Size Classification and Hazard Exposure

City

Hazard Exposure

Miami-Dade FL

Medium Exposure

Houston TX

High Exposure

San Francisco CA
Lou isvi lie-Jefferson
KY

Low Exposure
Low Exposure

Charlotte NC

Medium Exposure

Seattle WA

Medium Exposure

Portland OR

Low Exposure

St Paul MN
Source: DPI Project

Low Exposure

ICMA* City
Population
Classification
1,000,000 and
over
1,000,000 and
over
500,000 to
1,000,000
500,000 to
1,000,000
500,000 to
1,000,000
500,000 to
1,000,000
500,000 to
1,000,000
250,000 to
499,999

Fire departments provided data that included response times in minutes,
fire district names, and a list of fire stations. Two GIS shapefile layers were also
obtained from each fire department, which were used for analysis and included a
polygon fire district layer and a fire station point layer. Shapefiles of census tract
information were obtained from the Environmental Systems Research Institute
(ESRI) GIS data set. Variables at the census tract level will be retrieved from the
U.S. Census Bureau for the year 2000 and include: Household income,
population, total number of housing units, racial composition of the population,
housing values, real estate taxes, home ownership rates, single detached
homes, population living in poverty, and commuting times.
GIS was be used to aggregate the data from the census tract level to the
fire-district level. A problem arises of what to do with census tracts that are within
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two different fire districts. Weighted areal interpolation is a method that is
commonly used within GIS to deal with the problem of alignment between units
of measurement, in this case between census tracts and fire districts.
Specifically, "areal interpolation is a family of processes by which counts
aggregated to a set of zones are reassigned to a different set of zones that
describes the same region," (Mennis, 2003:1). Fire district boundaries (source
zone) were assigned to the corresponding census tract (intersection zone) as a
function of the fire-district area contained within the territory of the intersection
zone. This approach of weighted areal interpolation has an assumption that data
are equally distributed within each region (Flowerdew and Green, 1992). The
key rationale for using areal interpolation method is that is maintains the
pycnophylactic property, meaning that people are not created or destroyed
during the redistribution process of the data (Mennis, 2003). Values that are nonpopulation counts such as median household income, or median property value
will be assigned to the centroid to the census tract. The centroid will be used to
get an aggregate value for value-based variables, such as income, for each fire
district and that values for census tracts that are within multiple fire districts can
be only be used once.
Several steps were required for the data processing component of this
study so that the data could be used in SPSS for regression analysis. The
following is how census data was taken and joined with GIS data and aggregated
to the fire-district level for each city using GIS. The first step was to create a
census tract shapefile layer for each city and this was accomplished by using
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ESRI's main census tract shapefile layer for the entire country and using the clip
geoprocessing tool, which cuts out one layer based on the shape of another
layer. The fire district shapefile was used to clip the census tract layer for each
city. Each city then had a corresponding census tract shapefile. These census
tract shapefiles then needed to be projected in a specific geographic coordinate
system, and a corresponding shape file was created and was called
census_tract_projected. Projection of the shapefile was an important step
because having a projection would allow for determination of an area for each
census tract. Each census tract shapefile layer was then projected to the fire
district shapefile that were in the state plane coordinate system. The next step
was to calculate an area for each census tract and this was done by creating a
field called "oldArea" and using the XTools extension in ArcGIS. Census data for
each city was then exported (transfer of data from one program to another) from
Microsoft Access into ArcGIS in a Dbase (DBF) table. The DBF table was then
joined to the census tract shapefile layer table based on the Federal Information
Processing Standards (FIPS) Codes which was common to both tables. This
shapefile of the census tracts for each city along with the joined DBF table of
census data was used to create a new shapefile layer using the export feature
tool. The next step was to overlay the fire district shapefile layer over the census
tract shapefile layer to associate a census tract with a corresponding fire district
boundary. This was accomplished with the identify tool that was used to compute
the geometric intersection of the fire district on the census tract layer for each
city. A new shape file was then created after this step and was called
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census_tract_identify. A new data field was created in the table and was called
newArea. This field in the database was populated by using the XTools extension
to calculate the area of each newly created polygon from the
census_tractJdentify shapefile. A new field called areaPercent would have to be
calculated which was determined by dividing the newArea field from the
census_tract_identify shapefile and the oldArea field from the
census_tract_projected shapefile. This field called areaPercent would give the
total percentage of each census tract within each fire district. This field would be
used for areal interpolation. A new field was created for each variable within the
table and was called for example newPopulation, NewPopulationDensity, etc.
The areaPercent field was multiplied by population field to create newPopulation,
and this was done for every census variable. The final step for areal interpolation
was to create one last shapefile, which would have one polygon for each fire
district. This was done using the dissolve tool which aggregates polygons based
on a common field, and in this case the census tracts were dissolved based the
fire district they corresponded with. Each new polygon for the fire district has a
statistical summary field for each of the census variables that are aggregated
from each of the census tracts within each of the fire districts.
3.2 Quantitative Analysis
Average response time in seconds at the fire-district level is the
dependent variable for the analysis. The unit of analysis is the fire district and
there is a total 184 fire districts with response times for this study. In section 3.3
there is an explanation of why variables were selected, using the literature as a
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guide to identify the variables along with a description of each variable. The
regression equations are specified below in section 3.4 where there is a
description of how the models were derived.
There were also control variables in each of the models that included
population density, home density, area of the fire district, and per capita
expenditure. The outcome of the linear regression models were beta coefficients
for each independent variable which explains a possible unit change in the
dependent variable. Another outcome was R2 which is a figure that explains how
much variation in the dependent variable is explained by the model. There is also
a section of descriptive statistics that examines the number of observations,
means, standard deviations, minimum, and maximum value of the data set.
There was also an analysis to examine if the data was normally distributed. This
was accomplished with two statistics, skewness and kurtosis, which are
descriptive statistics. A normal distribution would be indicated by skewness value
of 0 and a kurtosis value of O. Skewness measures symmetry of the data-set and
negative values indicate a left-skewed data, while positive numbers indicate
right-skewed data. Kurtosis measures the peak of the data set and its
distribution around the mean. Skewness and kurtosis are important indicators
because if the majority of the data are not normally distributed then this will be a
signal to use the logarithm of the values for all the variables in the model.
Statistical analysis of the data was performed in SPSS and the data was
maintained in a Microsoft Access Database.
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3.3 Variable Selection and Description
3.31 Selection of Equality and Sprawl Variables
The urban service provision section has helped identify key socioeconomic factors for analysis and for the measurement of equality. Lineberry
(1977) and Jennings (1999) identified that the poor and racial minorities living in
substandard housing were disproportionally affected by fires. Oliver, Healey, and
LeGrand (2002) identified groupings based on race and income when it comes to
measuring equality in service provision. Sanger (1981) identified that the wealthy
and poor received superior fire service. Duncomb (1991) pointed out that fire
services would vary across a community based upon income and taxes. Based
on these findings several key variables have been identified including race,
poverty, income, housing, and taxes. These are variables that are readily
available or can be easily derived and quantified from the census which then can
be regressed with response times to determine if linear relationships exist.
There have been several attempts by fellow researchers to quantify urban
sprawl, and outcomes of urban sprawl. The purpose of this section is to identify
some of the common variables or indicators that have been utilized. The first,
and most common measure that was identified in the sprawl literature is
residential density (see, Table 5). Galster, et al. (2001) describes density as the
number of residential units per square mile. Ewing, Pendall and Chen (2002) in
their analysiS of sprawl for Smart Growth America also identified residential and
population density as an indicator for sprawl. Glaster et. al (2001) indentified
mixed uses, which is the extent of which to two or more different land uses exist
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within the same area. When land uses are not mixed they are segregated and
the segregation of land uses was an indicator of sprawl that was identified by
Ewing et al. (2002). They measured this through the percentage of the population
that was within one mile of an elementary school and this is also related to
Galster et aI's (2001) proximity indicator. Home type was also identified as a way
of identifying urban sprawl and both Burchell et al. (2005) and Ewing et al. (2002)
identified single family detached homes as a character of areas that are
sprawled.
Table 5 - Sprawl Indicators

Sprawl Indicator

Description

Segregated land
uses

Residential
Density
% of residents
with elementary
school 1 mile
away

Home type

Single detached
homes

Street
Accessibility
Vehicle
Ownership

Density

Commute Times

Centrality

Source

Source

Galster et al.
(2001) - Wrestling
Sprawl ...

Ewing et al. Smart Growth
America

Ewing et al. Smari Growth
America
Ewing et al. Smari Growth
America

Average Block
Size

Burchell et al.
(2005) - Sprawl
Costs
Ewing et al. Smart Growth
America

Vehicles per
Households

Burchell et al.
(2005) - Sprawl
Costs

Ewing et al. Smart Growth
America

Census commute
time in minutes

Burchell et al.
(2005) - Sprawl
Costs

Ewing et al. Smart Growth
America

Distance from
CBD

Galster et al.
(2001) - Wrestling
Sprawl ...
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Other sprawl related factors that were easily quantifiable were related to
the automobile. Commuting times from home to work and vehicle ownership
rates were both viewed as outcomes of urban sprawl by Burchell, et al. (2005)
and Ewing et al. (2002). Street accessibility also was used as an indicator of
urban sprawl. Sprawled areas were seen as having poor street accessibility,
because of the average block size was considerably larger for areas that were
sprawled compared to areas that were not sprawled (Ewing et aI., 2002).
Congestion was also identified as being associated with sprawl by Burchell, et al
(2005) and Ewing et al. (2002).
GIS was used to calculate several of the sprawl indicators. The indicators
derived from the use of GIS included the segregated land use variable, street
accessibility, congestion, and centrality. The segregated land use measure was
determined through the percentage of the population within one mile of an
elementary school. ESRI has a shape-file layer of schools. This layer of schools
was cross referenced with a list of elementary schools from each city. If the
school was not on the ESRI school layer it was geocoded (a process of taking an
address and assigning latitude and longitude coordinates so that file can be
displayed in a GIS) and added to the file. Block groups were used for population
and a one mile buffer was placed around the school to select all the block groups
that fell within one mile of the school buffer. The street accessibility and
congestion variables were calculated using the selected by location tool. Using
the ESRI street shapefile layer all the streets within a fire district were selected.
Then using the statistics tool this provided a mean length for a street segment
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within a fire district and this tool also provided a summary field which summed all
the street segments within the fire district to provide an overall street mile length
to calculate a population per street mile. Finally GIS was used to determine the
distance from each fire district to the CBD. A centroid for each census tract was
created. The location of the CBD was then determined from Google Earth, and
geocoded into the GIS. Then using an analysis tool in an extension of ArcView
GIS, the length between each census tract centroid to the CBD was calculated.
These values were then aggregated to the fire-district level to provide an average
distance to the CBD.

3.32 Descriptions of Variables

This section describes each variable, how the variable is calculated, along with
the source of the data. Table 5 provides a summary of this information for a
straightforward reference.
Dependent Variables in Analysis

Average Response Time in Seconds for the Fire District. Unit of analysis: Fire
District. Source: Various city fire departments.
Independent Variables in Analysis
Area
Total area of the fire district divided by the number of stations within a fire district.
Source: Various city fire departments;

Per Capita Expenditure (Expend)
This is the total funding for the fire department divided by the population that is
served by the fire department. In most cases this was a group-level indicator.
Louisville had different values for each of its fire districts. Source: Various city fire
departments; Source U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 Summary File 1 (SF 1)
100-Percent Data.
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Population Density (PopDen)
Total population of the fire district divided by total area of fire district., to give
population per sq. mile. Source U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 Summary
File 1 (SF 1) 100-Percent Data. Fire District Data provided by Fire Departments
in GIS shapefile format.
Housing Density (HomeDen)
Total number of homes in fire district divided by total area of fire district to give
number of homes per sq. mile. Source U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000
Summary File 1 (SF 1) 1OO-Percent Data. Fire District Data provided by Fire
Departments in GIS shapefile format.
Nonwhite Population (Race)
Percent of Total nonwhite population of fire district. Calculated by white
population - 1. Source U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 Summary File 1 (SF
1) 1OO-Percent Data.
Poverty
Percent of Population living in poverty for the fire district which uses the Census
Bureau and the federal government's official poverty definition. Population living
in poverty divided by the total population. Source U.S. Census Bureau, Census
2000 Summary File 3 Sample Data.
Housing Ownership (HomeOwn)
Percent of homes that are owner Occupied within fire district. Calculated as
owner occupied homes divided by total homes in fire district. Source U.S.
Census Bureau, Census 2000 Summary File 3 Sample Data.
Detached Homes (Home Type) (DetHse)
Percent of homes that are single detached. Single detached homes divided by
total number housing units within fire district. Source U.S. Census Bureau,
Census 2000 Summary File 3 Sample Data.
Vehicles I Household (VehHH)
Total number of vehicles divided by the total number of households. Source U.S.
Census Bureau, Census 2000 Summary File 3 Sample Data.
Average Commute Time (AvgCTime)
Total travel time in minutes to work. Calculate average travel time of commuters
at tract level by taking the midpoint of the travel time category and multiplying by
the total number of people for the category and then summing the total value of
all minutes divided by total number of people for the tract to give an average
travel time per person. Source U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 Summary File
3 Sample Data.
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Home Value (HomeVal)
Aggregate value (dollars) for all owner-occupied housing units in structure
divided by total number of owner-occupied housing units. Source U.S. Census
Bureau, Census 2000 Summary File 3 Sample Data.
Real Estate Taxes (ReaITax)
Aggregate Real Estate Taxes: total amount of all real estate taxes on the entire
property (land and buildings) payable in 1999 to all taxing jurisdictions, including
special assessments, school taxes, county taxes divided by total number of
owner-occupied housing units. Source U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000
Summary File 3 Sample Data
High-Income Households (Highlnc)
Percent of household that earn above $75,000 per year (1999), divided by total
number of households for the fire district. Data Source: U.S. Census Bureau,
Census 2000 Summary File 3 Sample Data
Population Per Street Mile (PopStMile)
Total Population of fire district divided by the total length of all roadways within
fire district. Data Source: Census 2000 Summary File 1 (SF 1) 1DO-Percent Data;
ESRI Street Data file
Street Segment Length (StreetSeg)
Average street segment length in feet. Data Source ESRI Street Data file.

Elementary School (ElmSch)
Percentage of residents of the fire district that are within 1 mile of an elementary
school. Source: Census 2000 Summary File 1 (SF 1) 1DO-Percent Data; ESRI;

Distance from Central Business District (CBD)
Distance of each census tract centroid to the central business district,
aggregated to the fire district. Source of CBD location google map. ESRI.
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Table 6 - Variable Summary Table

Area

Description
Area of fire district divided by # of fire
stations

Expend

Per capita expenditure

PopOen

Population per sq. mile

NonWhite

% of non white population

Variable

HomeOwn

1 to 14

Literature Source
(Halpern, 1979)

1 to 14

(Waters, 2000)
(Galster et ai, 2001); (Ewing et ai,
1t07 2002)
(Lineberry, 1977); (Jennings
,1999); (Oliver, Healey, and
1 LeGrand, 2002)

% of population living below poverty
Poverty

Equation

level
% of home owners that earn under
$29,999

(Lineberry, 1977); (Jennings
,1999); (Oliver, Healey, and
2 LeGrand, 2002);(Sanger, 1981)
(Lineberry, 1977); (Jennings
3 ,1999)
(Lineberry, 1977); (Jennings
4 ,1999)

RealTax

Average home value
Average property taxes per home
owner

Highlncome

% of households that earn $75,000+

HomeOen

PopStreetMile

Total number of homes per sq. mile
Average commute time to work in
minutes
Vehicles divided by number of
households
Population divided by total road mi. in
district

5 (Ouncomb, 1991)
(Sanger, 1981); (Oliver, Healey,
and LeGrand, 2002) ;
7 (Ouncomb, 1991)
(Galster et ai, 2001); (Ewing et ai,
8 to 14 2002)
(Burchell et al,2005);(Ewing et ai,
9,9a 2002)
(Burchell et al,2005);(Ewing et ai,
10,10a 2002)
(Galster et ai, 2001); (Ewing et ai,
11,11a 2002), (Burchell et ai, 2005)

StreetSeg

Average street segment length

12,12a (Ewing et ai, 2002)

ElmSchool

% of population within 1 mile of school
Average distance of fire district to the
CBO

13,13a (Ewing et ai, 2002)

HomeVal

AvgCTime
VehHseHold

CBO
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14,14a (Galster et ai, 2001)

3.4 Regression Equations and the Development of the Models
The first seven equations looked for proportional access. These models
were used to determine if a linear relationship existed between response times,
and the nonwhite population, population living in poverty, home ownership, home
values, real estate taxes, and high-income households that earn greater than
$75,000. There also were control variables that included the population density,
area of the fire district, and the per capita expenditure of the fire department.
The next 12 equations were used to determine if linear relationship existed
between response times and detached housing, vehicles/household, average
commute time, population per street mile, street segment length, elementary
school access and distance to the CBD.
Several different permutations were attempted before the final models
were derived. The first model that was examined was to regress response times
with all the equity variables while controlling for various factors. There also was a
similar model but with all the sprawl variables and response times along with the
control variables.

=

Response time f(area, expend, popden, homeden, nonwhite, poverty,
homeown, homevalue, realtax, Highlncome).

=

Response time f(area, expend, popden, homeden, detHse, AvgCTime,
VehHseHold, PopStreetMile, StreetSeg, ElmSchool, CBD).

However, the issue with these models that made them problematic was
multicolinearity. Many of the variables are related to one another and by putting
them all within one model distorts the results. It would be difficult to gauge the full
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impact of each variable on the dependent variable because many of the
variables are related to one another. A similar variation of each model also was
examined but included a dummy variable for each city to get a more precise
picture of how each variable affected the cities.
Response time = f(area, expend, popden, homeden, nonwhite, poverty,
homeown, homevalue, realtax, Highlncome, Charlotte, Houston,
Louisville, Seattle, Portland, St. Paul, Miami).
It was determined that it would be more effective if a new variable was created
for each city, which contained a particular factor such as nonwhite. The variable
was created by multiplying the dummy variable for a particular city and the
socioeconomic variables, such as nonwhite or poverty, to create a new
interaction variable, which was named using the city name followed by the
variable that it was multiplied with, such as CharlotteNonwhite. This field was
populated with only Charlotte's nonwhite values for each fire district, and every
other fire district that was not in Charlotte would have a value of 0 for this data
field. This was done for each city, except for st. Paul because st. Paul has just
three fire districts. So every city dummy variable was multiplied by every indicator
to create an indicator for each city which created an additional 42 different
variables for the equity models and 42 different variables for the sprawl models.
These 42 variables were then included into each model, however the results
were too complicated having so many different independent variables.

S3

=

Response time f(area, expend, popden, homeden, Nonwhitej , CharlottejNon
whitej, HoustonNonwhitej, LouisvillejNonwhitej, PortlandjNon whitej,
SanFranciscojNonwhitej, SeattleNonwhitej, MiamijNonwhitej PovertYj ,
CharlottepovertYj, HoustonjPovertYj, LouisviliePovertYi, Portland i PovertYj,
SanFranciscoPovertYj, SeattlejPovertYj, MiamipovertYj HomeOwnj,
CharlottejHomeOwnj, HoustonjHomeOwnj, LouisvillejHomeOwnj, HomeValj
CharlottejHomeValj, HoustonjHomeValj, LouisvillejHomeValj, PortlandjHomeValj,
SanFranciscojHomeValj, SeattlejHomeValj, MiamijHomeVah PortlandjHomeOwnj,
SanFranciscojHomeOwnj, SeattlejHomeOwni, MiamhHomeOwnj
Highlncomej,CharlottejHighlncomej, HoustonjHighlncomej, LouisvillejHighlncomej,
PortlandjHighlncomej, SanFranciscojHighlncomej, SeattlejHighlncomej,
MiamijHighlncomej
Other models were also examined including grouping similar variables together
in a model, like nonwhite and poverty, or homeown and homeval along with the
three control variables. Once again there were issues with multicolinearity as the
variables were related.
Response timej = f(Areaj ,Expendj, PopDenj, Nonwhitej PovertYj)
Response timej

=f(Areai ,Expendj, PopDenj,HomeOwnj, HomeValj)

It was determined that it would be most effective to examine each variable in
a separate model on its own along with the control variables. Seven interaction
variables, one for each city were also included for each of the cities, except for St
Paul. The overall variable would be representative for St. Paul. Equation 1
through 7 represents these models which look at the equality indicators. The
sprawl models were also similar. There was only one difference as there are two
models for each sprawl indicator. One model with the entire group variable not
stratified by the city (no city-interaction variable), and the second model with the
city-interaction variable.
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Race Model
1. Response timej::: f(Areaj ,Expendj, PopDenj, Nonwhitej , CharlottejNon
whitej, HoustonNonwhitej, LouisvillejNonwhitej, PortlandjNon whitej,
SanFranciscojNonwhitej, SeattleNonwhitej, MiamiNonwhitej,)
Poverty Model
2. Response timej::: f(Areaj ,Expend j, PopDenj, PovertYj, CharlottePovertYj,
HoustonjPovertYj, LouisviliepovertYj, Portlandj PovertYj,
San F ranciscojPovertYj, SeattlejPovertYj, M iam ijPovertYj)
Housing Tenure Model
3. Response timej::: f(Areaj ,Expend j, PopDenj, HomeOwnj,
CharlottejHomeOwnj, HoustonjHomeOwnj, LouisvillejHomeOwnj,
PortlandjHomeOwnj, SanFranciscojHomeOwnj, SeattlejHomeOwnj,
MiamijHomeOwnj)
Home Value Model
4. Response timej::: f(Areaj,Expend j, PopDenj, HomeVah CharlottejHomeVah,
HoustonjHomeVah, LouisvillejHomeValj, PortlandjHomeVah,
SanFranciscojHomeValj, SeattlejHomeValj, MiamijHomeVal; )
Property Tax Model
5. Response timej::: f(Areaj,Expendj, PopDenj, RealTaxj, CharlottejRealTaxj,
HoustonjRealTaxj, LouisvillejRealTaxj, PortlandjRealTaxj,
SanFranciscojRealTaxj, SeattlejRealTaxj, MiamiHealTaxj)
Income Model
6. Response timej::: f(Areaj ,Expend j, PopDenj,
highlncomej,CharlottejHighlncomej, HoustonjHighlncomej,
LouisvillejHighlncomej, PortlandjHighlncomej, SanFranciscojHighlncomej,
SeattlejHighlncomej, MiamijHighlncomej)
Home Density Model
7. Response timej::: f(Areaj ,Per Capita Expenditurej, HomeDenj, DetHsej)
a. Response timej = f(Areaj ,Expend j, HomeDenj, DetHsej
CharlottejDetHsej, HoustonjDetHsej, LouisvillejDetHsej,
PortlandjDetHsej, SanFranciscojDetHsej, SeattlejDetHsej,
MiamijDetHsej)

Commute Time Model
8. Response timej::: f(Areaj ,Expend j, HomeDenj, AvgCTimej)
a. Response timej::: f(Areaj ,Expend j, HomeDenj, AvgCTimej
CharlotteAvgCTimej, HoustonjAvgCTimej, LouisvillejAvgCTimej,
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PortlandjAvgCTimej, SanFranciscojAvgCTimej, SeattlejAvgCTimej,
MiamijAvgCTimej)

Vehicle Ownership Model
9. Response timej = f(Areaj ,Expend j, HomeDenj, VehHseHoldj)

=

a. Response timej f(Areaj ,Expend j, HomeDenj,
VehHseHoldj,CharlottejVehHseHold j, HoustonjVehHseHold j,
LouisvilieNehHseHoldj, PortlandNehHseHold j,
SanFranciscojVehHseHoldj, SeattleNehHseHoldj,
MiamhVehHseHoldj)

Congestion Model
10. Response timej f(Areaj ,Expend j, HomeDenj, PopStreetMilej)

=

=

a. Response timej f(Areaj ,Expend j, HomeDenj, PopStreetMilej,
CharlottepopStreetMilej, HoustonjPopStreetMilej,
LouisvillejPopStreetMilej, PortlandjPopStreetMilej,
SanFranciscojPopStreetMilej, SeattlejPopStreetMilej,
M iam ipopStreetMi lej)

Street Length Model
11. Response timej = f(Areaj ,Expend j, HomeDenj, StreetSegj)
a. Response timej =f(Areaj ,Expend j, HomeDenj,
StreetSegj,CharlottejStreetSegj, HoustonjStreetSegj,
LouisvillejStreetSegj, PortlandjStreetSegj, SanFranciscojStreetSegj,
SeattlejStreetSegj, MiamijStreetSegj)

Land Use Model
12. Response timej = f(Areaj ,Expend j, HomeDenj, ElmSchooh)
a. Response timej = f(Areaj ,Expend j, HomeDenj, ElmSchooh
CharlottejElmSchool j, HoustonjElmSchool j, LouisvillejElmSchooh,
PortlandjElmSchool j, SanFranciscojElmSchool j, SeattlejElmSchoolj,
MiamijElmSchool j)

Distance to the CaD Model
13. Response timej = f(Areaj ,Expend j, HomeDenj, CBD j)

=

a. Response timej f(Areaj ,Expend j, HomeDenj, CBDj,
CharlottejCBD j, HoustonjCBD j, LouisvillejCBD j, PortlandjCBDj,
SanFranciscojCBD j, SeattlejCBD j, MiamijCBD j )
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3.5 Qualitative Analysis
Following the quantitative analysis there was a case study of three
different fire districts from Louisville (Jefferson County). These case studies were
an in-depth investigation of several factors. First, there was a comprehensive
examination of the fire departments. Aspects of the fire department that were
analyzed include: management structure of the fire department, the Insurance
Services Office rating for the fire department, fire department budget, personnel,
vehicles, funding spent on training, location of new fire stations, shut down fire
stations, and similar issues. The next aspect that was examined is a closer focus
on the fire districts within with a complete assessment of the demographic profile
and the characteristics of the landscape that make up each of the fire districts.
Most importantly there was a comprehensive examination of the most salient
variables from the quantitative analYSis for each of the fire departments to get a
clearer picture of the why results turned out the way that they did.
The Institutional Review Board (IRB) process was followed. All the
required documentation, such as a copy of the interview questions and informed
consent were submitted to the IRB for approval before the interviews took place.
The IRB classified this project as exempt.
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3.51 Survey Questions for Qualitative Analysis
1. In Your opinion what is the most influencing factor on fire department
response times?

2. Do the allocation of resources such as personal, vehicles, stations, etc.
have an impact on response times?
3. Would you say that in certain cities the lower income areas are
disadvantaged with respect to response times?
4. Would you say that in certain cities that fire districts with higher-cost
housing have better response times?
5. Would you say that in certain cities that fire districts with higher rates of
property taxes have better response times?
6. It was found in this study it that in certain cities that lower income
areas were disadvantaged with respect to response times, however
this was not the case for all cities as reverse was found to be true.
Would you have any possible explanations for this?
7. Similar to the previous question, in certain cities fire district's with
higher cost housing had better response times, however once again
this was not the case for all cities as reverse was found to be true.
Would you have any possible explanations for this?
8. In this study it was found that the higher the rate of property taxes,
the worse the response time. Would you have any possible
explanations for this?
9. What do you think has the greatest influence on response times
for a fire district (increases response time)?
1. Commuting Time
2. Vehicle Ownership
3. Population Density (Population per street mile)
4. Length of the Block
5. Diversity of land use
6. Distance from the center of the city
7. % of detached housing
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10. Commuting times within the fire district where found to be the most
correlated with longer response times, would you agree with this and why
do you think this would be the case? What would you recommend to deal
with this?
11. The length of the street block was found to be the (2 nd most) correlated
with longer response times, would you agree with this and why do you
think this would be the case? What would you recommend to deal with
this?
12. Population density and congestion were found to be the correlated
with longer response times, would you agree with this and why do
you think this would be the case? What would you recommend to deal
with this?
13. Do issues with response times ever affect cities or fire department
policies in any way?
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS
4.1 Description of Cities
Table 7 displays a breakdown of the total number of fire districts for each
city and some other general information. Miami-Dade has data from two
separate Fire departments (F. D.), the City of Miami FD. and Miami-Dade F.D.,
which is the rest of the county outside of the city limits of Miami. In total there
were 63 fire districts, 14 for the city of Miami F.D., and 49 for Miami-Dade F.D.
Total area served by both fire departments was approximately 838 square miles
(35 square miles for the city of Miami, 802 square miles for the Miami-Dade
department). The average size of a fire district was 2.5 square miles for the City
of Miami FD., and 16 square miles for Miami-Dade FD. and 13 square miles for
both F.D. combined. The minimum value for a size of a fire district was 0.60
square miles, and the maximum was 127 square miles. In total, there were 63
fire stations for both fire departments. The total population for the Miami-Dade
area was 2.4 million people. The City of Miami accounts for 15 percent of the
total population. The average population per fire district was roughly 30,000, with
a minimum of 1,300 and a maximum of 70,000 (based on 2000 census figures).
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Table 7 - Cities and Fire District Information

City
Miami-Dade,
FL
Houston, TX

Fire
Districts

2000 Population

Area
Avg
Served Area /
Stations Mi. Sq District

2,253,362

63

63

837.58

13.29

1,953,631
776,733

21

110

616.5

29.36

10

42

43.18

4.32

San Francisco,
CA
LouisvilleJefferson
County, KY

693,604

20

56

392.6

19.63

Charlotte, NC

540,828

7

39

287.39

41.06

Seattle, WA

563,374

32

36

82.55

2.58

Portland, OR

529,121

28

30

154.12

5.5

St Paul, MN

287,151

3

16

64.17

21.39

There were a total of 21 fire districts in the City of Houston. The area
served by the fire department is 616 square miles, the largest of any single fire
department in this analysis. The mean size of a fire district within Houston was
29 square miles, with a minimum size of 3 square miles and a maximum of 78
square miles. Houston has a total of 110 fire stations, also the greatest number
of fire stations for a city in this analysis. The total population served by Houston
was approximately 2.07 million. The average population per fire district was close
to 90,000 people, with a minimum of 4,800 and a maximum of 190,000.
San Francisco had 10 fire districts, with a total area of 43 square miles.
The average size of a fire district in San Francisco was approximately 4.3 square
miles. The minimum size of a fire district was 1.8 square miles and the maximum
was 9.3 square miles. There were a total of 42 fire stations in San Francisco. The
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total population served by the San Francisco Fire department was roughly
770,000 people. The average population per fire district was roughly 76,500
people. The minimum was 22,000 and the maximum was 126,000 people.
Louisville-Jefferson County, Kentucky, had 20 different fire departments.
Louisville-Jefferson County was unique because of the number of fire
departments that it had. These fire departments include: Buechel, Camp Taylor,
Dixie Suburban, Eastwood, Fairdale, Fern Creek, Harrods Creek, Highview,
Jeffersontown, Lake Dreamland, Louisville, Lyndon, McMahan, Middletown,
Okolona, Pleasure Ridge Park, Shively, St. Matthews, and Worthington. The
total area that was served by all 20 fire departments was 390 square miles. The
City of Louisville Fire Depart was responsible for the greatest area within
Louisville-Jefferson County with 62 square miles. Pleasure Ridge Park and Fern
Creek also had very large areas. Dixie Suburban had the smallest area with 1
square miles in total. The average area for all the fire districts combined within
Louisville-Jefferson County was close to 20 square miles per station. There were
a total of 56 fire stations for the 20 fire departments. The Louisville fire
department had 22 of the 56 fire stations. Total population served by all 20 fire
departments was 690,000. The average population per fire district was roughly
34,000. The Louisville Fire District accounted for nearly 250,000 people, which
was the largest fire district. The Dixie Suburban Fire District was the smallest in
size, and also had the smallest population that was served.
Charlotte has one fire department with seven fire districts. The total area
that the Charlotte F.D. serves is 290 square miles. The average area per fire
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district is roughly 40 square miles, which is the largest average area for fire
districts for all the cities. The minimum value of a fire district within Charlotte is 21
square miles and the maximum is 61 square miles. Charlotte has a total of 39 fire
stations. Total population served by the Charlotte F.D. is 540,000. The average
population per fire district is 77,000, with a minimum of 42,500 and a maximum of
126,000.
Seattle had one main fire department with 32 fire districts. The total area
served by the Seattle F.D. is roughly 83 square miles. Seattle has 36 fire stations
in operation. The average size of a fire district within the jurisdiction of the Seattle
F.D. is roughly 2.6 square miles, the smallest average size of fire districts in this
study. The minimum value was 0.4 square miles, while the maximum was 4.5
square miles. The total population that is served by the Seattle F.D. is
approximately 560,000 people. The mean population served per fire district is
close to 16,000 people. The minimum value for population for a fire district was
roughly 3,100 people, while the maximum value was 41,000 people.
Portland has 28 fire districts, with a total of 30 fire stations. The total area
served by the Portland FD. is roughly 154 square miles. The average size of a
fire district within Portland is 5.5 square miles. The smallest fire district in size
was 1.6 square miles, while the largest was 18 square miles. Total population
served by the Portland FD. is close to 530,000 people. The average population
per fire district is 19,000 people. The minimum value for population for a fire
district is 1,200 people and the maximum value was 37,000.
St. Paul was the smallest city in the analysis, and also had the fewest
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number of fire districts, at three. The St. Paul fire department has 16 fire stations
to cover a total area of 64 square miles. The average area of a fire district in St.
Paul was 21 square miles, and the smallest area of a fire district was 17 square
miles, while the largest was 29 square miles. The total population that is served
by the St. Paul F.D. is close to 290,000 people. The average population per fire
district was close to 100,000 people, with a minimum of 87,000 and maximum of
113,000 people.

4.2 Descriptive Statistics

There were a total of 184 records for the entire data set. The dependent
variable in the analysis was response time in seconds. The mean average
response time for all fire districts was 337 seconds, with a median of 335
seconds and a minimum of 182 seconds and a maximum of 820 seconds, refer
to table 8. Seattle had the lowest average response time at 252 seconds, while
Houston had the highest average response time at 408 seconds, refer to table 9.
The standard deviation was 79 seconds. The response time variable was close
to being normally distributed as indicated by a skewness of 0.10 and a Kurtosis
of -0.85.
The mean area per station was 7.72 miles, with a median of 4.35 miles.
Miami-Dade had the highest average of miles per station with a value of 13.27,
while San Francisco had the only 1.02 miles per station. There was great
variability in the range of this data set as indicated by a low minimum of 0.39 and
a high maximum of 127.4 miles per station. The standard deviation was 13.94
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miles per station. Square miles per station were not normally distributed and
were heavily skewed as indicated by a skewness of 5.88 and a kurtosis of 41.49.
Per capita expenditure was a group-level indicator and had a mean of
$213 per capita for all the fire districts, and a median of $219. Charlotte,
Houston, Portland, San Francisco, Seattle, Tampa, and St. Paul all had one
value per city for the per capita expenditure, as the total fire department budgets
were not allocated according to the fire district. Louisville had a different budget
for each of its fire districts. There was also one budget for the city of Miami, and a
budget for the remainder of Dade County. San Francisco had the highest per
capita expenditure at $313 per person, while Louisville-Jefferson County had a
value of less than half of San Francisco at $122 per person. The minimum of the
per capita expenditure was $44, which was from the Dixie suburban fire district in
Louisville-Jefferson County. The maximum per capita expenditure was from San
Francisco at $313 per person. The standard deviation was $55. Per capita
expenditure was not normally distributed as it had a skewness of -0.74 and a
kurtosis of 0.35.
Population density had a mean of 5,743 people per square mile and a
median of 4,328 people per square mile. The minimum was 197 people per
square mile, while the maximum was 35,613 people per square mile. San
Francisco had the highest average population density per fire district at 20,969
people per square mile., while Louisville had the lowest at 1,933 people per
square miles. The standard deviation was 5,804. Population density was not
normally distributed as indicated by a skewness of 2.90 and a kurtosis of 10.32.
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Similar to population density, home density also had a great range. The mean
home density was 2,594 homes per square mile, with a median of 1,772 homes
per square mile, with a minimum of 65 and a maximum of 21 ,444 homes per
square mile. Both Louisville and Charlotte were tied for the lowest average home
density per fire district at 857 homes per square miles, while San Francisco had
the highest average home density at 10,454 homes per square mile. Home
density was not normally distributed and had a skewness of 3.41 and kurtosis of
14.43. The data was right-skewed and had very high peaks within the dataset.
The mean for percentage of the population that was nonwhite was 33
percent, with a median of 27 percent. The standard deviation was 22 percent for
the entire dataset. The minimum of the dataset was close to 5 percent while the
maximum was 92 percent. San Francisco had the highest mean per fire district of
nonwhite people at 50 percent, while Houston was also very close at 49 percent.
Louisville had the lowest proportion of nonwhite people per fire district at 19
percent. The nonwhite data was not normally distributed, although it was not
highly skewed either in any major direction with a skewness of 0.70 and a
kurtosis of -0.65.
There was a great variation in level of poverty. The mean rate for
percentage of the population living in poverty for the entire data set was 15
percent .The median was 13 percent, with a standard deviation of 9 percent. The
minimum was a low of 2 percent, while the maximum was 55 percent. Houston
and Miami had the highest average rates of poverty at roughly 19 percent.
Louisville had the lowest rate of poverty at roughly 8 percent. The standard
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deviation was 9.5. The data for poverty was not normally distributed as indicated
by a skewness of 1.26 and a kurtosis of 1.84.
The mean for home ownership rates for the entire data set was 55
percent, while the median was 58 percent. The minimum value was 5 percent
while the maximum value was 92 percent. Louisville had the highest average rate
of home ownership, with close 68 percent of the city's population being home
owners. San Francisco had the lowest average rate of home ownership with 33
percent of population being home owners. The standard deviation was 18
percent. The data for home ownership was close to being normally distributed.
The skewness was -0.62 and the kurtosis was 0.02.
The majority of homes were single detached as the mean for the entire
dataset was 51 percent. The median value was 56 percent. The minimum was 1
percent, while the maximum was 91 percent. San Francisco had the lowest mean
for single detached homes at 18 percent. Miami also had an average of 46
percent, which was lower than the overall average. Louisville had the highest
average of single detached home at 71 percent, which was significantly higher
than the average for the entire data set. The standard deviation was 23 percent.
The data was not normally distributed, however, it was also not very skewed as it
was only slighted left-skewed with a skewness of -0.64 and had a kurtosis of 0.55.
The mean number of vehicles per household was 1.48, while the median
was 1.53 vehicles per household. The low of the data set was 0.46 cars per
household. The high of the data set was 2.16 vehicles per household. Louisville
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had the highest average of 1.7 vehicles per household. San Francisco had the
lowest average of 1.1 vehicles per household, and was well below the mean for
the entire dataset. The standard deviation was 0.32. The data was not normally
distributed, and was left-skewed with a skewness of -1.01 and had a kurtosis of
1.45.
The average commute time for the all the cities within the data set was
27.9 minutes. The median for the data set was 27.6 minutes. The minimum of the
dataset was 19 minutes, while the maximum was 40 minutes. St. Paul had the
lowest average for commute times of 22.6 minutes. Louisville also had a low
average commute time of 23 minutes. San Francisco had the highest average
commute time of 32 minutes, while Miami also had a high average commute time
of 31 minutes. The standard deviation was 4.3. The data was close to being
normally distributed, although it was slightly right-skewed and had a skewness of
0.41, and a kurtosis of -0.33.
The mean for home prices for the entire dataset was approximately
$199,000, with a median of roughly $150,000. The standard deviation of the
dataset was $129,000. The minimum home value was approximately $44,000,
while the maximum was $790,000. Houston had the lowest average home prices
at close to $114,000. San Francisco had the highest average home values at
approximately $550,000. Seattle also had an average home value that was about
$100,000 higher than the average for the entire data set at $295,000. The data
was not normally distributed and was right-skewed. Average home value had a
skewness of 1.78, and a kurtosis of 3.78.
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The mean for property taxes for the entire data-set was approximately 1
percent of total property value. The median was also roughly 1 percent. The
standard deviation was 0.37%.The minimum property tax value for the eight
cities was 0.01 percent. The maximum property tax value was 2.15 percent of
total property value. San Francisco had the lowest average property tax rate for
all the cities at 0.29 percent of property values. Portland had the highest average
rate of property taxes at 1.53 percent. Houston also had a higher average rate of
property taxes at 1.52 percent. The data was close to being normally distributed.
The data was slightly left-skewed and had a skewness of -0.16 and a kurtosis of
0.41.
The mean for the percentage of high income households (that earn over
$75,000 per year) was 23 percent. The median for the dataset was 20 percent.
The standard deviation was 12 percent. The minimum for the data-set was 3
percent, while the maximum was 68 percent. San Francisco had the highest
mean for all the cities with close to 35 percent of all households earning greater
than $75,000. St. Paul and Miami had the lowest mean for household earning
above $75,000 at 19 percent. The data was right-skewed with a skewness of
0.97, and a kurtosis of 0.92.
The mean population per street mile was 320 people per mile of roadway.
The median was 272 people per mile of roadway. The minimum value for
population per street mile was 48, while the maximum value was 1437 people
per mile. Louisville had the lowest average population per street mile at 209
people per mile of roadway. Charlotte also had lower values at 210 people per
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mile of road way. San Francisco had the highest average at 837 people per mile
of road way. The standard deviation of the data set was 219. The data was not
normally distributed, was right-skewed, and had a skewness of 2.57 and a
kurtosis of 7.45.
The average street segment length for all the cities was 446 feet. The
median for street segment length was 417 feet. The minimum value of street
segment length was 232 feet and the maximum value was 1193 feet. As
expected, San Francisco had the lowest average of street segment length at 360
feet. Portland and Seattle also had averages that were lower than the overall
mean at 370 feet. Louisville had the highest average street segment length at
557 feet. Houston also had high values, with an average at 520 feet. The
standard deviation was 123. The data for street segment length was not normally
distributed, was right-skewed and had a skewness of 2.22. The kurtosis was
9.33.
The mean for the population living within 1 mile of an elementary school
for all the fire districts was 76 percent. The median was 97 percent. The
minimum value was 0 percent, while the maximum was 100 percent of the
population of the fire district living within 1 mile of an elementary school.
Charlotte had the highest mean, with 99 percent of its population living within 1
mile of an elementary school. San Francisco and Houston also had high
percentages of their population living within 1 mile of an elementary school at 98
percent and 96 percent. Miami had the lowest average rate with only 47 percent
of its population living within 1 mile of an elementary school. The standard
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deviation was 34 percent. The data was not normally distributed. The data was
left-skewed and had a skewness of -1.14 and a kurtosis of -0.18.
The mean distance from the Central Business District was 7.1 mile. The
median was 5.7 mile. The minimum for the dataset was 0.04 mile, while the
maximum was 27.5 mile. Both Miami and Louisville had the highest averages for
distance from the CBD at 9.8 mile. Charlotte had the lowest average at 1.8 mile.
The standard deviation was 5.16 mile. The data was not normally distributed.
The data was right-skewed and had a skewness of 1.11 and a kurtosis of 1.25.
Table 8 - Descriptive Statistics for Entire Data Set
Variable
Response Time
(Seconds)
Station Area
(miles)

N

Mean

Median

St Dev

Skew

Kurt

Min

Max

185

337

335

73

0.10

-0.85

182

537

185

7.72

4.35

13.94

5.88

41.49

0.39

127.4

Expenditure
PopDen (pop/sq.
mi.)
HomeDen
(homes/sq. mi.)

185

$213

$219

$55

-0.74

0.35

$44

$313

185

5,743

4,328

5,804

2.90

10.32

197

35,613

185

2,594

1,772

3,068

3.41

14.43

65

21,444

% Non White

185

33%

27%

22%

0.70

-0.65

5%

92%

% Poverty

185

15%

13%

9%

1.26

1.84

2%

55%

% HomeOwn

185

55%

58%

18%

-0.62

0.02

5%

92%

% DetHse

185

51%

56%

23%

-0.64

-0.55

1%

91%

Veh/Hhold
AvgCTime
(minutes)

185

1.48

1.53

0.32

-1.01

1.45

0.46

2.16

185

27.90

27.56

4.30

0.41

-0.33

19.55

40.28

Home Value ($)

185

$199,274

$153,214

$129,140

1.78

3.78

$43,746

$791,186

% Property Tax
Highlncome (%
households over
$75,000)

185

1.00%

1.06%

0.38%

-0.16

0.41

0.01%

2.15%

185

23%

20%

12%

0.97

0.92

3%

68%

Pop/ Street Mile

185

320

272

219

2.57

7.45

48

1,437

StreetSeg (feet)

185

446

417

123

2.22

9.33

232

1,193

ElemSchool

185

76%

97%

34%

-1.14

-0.18

0%

100%

CBD (Miles)

185

7.10

5.68

5.16

1.11

1.25

0.04

27.51
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Variable
Response
Time
(Seconds)
Station Area
(Sq. Miles)

Charlotte

Houston

Louisville

Portland

San
Francisco

319

408

283

297

327

252

291

396

8.25

6.54

6.92

5.5

1.02

2.51

4.22

13.27

Expenditure

$130

$151

$122

$236

$313

$219

$146

$244

Population

77,300

92,339

34,218

19,004

76,421

16,249

101,394

29,652

Households
PopDen
(Pop/Sq. Miles)
HomeDen
(Homes/Sq.
Miles)

30,812

34,019

14,176

8,025

32,496

7,504

39,641

10,077

1,987

3,588

1,933

4,390

20,969

6,576

4,901

5,903

857

1,439

857

2,049

10,454

3,293

1,518

2,422

% Non White

45%

49%

19%

21%

50%

32%

31%

34%

% Poverty

12%

19%

8%

14%

13%

13%

15%

19%

% HomeOwn

53%

45%

68%

53%

33%

47%

55%

53%

% DetHse

57%

52%

71%

58%

18%

52%

51%

46%

Veh/Hhold
AvgCTime
(Minutes)

1.59

1.49

1.73

1.49

1.07

1.42

1.41

1.51

26.00

29.00

23.00

24.00

32.00

25.83

22.58

31.31

$173,824

$114,235

$147,365

$204,229

$548,907

$295,923

$129,013

$145,069

0.88%

1.52%

0.73%

1.53%

0.29%

0.69%

1.06%

1.17%

25%

20%

27%

20%

35%

27%

19%

19%

210

298

209

238

837

313

310

336

501

520

557

370

360

370

438

469

ElemSchool

99%

96%

80%

89%

98%

91%

78%

47%

CBD (miles)

1.80

8.06

9.78

4.36

3.70

4.09

9.42

9.84

Home Value
% Property
Tax
High Income
(% households
over $75,000)
Pop/ Street
Mile (total
population/
total street
miles)
StreetSeg
(Feet)
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Seattle

st. Paul

Miami

4.3 Regression Results
Model 1, refer to Table 10, displays the results of the linear regression
analyses concerning the association between response time and proportion of
the nonwhite population, while controlling for area, expenditure, population
density and the individual city nonwhite values.
Table 10- Model 1 Results
1 (Non White)
R2 0.782
Variable
Sig
~
***
Constant
2.732
Area
0.059 ***
Expend
-0.086
Pop Den
-0.029 *
-0.028 **
NonWhite
Charlotte NW
-0.004
Houston - NW
0.025 ***
-0.025 ***
Louisville NW
-0.006
Portland NW
0.025 ***
San Fran NW
-0.018 **
Seattle- NW
Miami NW
0.028 ***

=

Std. Err
(0.142)
(0.016)
(0.055)
(0.016)
(0.013)
(0.007)
(0.006)
(0.007)
(0.007)
(0.008)
(0.007)
(0.007)

Model 1 and all the models were log-log models. The R2 for the model 1a was
0.78, which indicates that 78 percent of the variation of response times was
explained by this model. The signs of the coefficients were intuitively correct for
the model, with some exceptions. The area variable was significant and had a
positive sign in every socio-economic model, which was as expected. This
indicates fire districts that are larger in area with fewer stations can expect to
have longer response time. Population density in model 1a was only significant at
the 90 percent level; however the negative coefficient was not expected. Fire
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districts with greater population density can expect to have shorter response
times. The non-white variable, which is indicative of St. Paul, was found to be
significant at the O.OS level. Fire districts that have a greater non-white population
can expect to have shorter response times, overall. At the city level the Houston,
San Francisco, and Miami nonwhite variable were found to be significant at the

9S percent level or higher and had positive coefficients. This indicates that the
higher the proportion of nonwhites in those particular cities, the longer the
response times. Louisville, and Seattle also had coefficients that were significant
at the 9S% level or higher but had negative coefficients. This indicates that the
higher the proportion of nonwhites in those particular cities, the shorter the
response times. Since Model 1 and all the models are log-log specification
models, the coefficient can be interpreted as a direct percentage change in the
dependent variable. The estimates represent elasticities. For the purpose of
explanation, a 10 percent change in value will be used for the interpretation of
the coefficients. A 10 percent increase in the area of a fire district will result in an
increase in response times by 0.S9 percent, while holding all else constant, refer
to table 10. A 10 percent increase in population density will reduce response
times by 0.29 percent while holding all else constant. A 10 percent increase in
the non-white population of the fire district will increase response time by 0.28
percent, while holding all else constant.
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Table 11 - Summary Table for Results of 10% Elasticities for Equity Models

Model R2

1

2

3

0.782

0.796

0.722

Elasticity

I

10% inc in nonwhite pop. will result in a 0.28% dec in RT (St. Paul)

••

10% inc in the nonwhite pop. in Houston will result in a 0.25% inc in RT

•••

10% inc in the nonwhite pop. in Louisville will result in a 0.25% dec in RT

•••

10% inc in the nonwhite pop. in San Fran will result in a 0.25% inc in RT

•••

10% inc in the nonwhite pop. in Seattle will result in a 0.18% dec in RT

••

10% inc in the nonwhite pop. in Miami will result in a 0.28% inc in RT

•••

10% inc in the pop. in poverty will result in a 0.65% dec in RT (St. Paul)

•••

10% inc in the pop. in poverty in Houston will result in a 0.65% inc in RT
10% inc in the pop. in poverty in Louisville will result in a 0.33% dec in RT

•••
•••

10% inc in the pop. in poverty in San Fran will result in a 0.23% inc in RT

***

10% inc in the pop. in poverty in Seattle will result in a 0.23% dec in RT

***

10% inc in the pop. in poverty in Miami will result in a 0.31% inc in RT

•••

10% inc in homeowners in Houston will result in a 1.89% dec in RT

•••

10% inc in homeowners in Louisville will result in a 5.68% inc in RT

•••

10% inc in homeowners in Portland will result in a 2.37% inc in RT

•••

10% inc in homeowners in Portland will result in a 2.85% inc in RT

•••

10% inc in homeowners in Miami wi!1 result in a 0.88% dec in RT

•
•••
••
••

10% inc in the home value in Houston will result in a 0.13% dec in RT
10% inc in the home value in Louisville will result in a 0.21% inc in RT

4

S

6

0.766

0.779

0.748

Sig

10% inc in the home value in San Fran will result in a 0.17% inc in RT
10% inc in the home value in Seattle will result in a 0.01% dec in RT

**

10% inc in the home value in Miami will result in a 0.20% inc in RT

•••

10% inc in property taxes will result in a 0.66% inc in RT (St Paul)

•••

10% inc in property taxes in Houston will result in a 0.43% inc in RT

••*

10% inc in property taxes in San Fran will result in a 0.58% inc in RT

***

10% inc in property taxes in Miami will result in a 0.45% inc in RT

***

10% inc in high income households will result in a 0.51% inc in RT (St. Paul)

*

10% inc in high income households in Houston will result in a 1.04% dec in RT

***

10% inc in high income households in Louisville will result in a 1.14% inc in RT

***

10% inc in high income households in Portland will result in a 0.73% inc in RT

**

10% inc in high income households in Seattle will result in a 1.67% inc in RT

***

10% inc in high income households in Miami will result in a 0.79% dec in RT

**.

Inc· Increase, Dec· Decrease, RT • Response Time
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A 10 percent increase in the nonwhite population of Houston will result in
a 0.25 percent increase in response time, while holding all else constant, refer to
table 11 for a summary table of elasticities. A 10 percent increase in the
nonwhite population of Louisville will result in a 0.25 percent decrease in
response time, while holding all else constant. A 10 percent increase in the
nonwhite population of San Francisco will result in a 0.25 percent increase in
response time, while holding all else constant. A 10 percent increase in the
nonwhite population of Seattle will result in a 0.18 percent decrease in response
time, while holding all else constant. A 10 percent increase in the nonwhite
population of Miami will result in a 0.28 percent increase in response time, while
holding all else constant.
Table 12 - Model 2 Results
2 ~Poverty)
R = 0.796
Variable
Constant
Area
Expend
Pop Den
Poverty
Charlotte- Pov
Houston Pov
Louisville Pov
Portland Pov
San Fran Pov
Seattle Pov
Miami Pov

~

2.722
0.050
-0.100
-0.025
-0.065
-0.008
0.026
-0.033
-0.006
0.023
-0.023
0.031

Sig
***
***
*
*
***
***
***
***
***
***

Std. Err
(0.139)
(0.016)
(0.055)
(0.015)
(0.016)
(0.007)
(0.006)
(0.008)
(0.008)
(0.008)
(0.007)
(0.007)
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Model 2, refer to Table 12, had similar results to Model 1 and displays the
results of the linear regression analyses concerning the association between
response time and proportion of the population living in poverty and the control
variables. The R2 for the model 1b was 0.80. The control variables had almost
similar outcomes to Model 1. The only major difference was that the per capita
expenditure was found to be significant at the 90 percent level. The expenditure
variable had a negative coefficient, which was expected and indicates that the
higher the level of per capita spending the lower the response time will be. The
overall poverty variable was found to be significant at the 0.01 level and had a
positive coefficient, which was intuitively correct. The positive sign on the
coefficient indicates that the greater the proportion of the population living the
poverty within a fire district, the shorter the response times will be. The city level
poverty variables for Houston, Louisville, San Francisco, Seattle, and Miami were
all found to be significant. Houston, San Francisco, and Miami all had positive
coefficient signs, while Louisville and Seattle had negative coefficients. The
positive coefficients indicate that the higher the percentage of the population
living in poverty the longer the response time. The negative coefficient indicates
the higher the percentage of population living in poverty the shorter the response
time. A 10 percent increase in the area of a fire district will result in an increase
in response times by 0.50 percent, while holding all else constant. A 10 percent
increase in population density will result in a decrease in response times by 0.25
percent, while holding all else constant. A 10 percent increase in the population
living in poverty, will result in a 0.65 percent decrease in response time, while
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holding all else constant. A 10 percent increase in the population living in
poverty in Houston will result in a 0.26 percent increase in response time, while
holding all else constant. A 10 percent increase in the population living in
poverty in Louisville will result in a 0.26 percent decrease in response time, while
holding all else constant. A 10 percent increase in the population living in
poverty in San Francisco will result in a 0.23 percent increase in response time,
while holding all else constant. A 10 percent increase in the population living in
poverty in Seattle will result in a 0.23 percent decrease in response time, while
holding all else constant. A 10 percent increase in the population living in poverty
in Miami will result in a 0.31 percent increase in response time, while holding all
else constant.
Table 13 - Model 3 Results
3 (OwnHse)
R2 0.722

=

Variable
Constant
Area/Station
Expend
Pop Den
OwnHse
Charlotte OH
Houston_OH
Louisville OH
Portland OH
San Fran OH
Seattle OH
Miami OH

~

2.353
0.083
0.048
0.007
0.013
0.184
-0.189
0.568
0.237
-0.008
0.285
-0.088

Sig
***
***

*
***
***
***
***
*

Std. Err
(0.122)
(0.017)
(0.050)
(0.015)
(0.041 )
(0.096)
(0.056)
(0.022)
(0.022)
(0.026)
(0.021 )
(0.056)
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Model 3, refer to Table 13, displays the results of the linear regression
analyses concerning the association between response time and proportion of
home owners, while controlling for area, expenditure and population density. This
model had comparable results to the two preceding models. The R2 for the Model
3 was 0.72, which was lower than the other two models. The area control
variable was significant and positive. None of the other control variables were
found to be significant. The overall home owner variable was not found to be
significant. There were several individual city home owner variables that were
found to be significant at the 95 percent or higher level including Houston,
Louisville, Portland, and Seattle. Miami and Charlotte were significant at the 90
percent level. Charlotte, Louisville, Portland, and Seattle had positive coefficients
while Houston and Miami had negative coefficients. A positive coefficient
indicates that the higher the rate of homeownership the greater the response
time. A negative coefficient indicates that the higher the rate of homeownership
the lower the response time. A 10 percent increase in home ownership rates in
Charlotte will result in a 1.8 percent increase in response times, while holding all
else constant. A 10 percent increase in home ownership rates in Houston will
result in a 1.9 percent decrease in response times, while holding all else
constant. A 10 percent increase in homeownership rates in Louisville will results
in a 5.7 percent increase in response times, while holding all else constant. A 10
percent increase in homeownership rates in Portland will results in a 2.4 percent
increase in response times, while holding all else constant. A 10 percent increase
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in home ownership rates in Miami will result in a 0.9% decrease in response
times, while holding all else constant.
Model 4, refer to table 14, displays the results of the linear regression
analyses concerning the association between response time and home values,
while controlling for area, expenditure and population density. The R2 for the
model was 0.77 which indicates that 77 percent of the variation of response
times was explained by this model. The area control variable was significant and
positive. None of the other control variables were found to be significant.

Table 14 - Model 4 Results
4 (HomeVal)
R2= 0.766
Variable
Constant
Area
Expend
Pop Den
HomeVal
Charlotte_HV
Houston - HV
Louisville HV
Portland HV
San
Francisco HV
Seattle HV
Miami HV

p

Sig

2.655
0.071 ***
-0.051
-0.019
-0.006
-0.003
-0.013 ***
0.021 **
-0.004

Std. Err
(0.169)
(0.015)
(0.058)
(0.015)
(0.023)
(0.006)
(0.006)
(0.005)
(0.005)

0.017 **
-0.001 **
0.020 ***

(0.007)
(0.005)
(0.005)

***

The overall home value variable was not found to be significant. City home
value variables that were found to be significant at the 95 percent level with a
negative coefficient were Houston and Seattle, while Louisville, San Francisco
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and Miami were significant but had positive coefficients. A negative coefficient
indicates that the higher the home value, the lower the response time will be. The
positive coefficient indicates that the higher home value the higher the response
time. A 10 percent increase in the home value in Houston, would result in a
decrease in response time by 0.13 percent, while holding all else constant. A
10percent increase in the home values in Louisville would result in a 0.21 percent
increase in response times, while holding all else constant. A 10 percent increase
in home values in San Francisco would result in a 0.17 percent increase in
response time, while holding all else constant. A 10 percent increase in home
values in Miami would result in a 0.20 percent increase in response time, while
holding all else constant.
Table 15 - Model 5 Results
5 (ReaITax)
R2= 0.779
Variable
Constant
Area/Station
Expend
Pop Den
RealTax
Charlotte Tax
Houston Tax
Louisville Tax
Portland_Tax
San Fran Tax
Seattle_ T ax
Miami Tax

13

2.816
0.04
-0.064
-0.029
0.066
0.006
0.043
-0.012
0.003
0.058
-0.009
0.045

Sig
***
**
**
***
***

***
***

Std. Err
(0.169)
(0.015)
(0.058)
(0.015)
(0.023)
(0.006)
(0.006)
(0.005)
(0.005)
(0.007)
(0.005)
(0.005)

81

ModelS, refer to Table 15, displays the results of the linear regression
analyses concerning the association between response time and property-tax
rates, while controlling for area, expenditure and population density. The R2 for
the model was 0.78 which signifies that 78 percent of the variation of response
times was explained by this model. In this model the area control variable had a
positive coefficient and was significant at the 95 percent level. The population
density control variable was found to be significant and had a negative coefficient
that signifies the higher the population density the lower the response time. The
overall property tax variable was found to be significant at the 99 percent level
and had a positive coefficient. The higher the rate of property taxes the greater
the response time. Houston, San Francisco and Miami were all found to be
significant at the 99 percent level, and had positive coefficients that indicate that
the higher the rates of taxes the higher the response time. A 10 percent
increase in the property tax rate in Houston would result in a 0.43 percent
increase in response times, while holding all else constant. A 10 percent increase
in property taxes in a San Francisco would result in a 0.58 percent increase in
response times, while holding all else constant. A 10 percent increase in property
taxes in a Miami would result in a 0.45 percent increase in response times, while
holding all else constant.
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Table 16 - Model 6 Results
6(Highlncome)
R2= 0.748
Variable
Constant
Area
Expend
PopOen
Inc3
Charlotte_Highlncome
Houston_Highlncome
Louisville_Highlncome
Portland_Highlncome
San Fran_Highlncome
Seattle_Highlncome
Miami Highlncome

~

2.526
0.080
-0.010
0.000
0.051
0.062
-0.104
0.110
0.073
-0.069
0.167
-0.079

Sig
***
***

*
***
***
**
***
***

Std. Err
(0.157)
(0.016)
(0.062)
(0.015)
(0.030)
(0.042)
(0.030)
(0.038)
(0.031 )
(0.056)
(0.032)
(0.029)

Model 6, refer to Table 16, displays the results of the linear regression
analyses concerning the association between response time and proportion of
high income households while controlling for area, expenditure and population
density. The R2 for the model was 0.75. The area control variable had a positive
coefficient and was significant at the 95 percent level. None of the other control
variables were found to be significant. The overall Highlncome variable was
significant at the 90 percent level. The individual city Highlncome variables were
found to be significant for Houston, Louisville, Portland, Seattle, and Miami.
Houston and Miami had negative coefficients which indicate that the higher the
proportion of households who earn over $75,000 the lower the response time.
Louisville, Portland, and Seattle had positive coefficients which indicate that the
higher the proportion of households who earn over $75,000 the higher the
response time. For a 10 percent increase in the proportion of households who
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earn over $75,000 in Houston you would expect a 1 percent decrease in
response time, while holding all else constant. For a 10 percent increase in the
proportion of households who earn over $75,000 in Louisville you would expect a
1.1 percent increase in response time, while holding all else constant. For a 10
percent increase in the proportion of households who earn over $75,000 in
Portland you would expect a 0.73 percent increase in response time, while
holding all else constant. For a 10 percent increase in the proportion of
households who earn over $75,000 in Seattle you would expect a 1.7 percent
increase in response time, while holding all else constant. For a 10 percent
increase in the proportion of households who earn over $75,000 in Miami you
would expect a 0.8 percent decrease in response time, while holding all else
constant.
Model 7, refer to table 17, displays the results of the linear regression
analyses concerning the association between response time as the main
dependent variable and the proportion of detached housing as the main
independent variable, while controlling for area of the fire district, expenditure of
the fire department, and home density. All these models were log-log models.
The R2 for model 7 was 0.30. The area control variable was significant at the 99
percent level and had a positive coefficient. The expenditure variable was a
significant at the 95 percent level, and had a positive coefficient, which is not
intuitively correct.
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Table 17 - Model 7 Results
7 ~DetHse)
R = 0.304

p Sig
Variable
Constant
1.992 ***
Area
0.113 ***
Expend
0.153 **
HomeDen 0.000
DetHse
0.027 *

Std.
Err
(0.126)
(0.032)
(0.053)
(0.028)
(0.016)

Table 18 - Model7a Results
7a (DetHseCity)
R2= 0.649
Variable
Constant
Area/Station
Expend
HomeDen
DetHse
Charlotte DH
Houston DH
Louisville DH
Portland DH
San Fran_DH
Seattle DH
Miami DH

Std.
Sig
Err
13
***
2.441
(0.127)
0.094 *** (0.020)
0.026
(0.053)
-0.02
(0.017)
-0.02
(0.037)
(0.106)
0.159
***
-0.2
(0.056)
***
(0.123)
0.486
***
(0.046)
0.147
-0.03
(0.041 )
***
(0.040)
0.142
**
(0.040)
-0.08

The positive coefficient for expenditure indicates that the higher the level
of per capita spending, the greater the response time. The detached housing
variable was only significant at the 90 percent level, and had a positive
coefficient. For a 10 percent increase in the size of the area one could expect an
increase of 1.1 percent in response times, while holding all else constant. For a
10 percent increase in expenditure you would expect that response times to
8S

increase by 1.5 percent while holding all else constant. For a 10 percent increase
in proportion of detached housing you would expect a 0.3 percent increase in
response times.
Model 7a, refer to Table 18, is similar to model 7 the only difference is that
model 7a also has the variables for each city's proportion of detached housing.
The R2 for Model 7a was 0.65, which indicates that 65 percent of the variation in
response times is explainable by this model. The area control variable was
found to be significant with a positive coefficient, similar to Model 7. None of the
other control variables were found to be significant. The overall detached housing
variable was not significant at any level in this model. Detached housing
variables for Houston and Miami were found to be significant at the 95 percent
level or higher and both had negative coefficients. This indicates that the higher
the level of detached housing, the lower the response time. Louisville, Portland
and Seattle also were also significant, at the 99 percent level, and had positive
coefficient. The positive coefficient indicates that the higher the level of detached
housing the higher the response time. For a 10 percent increase in detached
housing in Houston one would expect a 2 percent decrease in response time,
while holding all else constant, refer to table 19 for a summary of elasticities for
all the sprawl models. For a 10 percent increase in detached housing in
Louisville, one would expect a 4.9 percent increase in response times, while
holding all else constant. For a 10 percent increase in detached housing in
Portland, one would expect a 1.5 percent increase in response times, while
holding all else constant.
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Table 19 - Summary Table for Results of 10% Elasticities for Sprawl Models

Model R2
7
0.304

7a

8

8a

9a
10

10a

11

11a

12
13

13a

0.649

0.486

0.77

0.609
0.35

0.774

OAOl

0.771

0.288
0.325
0.704

10% Elasticity

I

10% inc in detached housing will result in a 0.27% inc in RT
10% inc in detached housing in Houston will result in a 2.00% dec in RT
10% inc in detached housing in Louisville will result in a 4.86% inc in RT
10% inc in detached housing in Portland will result in a 1.47% inc in RT
10% inc in detached housing in Seattle will result in a 1.42% inc in RT
10% inc in detached housing in Miami will result in a 0.80% dec in RT
10% inc in AvgCtime will result in a 7.5% inc in RT
10% inc in AvgCtime in Houston will result in a 0.73% inc in RT
10% inc in AvgCtime in Louisville will result in a 0.49% dec in RT
10% inc in AvgCtime in San Fran will result in a 0.66% inc in RT
10% inc in AvgCtime in Seattle will result in a 0.42% dec in RT
10% inc in AvgCtime in Miami will result in a 0.70% inc in RT
10% inc in VehHH in Houston will result in a 8.94% inc in RT
10% inc in VehHH in San Fran will result in a 3.4% inc in RT
10% inc in VehHH in Miami will result in a 7.2% inc in RT
10% inc in PopStMile will result in a 1.8% inc in RT
10% inc in PopStMile in Houston will result in a 0.46% inc in RT
10% inc in PopStMile inLouisville will result in a 0.46% dec in RT
10% inc in PopStMile in San Fran will result in a 0.43% inc in RT
10% inc in PopStMile in Seattle will result in a 0.21% dec in RT
10% inc in popStMile in Miami will result in a 0.46% inc in RT
10% inc in streetSeg will result in a 0.81% inc in RT
10% inc in streetSeg in Houston will result in a 0.38% inc in RT
10% inc in streetSeg in Louisville will result in a 0.27% dec in RT
10% inc in streetSeg in San Fran will result in a 0.39% inc in RT
10% inc in streetSeg in Seattle will result in a 0.22% dec in RT
10% inc in streetSeg in Miami will result in a 0.39% inc in RT
10% inc in ElmSchool will result in a 0.36% dec in RT
10% inc in CDB will result in a 0.48% inc in RT
10% inc in CBD in Houston will result in a 1.46% inc in RT
10% inc in CBD in San Fran will result in a 1.59% inc in RT
10% inc in CBD in Miami will result in a 1.37% inc in RT
Inc· Increase, Dec· Decrease, RT • Response Time
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Sig
*
***
***
***
***
**
***
***
**
**
**
***
***
*
***
***
***
***
***
*
***
***
***
**
***
**
***
**
***
***
***
***

For a 10 percent increase in detached housing in Seattle, one would expect a 1.4
percent increase in response times, while holding all else constant. For 10
percent increase in detached housing in Miami one would expect a 0.8 percent
decrease in response time, while holding all else constant.
Table 20 - Model 8 Results
8(AvgCTime)
R2 0.486

=

Variable
Constant
Area
Expend
HomeDen
AvgCTime

~

Sig
***

1.429
0.084 ***
-0.011
-0.007
0.750 ***

Std.
Err
(0.126)
(0.022)
(0.043)
(0.020)
(0.091 )

Model 8, refer to Table 20, displays the results of the linear regression
analyses concerning the association between response time as the main
dependent variable and average commute times as the main independent
variable, while controlling for the area of the fire district, expenditure of the fire
department and home density. The R2 for the model 8 was 0.49. The area
control variable was significant at the 99 percent level and had a positive
coefficient. None of the other control variables were significant. The average
commute time variable was significant at the 99 percent level and had a positive
coefficient. This indicates that the greater the average commute time, the longer
the response time will be which is intuitively correct. For a 10 percent increase in
average commute times, one would expect a 7.5 percent increase in response
times.
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Table 21 - Model Sa Results
Sa (AvgCTimeCity)
R2= 0.770
Variable
Constant
Area
Expend
HomeDen
ComTime
Charlotte CT
Houston CT
Louisville CT
Portland CT
San Fran CT
Seattle CT
Miami CT

Std.
Sig
Err
~
2.642 *** (0.193)
0.057 *** (0.017)
-0.065
(0.057)
**
-0.029
(0.014)
0.033
(0.094)
-0.011
(0.022)
0.073 *** (0.019)
-0.049 **
(0.021)
-0.010
(0.020)
0.066 **
(0.026)
**
-0.042
(0.020)
0.070 *** (0.020)

Model Sa added the individual city commute time variables to model 3a.
The R2 for the model Sa was 0.77. The area control variable was significant at
the 99 percent level and had a positive coefficient. The home density control
variable was significant at the 95 percent level, and had a negative coefficient.
This indicates the higher the home density the lower the response time. The
overall commute time variable in model Sa was not significant. The individual city
commute time variables for Houston, Louisville, San Francisco, Seattle and
Miami were found to be significant at the 95 percent level or higher. Houston,
San Francisco and Miami had positive coefficients, while Louisville and Seattle
had negative coefficients. For a 10 percent increase in commute times in
Houston, one would expect an increase of 0.7 percent while holding all else
constant. For a 10 percent increase in commute time in Louisville, one would
expect a 0.5 decrease in response time, while holding all else constant. For a 10
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percent increase in commute time in San Francisco, would expect a 0.7 percent
increase in response times, while holding all else constant. For a 10 percent
increase in commute time in Seattle, one would expect a 0.5 decrease in
response time, while holding all else constant. For a 10 percent increase in
commute time in Miami, would expect a 0.7 percent increase in response times,
while holding all else constant.
Table 22 - Model 9 Results
9~VehHH)

R = 0.296
Variable
Constant
Area
Expend
HomeDen
VehHH

J3

Sig

2.060
0.141
0.116
0.027
0.053

***
***
**

Std.
Err
(0.118)
(0.026)
(0.047)
(0.023)
(0.066)

Model 9, refer to Table 22, displays the results of the linear regression
analyses concerning the association between response time as the main
dependent variable and the number of vehicles per household as the main
independent variable, while controlling for the area of the fire district, expenditure
of the fire department and home density. The R2 for the model 9 was 0.30. Both
the Area and expenditure control variables were found to be significant at the 95
percent level or higher and had positive coefficients, which were similar results to
model 8. The vehicles per household variable was not found to be significant.
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Table 23 - Model9a Results
9a (VehHH)
R2 = 0.609
Variable
Constant
Area/Station
Expend
HomeDen
VehHH
Charlotte VHH
Houston_VHH
Louisville VHH
Portland VHH
San Fran VHH
Seattle VHH
Miami VHH

~

Sig

2.355
0.044
0.034
0.002
-0.140
0.313
0.894
0.085
0.213
0.340
0.053
0.722

***
**

***

*
***

Std. Err
(0.146)
(0.022)
(0.056)
(0.018)
(0.152)
(0.198)
(0.177)
(0.171)
(0.169)
(0.190)
(0.163)
(0.166)

Model 9a, refer to Table 23, added the individual city vehicles per
household variables to the Model 9. The R2 for the Model 9a was 0.61. The area
control variable was significant, and had a positive sign for the coefficient.
Houston and Miami were both significant at the 99 percent level and had positive
signs for their coefficients. San Francisco was significant at the 90 percent level,
and also had a positive coefficient. For a 10 percent increase in the vehicles per
household in Houston, one would expect a 8.9 percent increase in response
times, while holding all else constant. For a 10 percent increase in the vehicles
per household, one would expect a 3.4 percent increase in response times in
San Francisco, while holding all else constant. For a 10 percent increase in the
vehicles per household in Miami, one would expect a 7.2 percent increase in
response times, while holding all else constant.
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Table 24 - Model 10 Results
10(PopStMile)
R2= 0.350
Variable
Constant
Area
Expend
HomeDen
PopStMile

~
1.884
0.133
0.140
-0.067
0.180

Sig
***
***
***

**
***

Std.
Err
(0.121)
(0.024)
(0.045)
(0.032)
(0.045)

Model 10 displays the results of the linear regression analyses concerning
the association between response time as the main dependent variable and the
population per street mile as the main independent variable, while controlling for
area of the fire district, expenditure of the fire department, and home density. The
R2 for the Model 10 was 0.35. The control variables for this model were all found
to be significant. Both area and expenditure were significant at the 99 percent
level and had positive coefficients. The home density variable was significant at
the 95 percent level and had a negative coefficient that indicates the higher the
home density the lower the response time. The population per street mile
variable was also significant at the 99 percent level. For a 10 percent increase in
the population per street mile one would expect a 1.8 percent decrease in
response times, while holding all else constant.
Model 10a, refer to Table 25, added the individual city population-perstreet-mile variables to the Model 10. The area and home density control
variables were found to be significant and had similar outcomes to Model 10.
Houston, San Francisco and the Miami population per street mile variables were
all significant at the 99 percent level and had a positive coefficient which
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indicates that the higher the population per street mile the longer the response
time.
Table 25 - Model10a Results
10a (PopStMileCity)
R2= 0.774
Variable
Sig
13
Constant
2.775 ***
Area
0.067 ***
Expend
-0.083
HomeDen
-0.025 **
PopStMile
-0.027
Charlotte PSM -0.008
Houston PSM
0.046 ***
Louisville PSM -0.032 ***
Portland PSM -0.004
San Fran PSM 0.043 ***
-0.021 *
Seattle PSM
Miami PSM
0.046 ***

Std. Err
(0.157)
(0.016)
(0.060)
(0.021 )
(0.033)
(0.013)
(0.011)
(0.012)
(0.011 )
(0.014)
(0.011 )
(0.011 )

Louisville was significant at the 99 percent level, while Seattle was significant at
the 90 percent level and both had negative coefficients. For a 10 percent
increase in the population per street mile in Houston one would expect a 0.5
percent increase in response times, while holding all else constant. For a 10
percent increase in the population per street mile in Louisville one would expect a
0.3 percent decrease in response times, while holding all else constant. For a 10
percent increase in the population per street mile in San Francisco one would
expect a 0.4 percent increase in response times, while holding all else constant.
For a 10 percent increase in the population per street mile in Seattle one would
expect a 0.2 percent decrease in response times, while holding all else constant.
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For a 10 percent increase in the population per street mile in Miami one would
expect a 0.5 percent increase in response times, while holding all else constant.
Table 26 - Model 11 Results
11 (StreetSeg)
R2 0.401

=

Variable
Constant
Area
Expend
HomeDen
StreetSeg

J3

0.552
0.131
0.165
0.088
0.461

Sig
*
***
***
***
***

Std. Err
(0.289)
(0.023)
(0.044)
(0.024)
(0.081)

Model 11, refer to Table 26, displays the results of the linear regression
analyses concerning the association between response time as the main
dependent variable and the length of the street segment as the main
independent variable, while controlling for area of the fire district, expenditure of
the fire department, and home density. The R2 for the Model 11 was 0.40. The
control variables for this model were all found to be significant at the 99 percent
level and all had positive sign for their coefficients. This was a reverse pattern for
the home density variable, which in Model 11 had a negative coefficient. The
street segment variable was found to be significant at the 99 percent level and
had a positive sign, which indicates that the longer the length of the street
segments the longer the response time will be. For a 10 percent increase in the
average street length one would expect response times to increase by 4.6
percent while holding all else constant.

In Model 11a, refer to table 27, the

individual city street segments variables were added to Model 11. The R2 for the
model 11 a was 0.77. The area control variable was significant at the 99 percent
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level and had a positive sign for the coefficient. Similar too many of the previous
models the street segment variables for Houston, San Francisco and Miami were
all significant at the 99 percent level and had positive signs for the coefficients.
Table 27 - Model11a Results
11 a (StreetSegCity)
R2 =0.771
Sig
Variable
~
***
Constant
2.363
Area
0.059 ***
-0.065
Expend
-0.011
HomeDen
0.101
StreetSeg
Charlotte SS
-0.006
0.038 ***
Houston SS
Louisville SS
-0.027 **
-0.003
Portland SS
0.039 ***
San Franc SS
-0.022 **
Seattle SS
0.039 ***
Miami SS

Std. Err
(0.157)
(0.016)
(0.060)
(0.021)
(0.033)
(0.013)
(0.011)
(0.012)
(0.011)
(0.014)
(0.011)
(0.011 )

This indicates that the greater the length of the street segment the longer the
response time will be. Louisville and Seattle were both significant at the 95
percent level and had negative coefficients. For a 10 percent increase in the
average length of a street segment in Houston one would expect a 0.4 percent
increase in response times, while holding all else constant. For a 10 percent
increase in the average length of a street segment in Louisville one would expect
a 0.3 percent decrease in response times, while holding all else constant. For a
10 percent increase in the average length of a street segment in San Francisco
one would expect a 0.4 percent increase in response times, while holding all else
constant. For a 10 percent increase in the average length of a street segment in
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Seattle one would expect a 0.2 percent decrease in response times, while
holding all else constant. For a 10 percent increase in the average length of a
street segment in Miami one would expect a 0.4 percent increase in response
times, while holding all else constant.
Table 28 - Model 12 Results
12 (ElmSch)
R2= 0.288
Variable
Constant
Area
Expend
HomeDen
ElmSch

p
2.124
0.152
0.069
0.039
-0.036

Sig
***
***

**

Std. Err
(0.121)
(0.027)
(0.050)
(0.026)
(0.018)

Model 12, refer to Table 28, displays the results of the linear regression
analyses concerning the association between response time as the main
dependent variable and the proportion of the population that lives within one mile
of an elementary school (Elmschool variable) as the main independent variable,
while controlling for area of the fire district, expenditure of the fire department,
and home density. The R2 for the model 12 was 0.29. The area control variable
was significant at the 99 percent level and had a positive coefficient. The other
control variables were not found to be significant. The Elmschool variable was
significant at the 95 percent level and had a negative sign for the coefficient,
which indicates that the higher the proportion of the population living within one
mile of an elementary school the lower the response time will be. For a 10
percent increase living within one mile of an elementary school one would expect
a 0.2 percent decrease in response times, while holding all else constant.
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Table 29 - Model 12a Results
12a (ElmSchooICity)
R2= 0.362
Variable
Sig
~
***
Constant
2.172
Area
0.138 ***
Expend
0.072
HomeOen
0.025
ElmSchool
0.044
Charlotte ES
1.025
-0.524
Houston ES
Louisville ES
0.049
Portland ES
-0.014
-0.465
San Fran ES
Seattle ES
0.258
Miami ES
-0.096

Std. Err
(0.128)
(0.028)
(0.049)
(0.028)
(0.399)
(3.491)
(0.480)
(0.401 )
(0.405)
(0.922)
(0.410)
(0.399)

In Model 12a, refer to Table 29, the individual city Elmschool variables
were added to Model 12. The R2 for the Model12a was 0.36. The area control
variable was significant at the 99 percent level and had a positive sign for the
coefficient. None of the individual city level Elmschool variables were found to be
significant.
Table 30 - Model 13 Results
13 (CBO)
R2= 0.325
Variable
Constant
Area
Expend
HomeOen
CBO

[3

Sig
***

2.056
0.134 ***
0.108 **
0.028
0.048 ***

Std.
Err
(0.113)
(0.025)
(0.046)
(0.023)
(0.017)
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Model 13, refer to Table 30, displays the results of the linear regression
analyses concerning the association between response time as the main
dependent variable and the distance from the CBO as the main independent
variable, while controlling for area of the fire district, expenditure of the fire
department, and home density. The R2 for the model 13 was 0.32. Both the Area
and expenditure control variables were found to be significant at the 95 percent
level or higher and had positive coefficients. The CBO variable was significant at
the 99 percent level and had a positive sign for the coefficient which indicates the
greater the distance from the CBO the longer the response time. For a 10
percent increase in the distance from the CSO one could expect a 0.5 percent
increase in response times while holding all else constant.
Table 31 - Model13a Results
13a(CSOcity)
R2 =0.704
Variable
Constant
Area
Expend
HomeOen
CSO
Charlotte_CBO
Houston_CBO
Louisville CSO
Portland CBO
San Fran CSO
Seattle CBO
Miami CBO

a

Sig

2.597
0.068
-0.054
-0.006
-0.041
0.082
0.146
-0.034
0.001
0.159
-0.064
0.137

***
***

***

***
***

Std.
Err
(0.128)
(0.028)
(0.049)
(0.028)
(0.399)
(3.491 )
(0.480)
(0.401 )
(0.405)
(0.922)
(0.410)
(0.399)
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In Model 13a, refer to Table 31, the individual city CBO variables were
added to model6a. The R2 for the model13a was 0.70. The area control variable
was significant at the 99 percent level and had a positive sign for the coefficient.
The CBO variables for Houston, San Francisco and Miami were all significant at
the 99 percent level and had positive signs for their coefficients. For a 10 percent
increase in the distance from the CBO in Houston one would expect a 1.5
percent increase in response times, while holding all else constant. For a 10
percent increase in the distance from the CBO in San Francisco one would
expect a 1.6 percent increase in response times, while holding all else constant.
For a 10 percent increase in the distance from the CBO in Miami one would
expect a 1.4 percent increase in response times, while holding all else constant.

4.3 Spatial Analysis
Figure 1 (Appendix 1) displays a map of the percentage of the nonwhite
population at the census tract level for Houston, Texas (and all of Harris County)
along with fire district boundaries. The percentages are displayed through four
categories using quartiles. The lowest percentages are represented by the yellow
color, which is less than 20 percent nonwhite, while the highest percentages are
represented by the dark red, which greater than 59.01 percent nonwhite. The
thick black lines on the map represent the fire districts for the Houston Fire
Oepartment. The CBO is represented by a red star on the map. The highest
proportions of nonwhites in Houston are concentrated within the central portion of
the city, surrounding the CBO. There are at least 40 census tracts in this area
that are greater than 90 percent nonwhite population. More specifically, areas
including the southwest, south central and north east of the CBO have the
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highest concentrations of nonwhites. Areas of Houston that have higher
concentrations of whites include the northeast, northwest, and eastern portions of
the city. There is also a swath just west of the CBO that also has higher
concentration of whites.
Figure 2 displays a similar map of the percentage of the nonwhite
population in Louisville, Kentucky. There is a similar coloring scheme to this map
as the lowest percentages of nonwhites are represented by the yellow color,
which is less than 6 percent nonwhite, while the highest percentages of
nonwhites are represented by the dark red, which are greater than 35.01 percent
nonwhite. Nonwhites are concentrated within two main areas in Louisville. The
first area with the highest concentration of nonwhites is in north west Louisville.
There are at least 35 census tracts within this area that fall within the last quartile
with the highest proportion of nonwhites. There are 15 census tracts in this area
that have at least a population of 90 percent nonwhite or greater. The CBO can
also be found in this part of the city. The second area with higher concentrations
of nonwhites can be found towards the center of Louisville-Jefferson County.
There are six census tracts in this cluster of high proportion of nonwhites, which
range from 40-90 percent nonwhite. The south-west and south-central edge of
the county generally have the lowest percentage of nonwhites and highest
concentration of whites.
Figure 3 displays a map of the nonwhites in Seattle, Washington. The
percentages are displayed through four categories using quartiles. The lowest
percentages are represented by the yellow color, which is less than 13 percent
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nonwhite, while the highest percentages are represented by the dark red, which
are greater than 40.01 percent nonwhite. The thick black lines on the map
represent the fire districts for the Seattle Fire Department. The highest
concentrations of nonwhites are found within the southern portion of Seattle.
There were at least 36 census tracts within this cluster in the last quartile in the
south of Seattle that had as a minimum a 40 percent nonwhite population. The
north and the west generally had lower concentrations of nonwhites, although in
the far north of the city there were higher concentrations of nonwhites in the 3rd
quartile between 20-40 percent nonwhite.
Figure 4 displays a map of the proportion of nonwhites by census tract in
Miami-Dade, Florida. This map has a similar color scheme to the other previous
maps. The census tracts can fall within four categories that have been divided
into quartiles. The yellow color represent the lowest proportion of nonwhites,
which is below 10 percent, while the dark red color represent the census tracts
with the highest proportion of nonwhites which is greater than 52.01 percent.
Nonwhites are heavily concentrated in within northern Miami-Dade, directly north
of the CBD. There are 70 census tracts in this area that have the highest
concentration of nonwhites, and approximately 24 of those census tracts have
greater than 90 percent nonwhites. The area just directly west of the CBD has
the lowest concentrations of nonwhites.
Figure 5 is a map that displays the proportion of people that are living in
poverty at the census tract level in Houston, Texas. This map has a similar
coloring scheme, as the previous maps. The data is broken down into 4
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categories using the quartiles. The yellow represents the lowest quartile, which is
less than or equal to 5 percent of the population living in poverty. The dark red is
the highest category of a population living in poverty and represents at least
23.01 percent or greater living in poverty. This map is very similar to nonwhite
map, although there are some minor differences. Poverty is concentrated within
the center of Houston, around the CBD, especially towards the east. The
difference between the nonwhite map and the poverty map was that there were
also high concentrations of nonwhite towards the southwest, and while there are
high rates of poverty in the southwest of Houston, they are not as high as around
the CBD, and towards the east of the CBD. There are several census tracts that
have at least 40 percent of the population or greater living in poverty.
Figure 6 displays rates of poverty in Louisville, Kentucky. The areas with
the highest rates of poverty, exactly match those areas that have the highest
concentrations of nonwhites within the city. The north west of the city has the
largest cluster of a population living below the poverty line. At least 20 of
Louisville 170 census tracts with the highest rates of poverty, greater than 30
percent, are found within this area. In general the west of Louisville has higher
rates of poverty when compared to the east. Rates of poverty were very low in
the eastern portion of Louisville, when compared to the rest of the city.
Figure 7 displays a map of the proportion of people that are living in
poverty at the census tract level in Seattle. Overall the rates of poverty were
lower in Seattle, when compared to Houston or Louisville. Seattle followed a
similar pattern to the other two cities in that areas with high poverty coincided

102

with areas that had high proportions of nonwhites. Poverty was concentrated in
the southern section of the city, south of the CBD. There were roughly 25 census
tracts around the CBD that had the highest concentrations of poverty where
between 15-50 percent of the population was living in poverty. Poverty was not
confined to the southern portion of Seattle, as there were a few census tracts in
the north of the city that fell in the group with the highest rates of poverty.
Figure 8 displays rates of poverty in Miami-Dade, Florida. The areas with
the highest rates of poverty, exactly match those areas that have the highest
concentrations of nonwhites within the city. As nonwhites were heavily
concentrated in within northern Miami, directly north of the CBD, so to were the
highest rates of poverty within the city. Anywhere between 25-65 percent of the
population in this area just north of the CBO was living below the poverty level.
There were at least 60 census tracts in this high concentration area that fell
within the highest rate of poverty category. There were also a few census tracts
in the south that fell into the highest category of poverty. Directly south west of
this area with the high rates of poverty was an area that had the lowest rates of
poverty within the city.
Figure 9 displays a map of the homeownership rates in Houston. The data
was divided into four categories using quartiles. The lowest rates of home
ownership were represented by yellow and included of rates of less than 33
percent owner occupied. Dark red represented the category with the highest
rates of homeownership, and greater than 74.01 percent owner occupied. The
general pattern was the rates of homeownership were the lowest in the center of
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the city. The further away from the center the higher the rates of ownership. This
map had the reverse pattern of the other two previous maps for Houston. The
highest rates of ownership were found within the north-east and north-west of the
city. There were also other sporadic areas across the city with high rates of home
ownership.
Figure 10 is a map of homeownership rates in Louisville. The data was
divided into four categories using quartiles, the lowest category being
represented by yellow with rates of ownership less than 47 percent and the
highest being represented by dark red with ownership rates of greater than 76.01
percent. This map displays similar patterns to the homeownership map of
Houston, and was somewhat the reverse of the other two previous maps of
Louisville. The lowest rates of homeownership were around the CBD. The further
away from the center of the city the higher the rates of home ownership. The
highest rates of ownership were at the edges of the county.
Figure 11 displays a map of homeownership rates in Seattle. The color
scheme was similar to the other maps. The lowest rates of home ownership were
represented by yellow and included of rates of less than 35 percent owner
occupied. Dark red represented the category with the highest rates of
homeownership, and greater than 67.01 percent owner occupied. Similar to all
the other cities homeownership rates were lowest in the area surrounding the
CBD. Rates of homeownership gradually increased the further away from the
CBD. However, this pattern was not as distinct in Seattle, as it was in other
locations. The largest cluster of the highest rates of homeownership was found in
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the north eastern section of the city. In general the edge of the city had higher
rates of home ownership compared to the central section of the city. Rates of
homeownership were not as high in Seattle as they were in Houston and
Louisville.
Figure 12 displays a map of homeownership rates in Miami. Similar to the
other maps, the lowest rates of home ownership were represented by yellow and
included of rates of less that 31 percent owner occupied. Dark red represented
the category with the highest rates of homeownership, and greater than 76.01
percent owner occupied. Similar to all the other home ownership maps, rates of
ownership were lowest surrounding the CBD, in north eastern section of MiamiDade in the city of Miami. Areas west and south west of the CBD had the highest
rates of home ownership. Miami was similar to the other cities in general as the
further the distance from the CBD the higher the rates of homeownership.
The next series of maps where those of average home values. Figure 20
displays a map of average home values by census tracts in Houston. Average
home values were divided into four categories using quartiles. Yellow represents
the lowest home values, with values of less than $26,000. The dark red
represents the area with the highest home values in Houston with values of
greater than $80,000. Home values were the lowest surrounding the CBD,
especially around the central eastern sections of the city. Home values in this
part of the city were very low, with an average below $20,000. The farther away
from this part of the city the higher the home values, especially towards the edge
of the city and county. Home values were generally higher in the northern
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sections on Houston, towards the north-west and north east. One area that had
the highest homes values of the city was towards the west of the CBD. This was
the same swath of census tracts that had higher proportions of whites. The
average home values in this area were around $250,000, however there were
many homes that were well above this value and were in the range of $400,000
to $800,000.
Figure 13 displays a map of home values in Louisville. Yellow represents
the lowest home values, with values of less than $40,000. The dark red
represents the area with the highest home values in Houston with values of
greater than $97,000. Louisville has a very distinct pattern. Home values were
much higher in the eastern portion of the city when compared to the western
portion of the city. The northeastern section of the city had the highest home
values in the city, with prices ranging between $250,000 - $350,000. Similar to
Houston, home values were the lowest surrounding the CBD. This area of the
city in the northwest of Louisville had very low home values with the average
being less than $23,000.
Figure 14 displays a map of home values by census tract in Seattle.
Yellow represents the lowest home values, with values of less than $88,000. The
dark red represents the area with the highest home values in Houston with
values of greater than $192,000. Home values in general were much higher in
Seattle when compared to Houston or Louisville. Similar to the other two cities,
home values were lowest surrounding the CBD. Homes values were around
$40,000 on average. The northern and western section of Seattle had higher
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home values and in fact the highest values where in the northwest where the
average home price was between $300,000- $500,000.
Figure 15 displays a home values in Miami. Yellow represents the lowest
home values, with values of less than $36,000. The dark red represents the area
with the highest home values in Houston with values of greater than $100,001.
Similar to all the other cities, the lowest values in Miami were found around the
CBD, or just directly north of the CBD. On average, homes were less than
$20,000 in this area. The north-eastern section of the Miami had lower home
values in general when compared to the rest of the city. The west and south-west
of the CBD had the highest home values. Homes on average were around
$250,000 in the south west section of Miami, and around $150,000 in the west.
The highest home values were generally found in census tracts that were along
the coast, just south west of the CBD and ranged in price between $400,000 and
$800,000.
Figure 16 displays a map of property tax rates in Houston. Tax rates were
divided into four groups, using quartiles. Yellow represent the lowest tax rates,
less the 1.3 percent. Dark red represents the highest tax rate, with values greater
than 1.81 percent. The general pattern is that rates are the lowest towards the
center of the city. The highest tax rates are out towards the suburbs outside of
the central city. Directly around the CBD rates are about 0.8 percent of the
property overall value on average. The census tracts with the lowest rates of
property taxes were however not all concentrated together in one particular area
of the city. The highest rates of taxation where in most cases on the edge of the
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city or outside of the city limits found in Harris County. Rates were on average
greater than 2 percent of overall property value on an annual basis. There were
also a few areas within the city on the extreme edge in the north east and south
east that did have rates higher rates, greater than 2 percent average.
Figure 17 displays a map of property tax rates in Louisville. The coloring
scheme was similar to the previous map, and divided up using quartiles. Yellow
represent the lowest tax rate in Louisville with values less than 0.67 percent,
while dark red represents the highest tax rates greater than 0.80 percent.
Property tax rates in Louisville were much lower than in Houston. Louisville also
displayed a different pattern than Houston. The major difference was that tax
rates in Louisville were the lowest in the suburbs that were the farthest away
from the CBD, although there were several census tracts in northwestern
Louisville that did have low rates of property taxes. Rates were higher towards
the center of the city. In fact, the highest rates, greater than 0.90 percent were all
found within the boundaries of old Louisville. The eastern portion of the city in
general did have some areas that had higher rates of property taxes.
Figure 18 displays a map of property tax rate in Miami, Florida. The color
scheme was similar to the previous map, and divided up using quartiles. Yellow
represent the lowest tax rate in Miami with values less than 1 percent. Dark red
represents the highest tax rates greater than 1.41 percent. Property tax rates in
Miami were higher than in Louisville, but where lower than in Houston on
average. Miami did not display any major patterns like the other two cities. Tax
rates were low immediately surrounding the CBD. The northern section of Miami
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tended to have the lower rates of property taxation. There was no area with a
major concentration of the highest rates of taxation as the census tracts with the
highest rates were spread throughout the city although they were away from the
CBO.
Figure 19 through 22 are maps of average commute times for Houston,
Louisville, Seattle, and Miami. Average commute times were divided into four
categories using quartiles. Yellow represents the lowest commute time, while
dark red represents the highest category for commute times. Commute times
were lowest in Louisville and highest in Miami. All four maps generally indicate
similar patterns. Commuting times are commonly the lowest around the CBO and
the center of each city. The further one gets from the center of the city towards
the suburban locations of each city the higher the average commute time. There
is an exception to this, however, and that is the areas with higher concentrations
of nonwhites which are usually close in proximity to the CBO also have higher
commute times.
Figure 23 through 26 are maps of response times at the fire district level
superimposed on the census tracts for Houston, Louisville, Seattle, and Miami.
Response times were divided into 4 categories using quartiles. Yellow represents
the lowest response time, while dark red represents the highest response times.
Figure 31 displays a map of response times for Houston. Response times were
the lowest around the CBO and just north and south of the CBO. The fire
districts that were farther away from the center of the city had response times
that were higher when compared to the center of the city. Generally speaking the
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highest response times where in the fire districts that were at the edge of the city.
Figure 27 displays a map of response times for Louisville and was somewhat
similar to the map of Houston. The similarity was the lowest response times
where in the center of the city around the eBO and the highest were towards the
edge of the city. However, there were a few fire districts that were also out in the
suburbs outside of old Louisville that also fell into the lowest category for
response times. The highest response times in Louisville were found in the in the
south-west and north east of the city. Figure 28 displays a map of response times
in Seattle. Similar to both Houston and Louisville, the lowest response times
were found in the center of the city. However, there were also a few fire districts
that were not in the center of the city and fell within the lowest response time
category as well. Generally the highest response times were out from the center
of the city and small clusters of the fire districts with higher response times could
be found in the north-east and south-west. Figure 34 displays a map of response
times of Miami. Miami's map was very similar to Houston, and displayed very
similar patterns. The lowest values for response times were found in the center of
the city towards the eBO and the further away from the center of the city,
generally speaking, the higher the response times.

110

4.5 Qualitative Results
The qualitative research in this study is a further in-depth analysis of the
most salient results of the quantitative portion. Three fire districts within
Louisville-Jefferson County were examined in-depth. Furthermore, the qualitative
research draws on the expertise of fire chiefs from several different fire
departments within Louisville-Jefferson County, Kentucky to explain factors that
influence response times. Specifically the intent of this portion of the research
was to get the experience from fire chiefs who experience fire fighting in different
types of urban environments and to get the perspective from an urban district fire
chief, an urban suburban fire chief and a fire chief from a totally suburban fire
district. The three fire departments and districts that were included for this portion
of the study were Lyndon, Jeffersontown and Harrods Creek.
The Lyndon fire protection district and Fire Department was the urban fire
district. An attempt was made to interview fire personnel from the Louisville Metro
Fire department for the urban fire district; however, the public information officer
was away on sick leave. Lyndon was selected as an alternative. The
urban/suburban mix fire district was the Jeffersontown fire protection district and
fire department. The suburban fire district was Harrods Creek. Each fire district
had different management structures, with some similarities. Lyndon had a Chief,
followed by three battalion chiefs.
Jeffersontown had a Chief followed by an assistant chief. Jeffersontown
also had three chiefs for the different divisions in the department including fire
prevention, training and maintenance. Harrods Creek had a chief followed by an
assistant chief. Harrods creek also had three division chiefs.
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Response Time

Stations
Career Fire Fighter
Volunteer Fire Fighter
Budget
Per Capita

ISO
Vehicles
Runs

Harrods
Lyndon
Jeffersontown Creek
3:28
5:03
5:45
2.00
3.00
2.00
27
48
35
15
5
25
$2,835,894

$4,725,791

$2,553,500

$94
3

$148

$167
3

6
1,640

6

5
2,172

2 (3/9)

556

30,315
31,960
15,288
Population
14,028
12,980
6,187
Homes
25.25
10.13
20.09
Area (Sq Mi)
1,266
2,992
761
Pop Den (Pop / Sq Mi)
1,385
514
308
Home Den (Homes / Sq Mi)
Avg Income
$64,887
$61,881
$131,630
(Income/Household)
$158,996
$141,649
$318,379
Average Home Value
$0.10/ $100
$0.10/$100
Tax Rate
$0.10/ $100
Source: Lyndon, Jefferson and Harrods Creek Fire Oepartments, 2009.

Lyndon was the smallest fire districts of the three, with a total area of 10.1
sq. mi., refer to Table 32. Jeffersontown was the largest fire district at 25 sq. mi.,
while Harrods Creek had an area of 20 sq. mi.. Lyndon had the shortest average
response time at 3:28, while Harrods Creek had the greatest average response
time at 5:45.
Both the Lyndon and Harrods Creek Fire Oepartments have two fire
stations, and Jeffersontown has three fire stations. Lyndon has a total of 27
career fire-fighters, and 15 volunteer fire-fighters. Jeffersontown has a 48 career
fire-fighters, and five volunteers. Harrods Creek has a 35 career and 25 volunteer
fire fighters. Harrods Creek had the greatest proportion of volunteer fire fighters
at 42 percent, while Jeffersontown had the lowest proportion of volunteer fire
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fighters at 9 percent. Jeffersontown had a budget of $4.7 million, the highest of
the 3. Lyndon had a budget of $2.8 million and Harrods Creek had a budget of
$2.5 million. On a per capita basis for expenditure Harrods Creek had the highest
dollar amount at $167 per individual in the fire district, while Jeffersontown was
$148 and Lyndon was $94 per individual. Lyndon and Harrods Creek both had
ISO ratings of 3, while Jeffersontown had multiple ratings. The actually city of
Jeffersontown has a rating of 2, while outside of the city boundaries has a ISO
rating of 3, and some parts of the fire district have an ISO rating of 9, which
means that in those particular areas homes are at least 1000 feet away from a
fire hydrant. Lyndon has five vehicles in total, while both Jeffersontown and
Harrods Creek both have six vehicles. Lyndon had 2,172 runs in total and 2,007
were non-fire runs. This includes medical, false alarms, Haz Mat, Other
Hazardous Calls, and mutual-aid calls. There were about 105 fire calls in total for
Lyndon. Jeffersontown had a total of 1,640 runs and Harrods Creek had a total of
556 runs.
Jeffersontown had the largest population at approximately 32,000 people
while Lyndon had approximately 30,000 people. Harrods Creek had the smallest
population at roughly 15,000 people. Lyndon had the highest population density
at nearly 3,000 people per sq. mile. Jeffersontown had a much lower population
density then Lyndon and was approximately 1,260 people per sq. mile. Harrods
Creek had the lowest population density among the three, at around 760 people
per sq. mile. Lyndon had the greatest number of homes, at around 14,000 while
Jeffersontown had 13,000 homes and Harrods Creek had the fewest number of
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homes at about 6,200. Similar to population density, home density was the
highest in Lyndon at about 1,400 homes per sq. mile. Jeffersontown had a much
lower home density at about 500 homes per sq. mil. and Harrods Creek had the
lowest home density at approximately 300 homes per sq. mi.. Both average
home values, and house hold income were the highest in Harrods Creek. Home
values were around $320,000, while household income was about $130,000.
Jeffersontown had both the lowest average home values and household income.
Home values were around $140,000 and household income was about $62,000.
The first question asked of the Fire Chiefs was "What is the most
influencing factor-(s) on fire department response times?" The Lyndon fire chief
believed that man power, was the most important factor in determining response
time, especially the number of staff in quarters and manning an apparatus. Other
factors that the Lyndon fire chief thought were important were infrastructure,
mainly the road system, and unknown factors such as rail crossings, weather,
downed trees and power lines, flooding, and construction. According to the
Jeffersontown fire chief, time of day was a major factor that influences response
time because of traffic conditions, and whether or not the fire fighters were awake
(because of 24-hour shifts). The Jeffersontown fire chief also thought that other
important factors were the environmental aspects of the district such as the
topography and geography of the area, and weather conditions. The Harrods
Creek fire chief said that resources and man power where the most significant
factors that influence response times; however, other factors such as geography,
the placement of stations, and traffic conditions were also important factors to
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consider. There were several common responses among the three fire chiefs on
the factors that influenced response times, mainly staffing, traffic conditions and
geography. There were no surprises with the fire chief's responses as they were
areas that were covered during the literature review.
Question 2 asked if "the allocation of resources such as personnel,
vehicles, stations, etc. has an impact on response times". The response of the
Lyndon Fire Chief was that the allocation of resource has the greatest impact on
response times. The positioning of resources is critical, and strategic planning is
of utmost importance especially for future growth. Deciding how equipment
should be manned and where they should be placed is important. The level of
staffing is not necessarily that important, but how many staff are in quarters and
on duty is very important. If the department relies more heavily on volunteer staff
rather than full-time staff then response times will suffer. The Jeffersontown Fire
Chief also believed that the allocation of resources was equally important in
determining of response times. Resources should be distributed based on two
factors, demographics and whoever has the greatest need. The Harrods Creek
fire chief also believed that the allocation of resource was one of most influencing
factors of response times. The problem is that sometimes when new growth at
the edge of the district occurs, new developments are far away from the current
stations, and fire departments do not have the resource to build a new station
around the new growth and response times will be affected. The distribution of
resources was important to all three fire chiefs in determining response times.
There were also a few other important factors that were identified such as
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response times suffering at new housing developments and that resources
should be distributed based on demographics and need. It was important that
this chief mentioned that resources should be distributed based on need and
demographics and not solely based on a population, as this would lead to
disparities.
Question 3 was "Would you say that in certain cities that lower-income
areas are disadvantaged with respect to response times?" The answers to this
question by all three fire chiefs were unanimous, and it was of no surprise. All
three believed that lower SES areas should not be disadvantaged with response
times, and in fact, lower-income areas should actually have better response
times. The Lyndon Fire Chief believed that lower income areas within inner cities
have full time staff, and the infrastructure hasn't changed and therefore stations
are in place and manned. However, the Lyndon chief believed that economic
factors could very likely affect this. Stations could be closed down in an
economically depressed area, and this would most certainly affect response
times as they would have to be served by another station or district. The Lyndon
fire chief pointed out this was currently going on in the Louisville Metro Fire
District, a station was recently lost because of the city's bad economic situation.
The Jeffersontown Fire Chief said that although fire follows poverty, that
response times should not be worse off in lower-income areas. Resources are
distributed on who needs and therefore people in higher poverty areas should
have more resources so they shouldn't be disadvantaged with regards to
response times. The Harrods Creek fire chief also had a similar opinion that
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resources are distributed based on demand and that lower income areas should
not be disadvantaged. Lower income areas have a greater demand for services
so more resource will be placed in those areas and should consequently have
better response times. If low income areas were disadvantaged, I don't believe
that these chiefs would actually admit this because this question has serious
implications for equity and it is such a sensitive subject.
Question 4 was the opposite of question 3 and was "Would you say that in
certain cities that fire districts with higher cost housing have better response
times". Similar to the answers to the previous question, the responses were
unanimous, and because in the previous question all three indicated that
resources are distributed based on need, that wealthier areas should in fact have
greater response times. The Lyndon Fire Chief didn't think that areas with higher
cost housing should have better response times, but they should actually have
worse off response times because big homes are on bigger parcels of land, and
the homes are spread farther apart and stations are also spread farther apart so
fire trucks should actually take a longer time in getting to the wealthier homes.
The Jeffersontown Fire Chief also did not believe that areas with wealthier
homes would have better response times. If it were the case that the wealthier
area had better response time than it might have something to do with the
funding levels. This was an interesting qualifying statement that was made that if
wealthier areas did have better response times that it was strictly related to
higher levels of funding. The lower socio-economic status area might have lower
levels of funding than a wealthier area and might have to rely on volunteers
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which would increase response times. The fire chief from Harrods Creek also did
not think that areas with higher cost housing should not have better response
times. However, the Harrods Creek Fire Chief made the same qualifying
statement that the Jeffersontown chief said, that if response times in wealthier
areas were better than it would most certainly have to do with levels of funding.
Certain areas may have better funding so they can afford more staffing, better
equipment and could as a result have better response times. The Harrods Creek
fire chief also thought that if an area that had the wealthier homes were in was a
smaller independent fire department then perhaps they could have better
response times. The Harrods Creek fire chief thought that smaller fire
departments were more efficient especially when it comes to management and
can readily make changes more easily than a larger fire department when a
problem is found like response times and address the issue.
Question 5 examines the fire chief's opinions on rates of property taxation
and its affect on response times. The question was "Would you say that in certain
cities with higher rates of property taxes would fire departments have better
response times". There seems to be some level of consensus about this question
between the three chiefs. The Lyndon fire chief believed if there were high rates
of taxation then a department would be able to afford having full time staff, rather
than relying upon volunteers and also having better equipment and stations
which would lead to better response times. The Jeffersontown Department Chief
also believed that a higher rate of taxation would lead to better response times, if
there were greater funding which would be used for more resources. However,
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total funding depends on the population density of the fire district. The greater the
density of the fire district the greater the amount of funding that is available. The
Harrods Creek fire chief also believed that a higher rate of property taxation
would lead to better response times because of more staffing. LouisvilleJefferson County Suburban fire districts have a rate of $0.10 per $100 of real
property (home and vehicle). The Harrods Creek fire chief pointed out that other
areas such as Indianapolis have property tax rates of $0.24 - $0.38 per $100 of
real property and Cincinnati has a rate of $0.17 per $100. The suburban fire
protection districts in Louisville have to do with less funding, when compared to
other similar cities. After several questions it is very apparent that funding is of
utmost importance. This question was related to funding and in the previous
questions issue of funding arose and the point was made very clear that higher
levels of funding for an area would lead to better response time and this could be
the potential reason for why higher SES areas could potentially have better
response times ..
The next three questions were about the specific results from the equity
portion of the quantitative analysis. Question 6 asked why "in certain cities lowerincome areas were disadvantaged with respect to response times ...... Would you
have any possible explanations for this?" All three fire chiefs were somewhat
surprised with these results, and did not think that it would be possible for lower
SES areas to be disadvantaged with response times. The Lyndon fire chief
thought that in certain areas, especially that were economically challenged, may
have closed down fire stations as a measure of cost-cutting and this would most
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likely affect response times. The Lyndon Chief believes that in economically
difficult times local governments resort to shutting down stations and
consolidating them which will result in response times going up.
The Lyndon chief also mentioned that a proposition in California closed
several fire stations which may have impacted response times in that state. Other
factors that will influence response times include a change in the infrastructure,
plant closures and urban development that results in traffic change. The
Jeffersontown Fire Chief believed that areas with higher density and in poverty
have a greater need for resources, because fire follows poverty. These areas
should have more resources according to the Jeffersontown Fire Chief, however
If stations are busy responding to calls fire engines from other locations may
have to be brought in, which will increase response times. The Harrods Creek
fire department found the result to be surprising and counterintuitive because
low- income areas should have a higher volume of calls, and therefore more
resources which should lead to better response times. The explanations that
were provided in my opinion were not sufficient and give the impression of an
excuse. If the reason why some lower SES areas are disadvantaged with
response times is because of funding and resources this would indicate that fire
provision is not distributed based on need. Areas that have the highest need
should not have station closures as this would jeopardize people within those
areas.
Question 7 was similar to question 6 and asked for explanations of why "in
certain cities would fire districts with higher cost housing have better response
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times". The response to this question was somewhat similar to the previous
question and the fire chiefs were again surprised by the results. Similar rational
as the previous question was used by two of the chiefs, who said wealthier areas
could potentially have greater funding which would allow for the acquisition of
greater resource and staffing which would all lead to lower response times.
The Lyndon Fire Chief said that he could only speak of his experience
from his fire district, and didn't know why in those cities results would end up the
way that they did. In Louisville-Jefferson County more affluent areas are served
by independent fire departments rather than one big fire department and funding
that is raised for fire is only spent on fire which is more efficient, where in other
cities that might not be the case and fire departments might have to fight for
funding from a city's general fund. The Lyndon Fire Chief also believed that
some wealthier areas would also have greater funding which would lead to more
staffing and resources which would lead to lower response times. The
Jeffersontown Fire Chief said that areas with more density, usually lower income
areas, will have more demand for services so greater demand could put a strain
on services which would increase response times. The Harrods Creek Fire Chief
believed that there could be some political reasons for areas with higher-cost
housing having better response times. Perhaps there could be some people with
political power living in areas where services are improved because a certain
politician lives in that area. The Harrods Creek Fire Chief gave the example of a
fire district in Jefferson County where they brought in an ambulance because of a
city councilor who had experienced a heart attack. The ambulance was kept in
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the district for several years, however, the cost was too great to keep it there.
The Harrods Creek Fire Chief gave the example of his district that has very
expensive housing; however they lack the population density to support having
additional resources so they don't have better response times when compared to
other areas with lower cost housing.
Question 8 examined why it was found that "the higher the rate of property
taxes, the worse the response time?" All three Chiefs gave explanations, some of
which were related to one another as to why some areas would have higher rates
of taxes, but worse off response times. Mainly that poor areas may not be able to
achieve similar levels of fudging with the same tax rate when compared with an
affluent district or area. The Lyndon fire chief thought that the area with the
higher rates of taxation could be in an economically depressed area, which is a
plausible explanation. These impoverished areas would need higher rates of
taxation to get similar response times or staffing levels as other areas that were
not economically depressed. The Lyndon fire chief gave the example of the Black
Mud Fire Protection District in Jefferson County. He said that this was an indigent
fire district and several years ago they were collecting taxes at a rate of $0.10 per
$100 of real property, while Lyndon was collecting taxes at the rate of $0.06 per
$100 of real property. The district was eventually absorbed by another fire district
because they were unable to provide adequate services to their residents.
The Lyndon Fire Chief also mentioned that the urban tax rate in Louisville
was higher than the suburban tax rate and that the urban response time was
most likely not the fastest. In fact, Lyndon has the fastest average response time
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in the Louisville-Jefferson County at 3:28, while Louisville Metro has an average
response time of 3:45. Districts outside of the Louisville urban service district
have more money and can afford more stations and have smaller service areas.
The Lyndon fire chief also said that "smaller fire departments do everything the
same as large departments, but do it with fewer people which means lower costs.
Unions don't like that, and Louisville has a good union." The Harrods Creek Fire
chief also mentioned the Louisville fire fighters union. He said that Louisville
annexed the Oxmoor area but did not provide additional resources to this area.
No new stations were built out in the Oxmoor area by the Louisville Urban Fire
department. The union contract also prohibited any suburban fire departments
from responding to an urban district and so he felt as if this was taxation without
representation. He thought that this would increase response times in that
particular area, and they also would have the higher tax rates of the urban
service district, which are around $0.22 to $0.25 per $100 of real property.
Similar to the Lyndon Fire Chief, the Harrods Creek Fire Chief also
believed that poor areas would have to compensate for not being able to collect
enough tax revenue from their residents so higher tax rates would be required.
The Jeffersontown Fire Chief believed that question about taxing rates and
response times has to do with how the fire departments and districts are funded.
He said that the Jeffersontown Fire Protection District has its own taxing authority
for the fire department and that the funds only come from Jeffersontown, while
Louisville funds the fire department from the general fund and funds come from
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all of Jefferson County. He also mentioned that Louisville has different taxing
sources that go into the general fund pool, such as the employment tax.
The next series of questions deal with the spatial and sprawl component
of the study. The questions asked each of the fire chiefs what they believed had
the biggest impact in slowing down their response times from the following seven
options including: commuting times, vehicle ownership, population density, length
of the block, divert of land use, distance from the center of the city, and
proportion of detached housing. Each of the fire chiefs gave a different answer
on which affected his fire district the most and this depended on where each of
the fire stations was located within the county such as urban, urban/suburban,
and completely suburban. It makes sense that each different area would be
faced with different challenges that are brought on by urban sprawl, and that not
each area would have a similar problem. The Lyndon Fire Chief selected
commuting time as having the largest impact on response times in his district. He
said that almost every factor is planned for except for traffic conditions and that
traffic patterns and the time of day have a huge impact on response times. The
Jeffersontown Fire Chief said that distance from the center of the city had the
largest impact on response times in his district. He said that there was a
considerable amount of new development at the edge of his fire district and no
new fire stations had been built around the new developments at the edge of the
county and district. The Harrods Creek Fire Chief said that they were most
affected by population density, or a lack of it. The Chief said that the low density
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within the fire district limits the departments funding, which affects staffing and
resources and impacts response times.
Question 10 examines the role of commuting and the impact of traffic on
response times for each of the fire districts and asks the chiefs for suggestions
on how to deal with issue. Two of chiefs, one from the urban and the other from
the urban/suburban mix fire districts thought that traffic was a major impediment
to their department in responding to an emergency. Lyndon was greatly affected
by traffic and commuting. The Lyndon Chief said that all the suburban fire
districts came together and implemented a policy of having the closest station
respond to a fire, regardless of the fire district and political boundary. Their GIS
dispatching system would take into account time of day and other factors before
dispatching a certain department to a fire. However, the union for the Louisville
Fire department prevents other districts from responding to fires within the
Louisville fire district unless a certain level of alarm is hit or they call and ask for
assistance. According to the Lyndon fire chief, one of the main reasons for this
program being implemented was because of traffic congestion in certain fire
districts which made it very difficult to respond to fires especially around
rush-hour times. Fire chiefs will usually ask developers for multiple access points
into developments and industrial parks, however the developers will argue that
building additional roads will cost too much.
The Jeffersontown fire district also has a problem with traffic and
responding to emergencies at certain times of the day. The Jeffersontown chief
gave an example of the industrial park within his district that has 30,000 people
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working in it. The chief said that this industrial park only has one way in and one
way out, and when an emergency occurs at rush-hour time when people are
either leaving or coming to work it creates a major problem for the fire
department in responding to an emergency. A major problem is not the amount
of congestion, but the congestion outpacing the ability of the infrastructure to
handle increased traffic. The Harrods Creek Fire Chief agreed that traffic
conditions and commuting was a problem for responding to emergencies,
however, because Harrods Creek was so sparsely populated that traffic was not
a major concern for his district. The Harrods Creek Chief suggested that having
more stations spread out around the district and staff would help reduce
problems associated with traffic conditions.
Question 11 examined the length of street blocks and their impact on
response times. Two of the three chiefs had problems with this issue of their fire
department being affected by street connectivity. The Lyndon fire chief said that
Lyndon was not really affected by the length of street blocks (street segment)
because they were based on a grid system and that there was good street
connectivity within Lyndon. This would be expected in any major urban area as
having smaller street blocks and great access. According to the Lyndon Fire
Chief connectivity is very important for fire departments as fire fighters need
multiple access points to get to specific locations for quick response. This was
also an important point for the Jeffersontown fire chief as connectivity is a major
problem. Short blocks are easy to navigate but large ones are not, and
sometimes fire fighters get lost responding to an emergency, and if the block is
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very large then the fire trucks will have to take a greater amount of time to get
around the block again to respond to the emergency. This is an important point
that the Jeffersontown Chief conceded, that on occasion fire fighters do get lost
and make mistakes which can potentially contributed to greater response times,
which the shape of the landscape will affect. The Harrods Creek Fire district was
also affected by block length. The chief said that the homes in this Harrods Creek
fire district are spaced far apart on long winding roads and long driveways
sometimes with gates and trees that doesn't allow for the passage of fire vehicles
that makes it very difficult to get to some emergenCies quickly
The last question of the survey asked if response times ever affected
policies of fire departments or cities in any way. All three fire chiefs said yes to
this question, that response times will affect policies and cities. The Lyndon Fire
Chief said that response times will tell you when another station is needed, or
when more resources are needed. The Lyndon fire chief pointed to the example
of the policy to share resources between the suburban fire departments
regardless of political boundary as a prime example of how response times affect
fire department policies. The Jeffersontown fire chief said that response times will
tell you where resources need to be assigned and whether or not a new station
needs to built or a station needs to be expanded and renovated. The
Jeffersontown Chief also said that sometimes fire department policies are
influenced not by wanting better protection and reducing response times, but by
keeping insurance rates down for businesses. The city and the economic
development people will approach fire departments and tell them that they need
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to build a fire station in close proximity to a new commercial development.
Developments need to be within 5 mi. of a fire station to get good ISO ratings.
The city and the developers tell the fire department that without the good ISO
ratings, businesses will not come to the new developments. So instead of placing
the station where it is truly needed, stations will be placed in locations that will
lower insurance rates for businesses. This is a common practice of the
development community and the fire department. The Harrods Creek Fire Chief
gave an example of how response times affected policy. He said that in an
adjacent fire district an influential person had died and the fire department had no
ambulance at the time. Due to the death of this prominent individual an
ambulance was placed in this fire district. The Harrods Creek Fire Chief believed
that response times will influence how resources are distributed and
administered within a fire district.
In summation this section was significant that all the chiefs believed that
resources were disseminated on need and not potential loss. None of the chiefs
believed that the lower SES areas should be disadvantaged with response times.
When the results of the study were revealed to the chiefs that in certain cities the
lower SES areas were disadvantaged and conversely the wealthy were
advantaged, they were all surprised. Levels of funding were used as the main
rationale by the chiefs to explain why these possible consequences could have
come about.
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CHAPTER 5
DISCUSSION, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
5.1 Discussion
Equality
"All Americans, white or black, rich or poor, are entitled to equal
protection" (Bullard, 2002:7). Based on the findings within this study, this does
not seem to be the case as poor minorities are worse off than their wealthier
white counterparts depending on what city they live in and what part of the city
they come from. These findings partly confirm the hypotheses, while some of the
other findings may create more questions. The first major finding is that response
times did vary by the socio-economic status (SES) of the people in the fire
district. Outcome of the analyses signified that the results varied by the city and
within the cities themselves. These findings would confirm and be in line with
findings of Duncombe (1991), Rich (1982), Peterson (1981) and Drier et al.
(2004) which indicated that services do vary across and between communities
and that service provision is not equal. Several of the statistical models
confirmed the hypothesis that response times did vary by the SES of the fire
district, and more specifically, that the poor and minority populations were worse
off with respect to response times, while the wealthy were better off in some
cities. Based on these results fire protection resources are not distributed based
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on need, contrary to what the fire chiefs said in the qualitative section, but rather
on potential loss, which is inequitable. If the main reason for this discrepancy is
because of funding, as identified as one of the potential reasons by the fire
chiefs, then shouldn't areas with greater need have greater funding?
The first model to indicate that response times did vary by the SES of the
fire districts population was the nonwhite model. Nonwhites were disadvantaged
with respect to response times when area, expenditure, and population density
were controlled for in Houston, San Francisco and Miami. The opposite was true
for nonwhites in Louisville, Seattle and St. Paul. The second model to indicate
that response times did vary by SES was the model that examined people living
in poverty. Those living below the poverty level in Houston, Miami and San
Francisco were worse off than people who were not living in poverty with respect
to response times, which is inequitable.
These findings are consistent with a study that was conducted by
Southwick and Butler (1985) which found that poverty and higher density was
consistently linked with fire loss in larger cities. Houston is most likely affected
by poverty, while San Francisco by density. Once again, the reverse was true for
people living in poverty in Louisville, Seattle and St. Paul as response times were
more favorable in the areas with higher poverty when compared to areas that
had fewer people who were not living in poverty. The housing tenure model also
indicated that response times varied by the SES of its population. Areas with
greater concentration of home-owners in Houston and Seattle had more
favorable response times when compared to areas in those cities with fewer
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home owners. Areas with higher concentrations of homeowners are usually white
and are able to organize and mobilize when concerns arise at the neighborhood
level and home owners can demand that action be taken, such as lobbying for
greater fire protection (Bullard, 2000). Areas with higher concentrations of home
owners in Louisville, San Francisco, and Miami had worse response times when
compared to areas with lower concentrations of homeowners.
The home value model was able to demonstrate that response times
varied by the average price of a home within a fire district. Fire districts with
higher home values in Houston and Seattle had more favorable response times
when compared to fire districts with lower home values. The opposite was true
for Louisville, San Francisco and Miami as areas with higher home values had
response times that were not favorable. Fire districts with higher rates of property
taxation were worse off for response times in Houston, San Francisco and Miami.
The statistical model which looked at high income households and response
times also signified that results varied by the SES and were inequitable as
households that earned greater than $75,000 in Houston and Miami where better
off with respect to response times. The reverse was true in Louisville, Portland
and Seattle and households who earned more than $75,000 where worse off for
response times.
The results indicate that people in lower SES groups have poorer
response times (when controlling for several factors) in some cities and better off
in others. People in lower SES groups were worse off in cities like Houston, San
Francisco and Miami, but they were better off in cities like Louisville and Seattle.
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There are possible explanations of why people of lower SES where worse off in
certain cities like Houston, Miami, and San Francisco while they fared better in
cities like Louisville or Seattle. One of the more obvious explanation is size of the
cities that were compared as Houston, Miami and San Francisco where much
larger than Louisville or Seattle. Houston is the fourth largest city in the country.
Related to this is the proportion of minorities and people living in poverty are
much higher in cities like Houston and Miami when compared to Louisville and
Seattle. Approximately 50 percent of the population in both Miami and Houston
were nonwhite and close to 19 percent of population was living below the poverty
level. The proportion of nonwhites was much lower in Louisville with 19 percent
of the population being nonwhite, and 32 percent for Seattle. The levels of
poverty were also much lower in both Seattle and Louisville, with 8 percent of the
population living in poverty in Louisville and 13 percent of the population in
Seattle was living in Poverty. San Francisco also had higher proportion of
nonwhites, however, the level of poverty was much lower than Houston and
Miami.
Based on the maps it is evident that nonwhites and people living below the
poverty level were concentrated in Houston, Louisville, Seattle, and Miami.
Powell (2002) explains that when poverty and the social problems that are
associated with poverty are concentrated within inner cities that the problems are
isolated on the "minority" side of the city boundary, and that suburban whites are
spared from having to share the fiscal and social burdens associated with the
problems of the inner city. Drier et al. (2004) have identified many social and
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economic disparities between inner cities and suburbs. Houston is one city that
demonstrates many of these disparities that these authors discuss. Houston is a
city that has pursued a policy of low taxes and low public services (Savitich and
Kantor 2002). The existence of neighborhoods with unique service needs, such
as greater fire protection, creates the potential for inequitable service delivery
(Rich, 1978). Inner city neighborhoods are unique and require greater fire
protection services. This is one reason why minorities fared worst in Houston.
During the interview in the qualitative section one of the chiefs said that it was
most likely that the low-income areas faced station closings as possible rationale
of why minorities experienced worse conditions with respect to response times in
cities such as Houston and Miami. If this was the case that a lower SES area
with greater need for services experienced a station closures, then this would be
a clear example of inequality. With some further investigation it was found that
the Houston Fire Department closed three fire stations within the last decade.
Two of the three fire stations were located within the fire district with the CBD that
was among the lowest for housing values within Houston and had the highest
proportion of minorities and people living in poverty. Stations closures could also
related to declining populations within an area, and because these closures
occurred in the downtown section of Houston it is plausible that the area
experienced a declining population. Louisville also has recently shut down a
station within its urban fire district close to south-west Louisville near the CBD.
All the fire chiefs said that response times would go up as a result because crews
have to come from farther distances to respond to an emergency. According to
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the Louisville daily paper, The Courier-Journal, by shutting down the station the
city will save approximately $500,000 and will reassign 12 fire-fighters.
High-income households were better off in Houston and Miami which is
inequitable because it means these groups do have the same level of need as
low income groups. High income households were worse off in Louisville,
Portland and Seattle. Lower-income fire districts utilize fire services more than
affluent areas. If there is a greater need for fire services in these districts than fire
crews stationed in the lower-income areas and their services will be will be used
more often and crews might have to sent in from other areas to compensate for
the greater volume of work. However, according to all three fire chiefs in
Louisville-Jefferson County resources are disseminated based on need, so, in
fact, these lower-income areas should have greater resources and poor people
should have shorter response times, but this is not what is actually occurring in
Houston in Miami which indicates inequality in these cities. It seems as if
resources were distributed based on need in Louisville and to a lesser extent in
Seattle as areas with lower SES had better response times. In every model
people in the lower socio-economic status groups fared better with respect to
response times in Louisville when compared to people in the higher socio
economic groups. The same was generally true for Seattle, except for in the
model with home values, which demonstrated that the higher the costs of
housing within the fire district the lower the response time. This would seem to be
in line with Lineberry's findings (1977) that the poor are not worse off, at least in
Louisville. These findings from Louisville and Seattle would confirm what the fire
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chiefs said in the qualitative interviews, that resources are distributed on need
because people in the lower socioeconomic status groups did better with
response times as a measure of service. However one fact that contradicts this
finding is that during the qualitative interviews it came out that the economic
development people in Louisville put pressure upon the fire departments to build
fire stations near new commercial developments for the purpose of achieving
lower insurance rates. If new fire stations are not placed in these locations then
the fire chiefs are warned that businesses will not locate in these developments.
If this is the case that resources and services are not always distributed based on
need but rather on potential loss. This would confirm the findings and results
from previous studies of Lucy (1981), Cingranelli (1981), and Sanger (1982).

Sprawl
The second major finding of this dissertation is that urban sprawl does
affect response times and that it does endanger people. However the findings
depend on the city. Sprawl factors increased response times which put people's
lives at risk in Houston, Miami and San Francisco, which were in line with my
hypothesis. However, San Francisco is not considered a sprawled city and is
actually a very dense and compact city and the linear relationships could be as a
result of the high density of the city. Sprawl did not seem to hinder fire response
in Louisville and Seattle, and in fact, the opposite may have occurred which is
counter intuitive. The sprawl factors that had the greatest influence on response
times were commuting times, population per street mile, the length of the street
segment and the number of vehicles per household. Other sprawl factors also
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affected response times to a lesser degree. In the qualitative section it was
identified that fire districts, depending on where they are located will be impacted
by sprawl factors in different ways. For example traffic and congestion was the
biggest problem for the Lyndon (urban) fire district, which is an applicable finding
to San Francisco's results. However, Lyndon did not have problems with
connectivity as there street system is based on a grid and they have smaller
street block, which would also apply to San Francisco.
Areas with detached housing had higher response times in general,
however when cities where examined on an individual basis the results were
surprising. In both Houston and Miami the higher the proportion of detached
housing, the lower the response time which would indicate that inner city areas
with fewer single family detached homes have longer response times. This is the
goal of fire codes that discourage multifamily dwellings in favor of single
detached homes that fire response will be able to maneuver more efficiently in
areas with less density. The findings from this model for Houston and Miami are
in line with the other findings from the equity models as areas that are usually far
away from the inner city have a higher proportion of detached housing and in
Houston these results are favorable towards those who live in detached housing.
In Louisville, Portland and Seattle the higher the proportion of detached housing
the higher the response time. These findings are not favorable towards people
who live in detached housing.
The impact of commuting times, congestion and automobile ownership on
response times in Houston, Miami and San Francisco was no surprise and are
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very clear. These factors were all identified as problems by the fire chiefs within
the qualitative analysis. These factors are dangerous to peoples lives, because
they increase response times. Commuting times in Houston, San Francisco and
Miami negatively affected response times, while the opposite was true for
Louisville and Seattle which was somewhat unexpected. Vehicle ownership in
both Houston and Miami also negatively affected response times. Population per
street mile, a proxy measure for congestion, negatively affected response times
in Houston, San Francisco and Miami. The opposite was true for Louisville and
Seattle and the higher the population per street mile the lower the response
times.
The worsening traffic conditions within the suburbs have been as a result
of a rapid increase in population, vehicle ownership, and vehicle usage within
these sprawled areas (Burchell et aI., 2005) Traffic conditions have a major
impact on how fire departments respond to emergencies. Fire departments
respond to traffic accidents, and if there are a considerable amount of accidents
this will prevent the fire department from responding to fire emergencies in a
decent time, which puts people's lives in jeopardy. Traffic of an entire community
may solely rely on a single road and this may entirely be the case in suburban
regions and as a result may be congested for a great portions of the day, and if
an accident occurs, the entire road system is baSically useless until the problem
is cleared (Duany et al.,2000). Sprawl has also made traffic conditions worse
because of the combination of longer trips, and a higher proportion of people
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using private automobiles results in greater miles driven on the roadways
(Burchell et aI., 2005).
The fire chiefs in the qualitative analysis stressed that traffic had a major
impact on response. During certain times of the day responding to emergencies
becomes increasingly difficult because of grid lock on the roadways. This is
especially the case in Houston, where response times where greatly affected by
commuting and congestion. Houston is city that is known for sprawl and has a
combination of low-density living and an absence of mass transportation system
which has brought traffic congestion to the point of suffocation (Savitch and
Kantor, 2002).Louisville was one of the smaller cities in this study, and although
in the regression results it does not seem to be affected by commuting, it still
faces problems with traffic congestion as pointed out during the qualitative
section. Based on a study that was conducted by the Brookings Institute (2002)
on Louisville, the percentage of the congested lane miles in the region increased
from 36 percent to 55 percent between 1990 and 2000. This rise in congestion
according to the study poses a serious threat to the quality of life.
Based on the findings from the spatial analysis, commuting times where
still the highest in the suburban regions on each 4 cities that were examined, and
the lowest towards the center of the city. The traditional pattern of commuting
has been that people from the suburban neighborhoods commute to the CBD to
their place of employment. Although many jobs are still located within the CBD,
some people may no longer work in the downtown core, as many places of
employment have scattered throughout the metropolitan area. Suburban areas
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are home to many new office parks and small downtowns that located at major
intersections at the edges of cities (Jargowsky, 2002). People may now travel
from one suburban location where they live to another suburban location where
their place of employment is located. According to Jargowsky (2002) when
companies decide to locate within suburban regions, this creates a spatial
mismatch, and people located within the urban core, especially the
underprivileged are unable for various reasons to get to those particular jobs.
This could also be another reason for the lower commuting within the downtown
core.
There were some interesting results from the length of the street segment,
proportion of the population within 1 mile of an elementary school and the
distance from the CBD. The length of the street segment was a proxy measure
for the size of the block. The results demonstrated that the length of the street
segment affected response times. In the general model for the length of the
street segment the longer the length of the street segment the longer the
response times. The results with the individual cities are more interesting as
findings indicate that the longer the length of the street segment in Houston, San
Francisco and Miami the longer the response time, while the opposite is true for
Louisville and Seattle the longer the length of the street segment the lower the
response time. The general model for land use was measured through a proxy
variable which measured the percentage of the population living within 1 mile of
an elementary school. The results indicate that the higher the proportion of the
population living within 1 mile of an elementary school the lower the response
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time. However the model which includes the cities was unable to find any
relationships.
There were some positive associations with the distance of the fire district
from the CBD and response times that indicated that the farther away the fire
district was from the CBD, the higher the response time. In model which stratified
that data by cities it was found that in Houston, San Francisco, and Miami the
further the distance from the CBD the higher the response time. In the qualitative
section the Jeffersontown Fire Chief said that distance from the center of the city
was a big problem for his fire district. A considerable amount of new development
had occurred at the fringes of the Jeffersontown district and these new
developments were very far from the existing fire stations that were located
within the older areas of the district, and no new stations had been built to
accommodate this development so response times at these suburban locations
had suffered. Sprawled developments challenge public safety because the long
distances and single-entry subdivisions make it difficult to provide adequate
services with reasonable response times (Duany et aI., 2000). These new
development at the fringes of cities such as Houston or Miami might not have fire
hydrants in close proximity so tanker trucks need to be used to provide water
supply for fighting a fire which will take additional time for the vehicle to arrive on
scene. In the qualitative section it was identified that some locations in the
Jeffersontown Fire District are located at the fringe of the county and have an
ISO rating of 9, which indicates that homes are at least 1,000 feet away from a
fire hydrant and this could be why in Houston and Miami the farther away from
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the CBD, the higher the response times, Water supply and fire hydrants should
not be a problem in San Francisco as the city has established a wide network of
cisterns, pump stations, and a pipe network to provide water for fire department
as the city learned a tough lesson from the 1906 earth quake as the main
problem was a lack of water to fight the fire that resulted after the earth quake
(Scawthorn, Yamada, and Lemura, 2007),
Are Sprawl and Equity Related?
The findings regarding the sprawl factors were expected, that sprawl
would at least in some cities endanger people because of its effects on
lengthening response times, However, these findings seem somewhat
contradictory at a first glance as one might expect that if sprawl would negatively
affect response times, then areas that have higher concentrations of people in
lower socio-economic classes, who are usually concentrated within the inner
cities should have better response times, yet the opposite was true in Houston,
Miami and San Francisco, Some might say, so what why does it matter that that
people who live in sprawled areas have longer fire department response times,
that these people can "afford" to have longer response times,
However, based on the results from the analysis of this study, I argue that
not only are people who are living in sprawled areas affected by greater
response times, but people who are living in the inner cities are also affected by
this, Communities that are sprawled have spread their resources too thin and
both groups of people who live in the inner cities and people who live in sprawled
developments are negatively affected when it comes to service provision, Drier,
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et al (2004) identify when people try to maximize their personal well-being by
living in sprawled suburban developments their choices create social costs that
affect everybody, even the wealthy. Duanay et al. (2000) discuss a study of
suburban Milwaukee where the residents pay $5,000 in property taxes, but
services cost the city more than $10,000 on an annual basis. Sprawled
developments usually require greater funding for fire protection because the
costs for providing equipment increases as new homes that require protection
are in outlying areas that do not have adequate water supply so fire departments
may have to spend $200,000 for tankers that provide water in remote locations
(Livingston, Ridlington, and Baker, 2003). Livingston et al. (2003) were able to
demonstrate that a community of 50,000 developed at one home per 1.6 acres
would need approximately eight fire stations to provide adequate services, for a
total cost of $12 million, however by developing more compactly the same
population could be served by 4 or 5 stations for a total cost of about $6-7.5
million. Cities need to make up the balance of this cost discrepancy somewhere.
What ends up happening is that all residents end up paying for the services of
those who live in suburban areas, or municipalities will provide fewer public
services (Burchell et aI., 2005). Those who suffer the greatest from a lack of fire
protection are not those who live in wealthy neighborhoods, but are the poor who
live in the inner cities. The fire chief from the completely suburban fire district in
Louisville explained that in his district there were no fires within the past 18
months for which to respond.
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A study conducted by Savitch, Collins, Sanders and Markham (1993)
found that central cities and their surrounding suburbs and regions were highly
interdependent. Furthermore Savitch et al. (1993) were able to demonstrate with
strong statistical correlations that suburbs benefit when their core cities are
viable. This was a study that examined economic prosperity; however, I believe
that it could also be applied to the example from this study. Generally speaking,
the results indicated that when the lower socio-economic groups concentrated
within inner cities fared worse, so did the suburban areas of those cities primarily
in Houston and Miami. When the reverse occurred and the lower socioeconomic
groups did not fare worse in Louisville and Seattle, the suburban areas also did a
better job at providing better fire protection to the outlying areas.
Fire-fighters in Louisville Jefferson County get training from different
sources than fire fighters who are trained at one unified fire department. The
urban fire district is trained in one location and the fire fighters from the suburban
fire district are trained at another location. Perhaps by splitting up the training,
fire-fighters are able to focus on the needs of their particular location. Fire
fighters for example from a fire department in Houston or Miami who work in an
inner-city fire district might be relocated to a suburban fire district and take along
with them the training and mentality that is prevalent within that district.
Another explanation for the results of why sprawl did not negatively affect
response in Louisville is the structure of fire districts and departments. Results
indicate that sprawl did not impede the ability of fire departments to respond to
emergencies within Louisville-Jefferson County. The results of the Louisville
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were very different from the Houston and Miami. Seattle also had somewhat
similar results to Louisville. The fire department system in Louisville is very
different from the other cities. Each fire district within Louisville-Jefferson County
has its own department, and is a separate jurisdictional entity, compared to
Houston and Seattle which have one unified fire department and Miami which
has a fire department for the city and another fire department for the rest of the
county. The suburban fire departments in Jefferson County have set up a
mutual-aid agreement that will allow during certain times of the day when traffic
conditions are unfavorable for the nearest fire department to respond to an
emergency regardless of the district that the emergency is located in. It appears
as if this policy has been beneficial to suburban residents of Jefferson County as
they are not negatively affected by sprawl.
The results may also have something to do with the fire districts being
independent in Louisville and being a special unit of government. Burns (1994)
identified that these special district governments, which provide services such as
fire provision, build exclusionary walls against lower SES groups to protect
themselves from the taxes and problems of older cities and this would be very
relevant to the findings for Louisville. As lower income areas within in the inner
cities have a greater number of fires, fire protective services are utilized more
often and therefore cost more. In the qualitative section it was identified that
suburban residents in Jefferson County have a tax rate of $0.10 per $100 of real
property, while the residents of urban fire district have a rate that is at least twice
that of the suburban rate. These individuals who live in these independent fire
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districts have their tax dollars only going to their district and the funds are strictly
used for fire-fighting within their district. By having these independent fire districts
wealthier people are isolating themselves from the costs of those who live in the
urban fire district and make greater use of fire services.
Based on the qualitative and quantitative research of this study, smaller
fire departments (in Louisville) are more effective and efficient then one very
large fire department. This is consistent with other findings that have found small
and medium sized police departments perform more effectively than larger police
departments and they are more cost efficient (Ostrom, 2000). Hirsch (1964) and
Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren (1961) also have found that services are not
always best delivered through a one major governmental source, but through
different governments that vary in scale and geography. This was the case for
the fire departments in the Louisville-Jefferson County. For example, per capita
funding for the Lyndon Fire District was $94, $148 for the Jeffersontown fire
district and $167 for the Harrods Creek Fire District. Per capita funding in
Houston was higher than Lyndon and Jeffersontown at $151; however, Houston
was much lower than the other major cities. Per capita funding for Miami City
was $211 and $253 for Miami-Dade and $313 per capita for San Francisco. Both
Jeffersontown and Harrods Creek fire departments are fire districts that are of a
suburban nature and therefore per capita costs are higher because similar
services have to be provided to fewer number of residents.
It was found in Houston, Miami and San Francisco that the higher the rate
of property taxes, the higher the response time. One would expect the opposite
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to occur, if greater revenue meant improved service, however, this wasn't the
case. The fire chiefs said that greater resources and funding should reduce
response times, however, based on the findings from this analysis this wasn't the
case. The expenditure control variables were significant (at 95 percent or higher)
in several models. The coefficient in every case was positive, which indicates the
higher the per capita spending the higher the response time. At first glance this
seems counter intuitive, however if we examine the per capita spending levels of
Lyndon, Jeffersontown and Harrods Creek Fire Districts, the spending level
increase per capita and response times go up. However, this is in line with my
hypothesis that sprawled areas cost more in services and have worse response
times. However, higher spending doesn't necessarily mean inefficient services; it
could be that as demand for the service increase, such as fire protection, that
governments purchase mores services, and expenditures increase (Peterson,
1981). Residents are choosing are bundle of goods and services, in this case fire
protection, and they have different per capita costs than the urban areas because
of less demand for the uses of the fire protection services.
Sprawl did not seem to affect response times in Seattle. The structure of
the Seattle Fire Department was different from Louisville, but was similar to
Houston's. One possible explanation for sprawl not having a major impact on
Seattle is that Seattle is not a city that has a considerable amount of sprawl.
According to study that was conducted by Smart Growth America, Seattle ranked

44th out of 83 metro areas that were ranked for sprawl. Furthermore Seattle was
ranked 63 rd out of 83 for accessibility of street network. Seattle had an average
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street segment length of 370 feet, the second lowest average in this study just
nd
behind San Francisco. Houston was ranked 32 overall in the sprawl index and

36 th for accessibility of its street network. The closer the sprawl index score is to
1, the greater the degree of sprawl.
Based on the interviews, the fire unions have strong control over how and
where resources are deployed. Although there is not a considerable amount of
empirical evidence from this study, the fire chiefs from the interviews said that a
strong union in the Louisville Metro Fire Department prevented a mutual aid
agreement, which would allow for the suburban fire departments to respond to an
emergency within the Louisville urban fire district. These findings are in line with
Viteritti's (1982) findings of the New York firefighters union which had strong
control over where resources where placed so that there would be greater
presence of fire fighters in high demand areas. Although in the New York case
the union was not detrimental to fire response, the actions of the Louisville
firefighters seems to be counterproductive for fire protection to the residents of
the urban fire district. By preventing an agreement of this nature, the Louisville
Fire Department potentially could raise costs because there would be greater
demand for work for its employees where they could possibly be awarded
overtime pay. A study by Marlow and Orzechowski (1996) found that unions
adversely impact productivity and raise the costs of providing services through
the public sector.
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5. 2 Recommendations
One of the first recommendations that I would make based on the findings
of this study are to promote smaller, independent fire departments. These
smaller fire departments have demonstrated more effective ability to respond
quickly to a call than one large unified fire department for an entire city. I am
however not advocating for exclusionary districts that are able to isolate
themselves from the cost associated with providing services to the inner cities.
Perhaps there needs to be a way to share funding at regional level. The structure
of the Louisville-Jefferson County fire services is an example of how other cities
could model their fire protective services. In addition, Louisville-Jefferson County
leads by example and by having a mutual-aid agreement that allows a nearest
fire station to respond to an emergency during certain times of the day, such as
rush hour, which will allow for speedier response times. Another recommendation
I would make is to prevent the union from having control that would prohibit a
mutual-aid agreement from allowing another fire district to respond to an
emergency if that district and department can respond to the emergency faster.
Developers should not have the ability to put pressure on fire departments
to build new fire stations for commercial areas on the fringes of cities so that
lower insurance rates could be possible for commercial interests. This takes
away resource from where they are needed, in areas of the inner-city where the
services are utilized the most because cities have limited funding. Efforts should
be made by city planners, fire departments, and developers to create new
developments that are not automobile dependent with smaller street blocks and
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smaller road segments. By reducing congestion on the road ways and providing
public transportation options this will help in reducing response times because
there will be fewer people driving. Lambert and Meyer (2006) also made a useful
policy suggestion in their study on sprawl and EMS response times that city and
county governments should create impact fees for new developments for the cost
of extending fire, police and emergency services to these outlying areas. If
developers do not want to pay these additional costs of developing in these
outlying areas then greater efforts need to be made to develop within existing city
areas that need infill. Related to Lambert and Meyer's (2006) suggestion that
developers should pay additional costs, Oeyle and Smith (2000) have argued
that property owners who face additional costs, such as hazardous conditions,
should pay the additional costs of emergency services based on their relative
risk, which would provide a disincentive to new sprawled developments. If both
developers and consumers are hit with higher cots associated with the risk of
living in sprawled areas than people may reconsider their choices on where to
live.
Previous studies have shown that fire follows poverty, and in this study it
was demonstrated that people in poverty in Houston and Miami have worse off
response times when controlling for several factors. Efforts have to be continually
made to reduce levels of poverty so that the number of fires and the demand for
fire services will eventually be reduced. Additionally the quality of housing should
be improved within inner cities with protective measures such as sprinklers. Fire
departments, in cities such as Houston or Miami that have higher proportions of
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minorities and people who live in poverty should make greater efforts to
reexamine response times and SES factors so that areas that have the highest
need receive the greatest protection and not the reverse. What the suburban fire
chief from Harrods Creek said during the qualitative section was very striking;
that there had been no fire within his district within the past 18 months and it
would be great if this could be said about an inner-city fire district.

5. 3 Conclusions
Results from this dissertation indicate that fire protective services do vary
within a city and between cities. There was inequality in Houston and Miami and
to a lesser extent in San Francisco as lower socio-economic groups fared poorly
with respect to fire service as measured by response times, while in other cities
such as in Louisville and Seattle this was not the case and resources have been
distributed based on need and not potential loss. Similarly, sprawl factors
negatively affected response times in the same cities that were inequitable,
mainly Houston and Miami, while in Louisville and Seattle response times were
not affected by sprawl in a negative manner. The intent of this study was to
demonstrate if any correlations existed between response times, socio economic
status and urban sprawl and the findings indicated that these correlations did
exist. It was never the objective of this dissertation to prove causation but merely
to investigate how sprawl impacted fire service provision and if certain groups
within a city have equitable access to fire protective resources. Eight cities
including Charlotte, North Carolina, Houston, Texas., Louisville, Kentcuky,
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Portland, Oregon., Seattle, Washington, St. Paul, Minnesota, San Francisco,
California., and Miami, Florida where included in this study. Based on these
findings I would claim that people in lower SES have equitable access to fire
protective services in cities like Louisville and Seattle and that fire protection
services are distributed on need, while in Houston and Miami lower SES people
do not have equitable access to resources. One major limitation is that there
were only these eight cities within the study, which makes it very difficult to have
external validity and apply these results to other cities. In reality cities are these
dynamic places that have multiple dimensions and components that impact a
service like fire provision as measured through average response times. This
study only examined a few of these factors. I believe that there are some issues
with selection bias and the cities in this study as this was not a true random
sample. The problem was the data could be collected from the city if the city was
willing to share both its fire department and GIS data, and this did not always
happen. The dependent variable in this analysis was response time, which is an
average and averages also have problems associated with them.
I believe that the results do confirm my hypothesis that response times
did vary by socioeconomic status of the inhabitants of the fire district. People in
lower socio-economic status groups were negatively affected by longer
responses times in Houston and Miami and to a lesser extent in San Francisco.
It was also found that the wealthy were better off in other cities, such as Houston,
as they have lower response times and this ultimately translates to fire services
being distributed based on a potential for loss rather than actually loss which is
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inequitable. People in lower socioeconomic status groups in Louisville and
Seattle were better off with respect to response times. My hypothesis was correct
for Houston and Miami as sprawl factors negatively impacted response times and
jeopardize people's lives in these cities. Sprawl however did not negatively
impact response times in Louisville and Seattle.
Three fire chiefs, one from an urban fire district, one from an
urban/suburban mix and one from a suburban fire district also were interviewed
for this study. Some good insight was gained from these interviews. All of the fire
chiefs believed that resources where distributed on need for services and that the
lower-income groups should have been better served with lower response times,
and were surprised when this wasn't the case in all the cities. All the chiefs also
believed that sprawl had a major impact on response times and that different
aspects of sprawl affected each district differently depending on where they were
located within the city. Other important findings from the qualitative section were
about the mutual aid agreement between the Louisville suburban fire districts, the
impact of union's and developers on fire services.
Further study is needed on this topic with both more empirical and
qualitative evidence. It would be beneficial to have data from other fire
departments that were structured in a similar fashion to the Louisville-Jefferson
County Fire District, with an independent fire department with its own taxing
authority for each district. It would also be valuable for future research to observe
response time data for multiple years to examine the influence of different
political administrations and fire protection. Although the recommendation was
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made that cities should have several smaller independent fire departments it is
completely possible that the results for Louisville ended up the way they did
because of other unforeseen spurious reasons. It also would be beneficial to
interview all the fire chiefs from each city. This way insight from each region
could be gained and the qualitative results of each city could be discussed with
that city's fire chief. Conduction the analysis at a smaller scale of geography,
such as at the census tract level, would provide further insight into this topic as
more variation occurs at the census tract level. It would be beneficial as a part of
that analysis to examine the characteristics and features of each census tract
that a fire station is located in. Having cities of different sizes also makes it very
difficult to compare one to another, as a cities vary in size, sprawl, composition
and many other areas. Each city is unique in its own manner which makes it very
difficult to compare, and it would be beneficial if similar cities could be examined
for a study of this nature in the future.
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Appendix 1 - Maps
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Figure 9

Nonwhite Population in Lousiville-Jefferson, KY
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Nonwhite Population in Seattle, WA
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Figure 11

Nonwhite Population in Miami-Dade, FL
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Population Living in Poverty in Houston, TX
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Figure 13

Population living in Poverty in Lousiville-Jefferson, KY
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Figure 14

Population Living in Poverty in Seattle, WA
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Figure 15

Population Living in Poverty in Miami-Dade, FL
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Figure 16

Home Ownership Rates in Houston, TX
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Figure 17

Home Ownership Rates in Lousiville-Jefferson, KY
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Figure 18

Home Ownership Rates in Seattle, WA
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Figure 19

Home Ownership Rates in Miami-Dade, FL
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Figure 20

Average Home Values in Houston, TX
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Figure 21

Average Home Values in Lousiville-Jefferson, KY
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Figure 22

Average Home Values in Seattle, WA
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Figure 23

Average Home Values in Miami-Dade, FL
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Figure 24

Tax Rate in Houston, TX
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Figure 25

Tax Rate in Lousiville-Jefferson, KY
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Figure 26

Tax Rate in Miami-Dade, FL
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Figure 27

Commute Times in Houston, TX
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Figure 28

Commute Times in Lousiville-Jefferson, KY
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Figure 29

Commute Times in Seattle, WA
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Figure 30

Commute Times in Miami-Dade, FL
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Figure 31

Response Times in Houston, TX
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Figure 32

Response Times in Lousiville-Jefferson, KY
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Figure 33

Response Times in Seattle, WA
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Figure 34

Response Times in Miami-Dade, FL
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Appendix 2 - Interviews
Fire Department: Lyndon
Position: Battalion Chief Stich

14. In Your opinion what is the most influencing factor on fire department response times?

Staffing in quarters or on apparatus so response can be imitated. Infrastructure, road
system what are the barriers, rail crossings, weather ~ trees, flooding, power lines
down. Unknown factors such as traffic accidents, construction that unaware oft some
route blockage.

15. Does the allocation of resources such as personal, vehicles, stations, etc. have an impact
on response times?

Yes, # 1 impact is positioning of resources. Strategic planning is important on where to
place stations for future growth. Where stations should be placed. How should the
equipment be manned. Not staffing numbers necessarily but staffing in quarters
makes big difference from having volunteer staff big delay in getting volunteers to
scene to fight fire.

16. Would you say that in certain cities that the lower income areas are disadvantaged with
respect to response times?
No don't think so. Lower income areas in inner city areas have full time staft

infrastructure hasn't changed. Stations are in placed and staffed. Don't see a lot of
change in area street wise. But there can be economic factors that affect this. The
closing down of station. So area that loses a station will have to be served by another
district or station, but wont be as quickly as previously.

17. Would you say that in certain cities that fire districts with higher cost housing have
better response times?
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NOI typically areas with higher cost housing shouldnlt have better response times.
Will be longer response times. 3:35 Lyndon area response time. Get bigger parcels of
landl homes spread out further apartl stations further apart. Takes trucks longer time
to get there. Response time is drawn by need. Where ever has most need will have
most resources similar to police protectionl not based on having equality on response
times.

18. Would you say that in certain cities that fire districts with higher rates of property taxes
have better response times?

Yesl they are able to afford full time staffingl rather than having volunteers. Areas
with more money have better stationsl better equipment. Economically depressed
areas could have stuff that is not the greatest.

19. It was found in this study it that in certain cities that lower income areas were
disadvantaged with respect to response times, however this was not the case for all
cities as reverse was found to be true. Would you have any possible explanations for
this?

Not knowing about the citYI they have gone through stations that have closed. Those
poor areas were served by more stationsl but as a means for cost cutting they shut
down the stations in the poor areas. In California proposition 44 came in and saw a
flurry of station closers. In economic hard times governments will shut down stations
and consolidate. Response times will go up. Other things ~ change in infrastructurel
plant closuresl urban development that results in change in traffic flows and roadsl
some type of service change. In older cities fire stations where only designed for horse
and buggy. Sa had to be much closer for communication. IF fire people would run to
fire station (prior to telephone) and notify of fire.

20. Similar to the previous question, in certain cities fire district's with higher cost housing
had better response times, however once again this was not the case for all cities as
reverse was found to be true. Would you have any possible explanations for this?

Could be because of smaller service district? Are all areas served by the same fire
department? District within fire department. Have Louisville fire department in urban
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area and more affluent areas are served independent fire district and departments.
More efficient because of taxing, from the comes from the fire district and is only
spent on /ire. So money collected from Lyndon stays in Lyndon and is spent on fire
$0.10 per 100. Every penny is spent on fire. Don't have other agencies fighting for
dollars. Can position stations closer together have smaller area. In more affluent areas
would receive higher funding have better staffing. Metro govt no control over us.

21. In this study it was found that the higher the rate of property taxes, the worse the
response time. Would you have any possible explanations for this?

If area getting $0.12 per $100 rather maybe because the area is economically
depressed. In order to get the same response time or staffing would need higher rate
of tax to get a similar results. Black mud fire district economically depressed area.
Revenues were dwindling. Wanted to share resources, with rest of county however,
they were absorbed. They were getting $0.10 per $100 while Lyndon was getting
$0.06 per $100 because they were economically depressed. The urban tax rate in
Louisville is higher than the suburban tax rate. Urban response time is probably not
the fastest. Other districts outside of urban area have more money so can afford more
stations and have smaller service areas. In smaller fire departments we do everything
the same as the large department but do it with fewer people. Unions don't like that.
Louisville has good union.

22. What do you think has the greatest influence on response times for a fire district
(increases response time)?

8. Commuting Time *** Traffic Patterns have biggest impact.
9.

Vehicle Ownership

10. Population Density (Population per street mile)
11. Length of the Block
12. Diversity of land use
13. Distance from the center of the city?
14. % of detached housing

Have planned for other factors, its not unknown. We know what to expect. Can't avoid
traffic and commuting. We are affected the most by traffic, for example at the busiest
intersection at 5:00 in the afternoon we will be impacted for sure.

23. Commuting times within the fire district where found to be the most correlated with
longer response times, would you agree with this and why do you think this would be
the case? What would you recommend to deal with this?
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What we have done is implemented closest station response regardless of the fire
district and political boundaries that the fire is in. When we have an incident in our
district however if its closest to Harrods creek they may be the ones to respond. Or if
there is some issue with traffic and we cant get to the fire, then another department
will responds. Cad dispatching system accounts for certain situation which will
account for that. We have dropped the kingdom barriers. However, Louisville still has
the barriers and the Union prevents other districts from responding. So we don't go
into the urban service district until a certain level alarm is hit or they call us.
I

24. The length of the street block was found to be the (2 nd most) correlated with longer
response times, would you agree with this and why do you think this would be the case?
What would you recommend to deal with this?

That will have some effect, doesn't really affect us in Lyndon because we are on a grid
system. One factor for those areas that are affected by it is on where resources are
placed. A lot of times fire stations are placed in central areas. Have to be prepared to
move from that central area. It may no longer be central point in district. Middletown
did that a few years ago when the changed there headquarter location. Didn't do for
economic reasons, but because old location was no longer at central point of district
service wise. Lyndon in 60 's located second station across railroad track on Westport
road so that they would have equipment on both sides of the railroad. Picked location
that was central. Need multiple access points into developments for connectivity.
However developers will argue with chiefs saying why do you need another road here,
it cost too much. Developers do not want to emergency services. Want to develop land
than pass it off to somebody else than it becomes problem of the city if there are
problems with access.

25. Population density and congestion were found to be the correlated with longer
response times, would you agree with this and why do you think this would be the case?
What would you recommend to deal with this?

Greater density in urban areas and more vehicles on the road more congestion. In
rural areas won't have traffic levels, however roads aren't as good. We run into (not
amount of congestion) but congestion outpacing infrastructure. So as area grows
faster than road allow this creates a major problem.

26. Do issues with response times ever affect cities or fire department policies in any way?
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Yes, will affect another station is needed or dispatched to an incident. We came up
with policy to share resource to reduce response times regardless of political
boundaries. Staffing on equipment.

•

We have been downgrading emergency response. What was emergency 2
years ago is not today. Traffic accidents, heart attacks. Definitions change of
emergency. You risk a lot to save a lot and 'vice versa. Should be looked at all
data. Trick to fool public is response time of first arriving unit ~ fire chief
arrives at scene to scope out area, then trucks get there. Public wants to know
when does unit get there, so response time of apparatus and command
officer.
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Fire Department: Jeffersontown
Position Fire Chief Jack Reckner

27. In Your opinion what is the most influencing factor Qln fire department response times?

Time of day of the incident ie rush hour, are the fir~ fighters asleep, awake because of
24 hour shift. Environmental factors ~ weather. IrlPustrial park and traffic conditions
high traffic area with lots of congestion. Topograpihy of area, geography.

28. Does the allocation of resources such as personal, vehicles, stations, etc. have an impact
on response times?

Yes, resources need to be deployed based on demographics. Will have a large impact
on response times.
29. Would you say that in certain cities that the lower income areas are disadvantaged with
respect to response times?

No, even though fire follows poverty. Resources are based and distributed on who
needs them the most and people in areas that are higher poverty should have more
resources so shouldn't be disadvantaged with resp(mse times.
30. Would you say that in certain cities that fire districts with higher cost housing have
better response times?

Would say no, but could be because of funding maybe. Tax revenues higher in east
end, lower in west end. Lower SES areas could have all volunteer fire fighters.

31. Would you say that in certain cities that fire districts with higher rates of property taxes
have better response times?

Maybe if that means greater funding and leads to more resources and better
resources. Depends on density of population.

32. It was found in this study it that in certain cities tha~ lower income areas were
disadvantaged with respect to response times, however this was not the case for all
cities as reverse was found to be true. Would you h~ve any possible explanations for
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this? Louisville used block development grand fun~s to by fire trucks. Depends on how

resources were allocated. Poverty is a big factors. tau can over allocate. Areas with
more density can have more fires, fire is attracted to poverty. If trucks and stations are
busy responding to fire, trucks from other districts /.viii respond which will increase
response times.
33. Similar to the previous question, in certain cities fir~ district's with higher cost housing
had better response times, however once again thisi was not the case for all cities as
reverse was found to be true. Would you have any ~ossible explanations for this?
The more density an area has the more fires it will have. Lower SES areas have more
demand for services so greater demand could put s~rain on services.

34. In this study it was found that the higher the rate of, property taxes, the worse the
response time. Would you have any possible explanl3tions for this?

Depends on taxing authority, does funding come frpm general fund or does fire district
have taxing power. Jeffersontown only gets mone~ from Jefferson town. Louisville
gets money from all county in general fund. Also tax from employment. Urban service
area different than suburban areas.

35. What do you think has the greatest influence on response times for a fire district
(increases response time)?
15. Commuting Time
16. Vehicle Ownership
17. Population Density (Population per stre~t mile)
18. Length of the Block
19. Diversity of land use
20. Distance from the center of the city? *~*

21. % of detached housing

Distance form CBD most important for Jefferson To!wn. The areas on the edge of the
district have much worse response times, because lire stations are so far away.
36. Commuting times within the fire district where fou~d to be the most correlated with
longer response times, would you agree with this a~d why do you think this would be
the case? What would you recommend to deal with!this?

Yes. Traffic is really bad. We have industrial park ~ith 30,000 people working there.
Only 1 way in and 1 way out. Commuting burden h~ge. ISO ratings have nothing to do
with good protection, no correlation. No greater tHan 5 miles rule. TO KEEP
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INSURANCE RATING DOWN. Rules made from 191~ from horse and buggy time.
Economic development people need fire stations tq get good ISO ratings, or
development will not come. With a station close b~ people will get good ratings with
lower rates of insurance.

37. The length of the street block was found to be the (~nd most) correlated with longer
response times, would you agree with this and why do you think this would be the case?
What would you recommend to deal with this?

Yes, fire trucks need to get to location ASAP, howefer difficult with problems with
connectivity. Short blocks easy to get around, long "Iocks not. If got lost have to go all
the way around takes a lot of time.
Adequacy of fire protection ordinance.

38. Population density and congestion were found to

b~

the correlated with longer

response times, would you agree with this and why tlo you think this would be the case?
What would you recommend to deal with this?

Not surprising, more demand more pull for resourcrs. Residential sprinklers will reduce
the need.

39. Do issues with response times ever affect cities or fire department policies in any way?

Yes have weakness will try to shift policy by assignlrg resource to different areas.
Renovate stations or build new ones. Jeffersontowb had station in industrial park,
however no longer needed it so closed it down.
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Fire Department

Harrods Creek Fire Department

Position

Chief

Aponte

40. In Your opinion what is the most influencing factor Ciln fire department response times?

Resources, where resources are placed, where stat~ons are placed, man power, money,
geography, speed ie average speed is about 25mpl1 because of all stops, lights, traffic,
weather,
Availability of man power, money all tied together~ geography. Avg speed 24 mph.
Geography where station is placed.

41. Does the allocation of resources such as personal, vehicles, stations, etc. have an impact
on response times?

Yes one of the biggest factors for influence, hope that your station is in the best
location. But sometimes you have a station in a district and all new homes and
development in that district are very lar away Ironi station, which is bad lor response
times.
20sq miles for 2 station don't have resource to addinew stations, hope we have best
locations.

42. Would you say that in certain cities that the lower income areas are disadvantaged with
respect to response times?
No the opposite is true. Poor areas have greater d~mand lor services so more

resources will be placed in those areas so should h~ve better response times.
Seem to be based on run volume. Lower SES areas ihave greater demand so more
demand. Suburban areas more run volume will be ~igher and will have more
resources. Should be better response.

43. Would you say that in certain cities that fire districts with higher cost housing have
better response times?
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Similar to previous question, however certain area$ may have better funding so they
can afford more staffing and better equipment so ~hey could possibly have better
times. Also smaller /ire departments are more effic~ent, easy to make changes when
needed and problems are found. Depends upon th~ region. Old city of Louisville the
opposite should be true. Areas with more volume s1Jould be have better response time.
Certain areas with greater tax and assets more fun~ing should have better times.
Some affluent areas have better fire department. 71he larger the department the
decrease inability to have good management to ha,ve control in issues and pass down
change. Consider merging but thought they would be less likely to responds. Small
city mayors were worried about losing communication.

44. Would you say that in certain cities that fire districts with higher rates of property taxes
have better response times?

You would think so if it resulted in greater funding you could have more staffing.
Current tax rate $0.10 per $100 of real property value (home, vehicle). Indianapolis 7
$0.24-$0.38 per $100. Areas with lower taxing rate~ usually have to rely on volunteers.
It tokes volunteers several minutes to response to calls, if the district is very large then
response times go up. In some instances Cities willi annex areas to gain funding, but
they will not add services. Ie Oxmoor.
Would be better with greater taxing. Other areas have higher revenues. Cincinatti 0.17
per $100 of real property. Can better staff with more funding. Some areas staffed
Mon-Fri. In evening volunteers, weekend volunteef'5. Takes while for people to come
in. Had they had the money would have full time staff which is big difference.

45. It was found in this study it that in certain cities

tha~

lower income areas were

disadvantaged with respect to response times, however this was not the case for all
cities as reverse was found to be true. Would you

h~ve

any possible explanations for

this? You wouldn't think this should be the case.

Surprising and counterintuitive. Typically low income areas should have more volume
better response times.

46. Similar to the previous question, in certain cities fire district's with higher cost housing
had better response times, however once again this! was not the case for all cities as
reverse was found to be true. Would you have any
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~ossible

explanations for this?

Could be some political explanations.

Is there political reasons? Don't have enough dens~ty, wealthy housing however, not
enough of it to get good funding levels. 9 th in income, but expensive housing. But
density doesn't support having additional resources. Don't have population density to
support better services.
47. In this study it was found that the higher the rate of property taxes, the worse the
response time. Would you have any possible explanations for this?

Very expensive homes in hard to reach areas. Long.narrow windy roads, isolated.
Bridges. Tax rate is same. Louisville urban service district general fund about 0.22-0.25
per $100.
Stations are placed in certain areas, however new growth occurs away from station.
Poor areas might not be able to raise enough mon¢y, so need higher rates to
compensate.
48. What do you think has the greatest influence on response times for a fire district
(increases response time)?
22. Commuting Time
23. Vehicle Ownership

26. Diversity of land use
27. Distance from the center of the city?

I
49. Commuting times within the fire district where found to be the most correlated with
longer response times, would you agree with this and why do you think this would be
the case? What would you recommend to deal with this?

Yes would agree with these. Traffic not an issue fot' suburban area. Finding the most
efficient route. Add more infrastructure.

50. The length of the street block was found to be the (2

nd

most) correlated with longer

response times, would you agree with this and why do you think this would be the case?
What would you recommend to deal with this?
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Would agree with this. How would deal with this? Less expensive to have more staff
rather than to build roads. Have developers talk with fire people. Louisville annexed
areas of Oxmoor but did not provide additional resources. So when send fire trucks to
Oxmoor trucks go through 2 different fire protectiQn districts to get there. Union
contracts prevent suburban districts to response to urban district. Taxation without
representation. Take tax money but don't provide Qdditional services. Still like that. So
increase response time.

51. Population density and congestion were found to be the correlated with longer
response times, would you agree with this and why do you think this would be the case?
What would you recommend to deal with this?

Yes, not really applicable to suburban area. But just add more resources.

52. Do issues with response times ever affect cities or fire department policies in any way?

Yes, policies for response. Response affects the type and number of apparatus that
are sent. Water supplies in isolated areas no hydrants. Tankers need ta come in. Roads
more narrow, don't hove weight capacity need smaller trucks. Affected by narrow
roads. Some areas get in to because of private brid'ges, gates that block trucks. Have
problems with big tree canopies. Trees grow up and out trucks get damaged.
Ambulance put in location in area with political pressure. Influential person died so
ambulance placed in location for 6-7 area. If money is not there will do best with what
you have.
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Appendix 3 -IRB Documentation
Flor IRS Approval Stamp

Subject Informed Consent Document
Equity, Sprawl and Fire Department Response Times Across the U.S.

Investigator(s) name & address: David M. Simpson, Matin Katirai. 426 West
Bloom St. Louisville, KY 40208.
Site(s) where study is to be conducted: Fire StatioMs in Jefferson County
Kentucky.
Phone number for subjects to call for questions: 502-852-4735

Introduction and Background Information
You are invited to participate in a research study. The study is being conducted
by David M Simpson, PhD and Matin Katirai, MPH, Student .The study is
sponsored by the University of Louisville, Department of Urban and Public
Affairs. The study will take place at Fire station in Jefferson County Kentucky.
Approximately 3 subjects will be invited to participate.

Purpose
The purpose of this study is to understand the factors that influence fire department
response times and offer possible explanations for most significant factors of this study.
It is a follow up to the quantitative findings of the study.

Procedures
In this study, you will be asked to identify factors that influence response times and
offer possible explanations for most significant factors that were found in this study
through a survey. The surveys will be conducted in per$on. You may decline any
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question that makes you uncomfortable. The survey should take less than fifteen
minutes to complete.

Potential Risks

There are no foreseeable risks, although there may be unforeseen risks.

Benefits

The possible benefits of this study include improved understanding of factors that
influence response times. The information collected may not benefit you directly.
The information learned in this study may be helpful to others.

Compensation
You will not be compensated for your time, inconvenience, or expenses for your
participation in this study

Confidentiality
Your identity as a subject in this study and the information you provide may be
released and published only if you agree that the information may be made
public. Data collected in this project will be kept in the principal investigator's
computer under passwords secured protection

Voluntary Participation
Taking part in this study is voluntary. You may choose not to take part at all. If
you decide to be in this study you may stop taking part at any time. If you decide
not to be in this study or if you stop taking part at any time, you will not lose any
benefits for which you may qualify.
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Research Subject's Rights, Questions, Concerns, and Complaints
If you have any concerns or complaints about the study or the study staff, you
have three options.

You may contact the principal investigator at 502-852-4735.

If you have any questions about your rights as a study subject, questions,
concerns or complaints, you may call the Human Subjects Protection
Program Office (HSPPO) (502) 852-5188. You may discuss any
questions about your rights as a subject, in secret, with a member of the
Institutional Review Soard (IRS) or the HSPPO staff. The IRS is an
independent committee composed of members of the University
community, staff of the institutions, as we" as lay members of the
community not connected with these institutions. The IRS has reviewed
this study.

If you want to speak to a person outside the University, you may call 1877-852-1167. You wi" be given the chance to talk about any questions,
concerns or complaints in secret. This is a 24 hour hot line answered by
people who do not work at the University of Louisvi"e.

This paper tells you what wi" happen during the study if you choose to take part.
Your signature means that this study has been discussed with you, that your
questions have been answered, and that you wi" take part in the study. This
informed consent document is not a contract. You are not giving up any legal
rights by signing this informed consent document. You wi" be given a signed
copy of this paper to keep for your records.

Signature of Subject/Legal Representative

Date Signed

Signature of Person Explaining the Consent Form
(if other than the Investigator)

Date Signed
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signature of Investigator

Date Signed

LIST OF INVESTIGATORS

PHONE NUMBERS

David M Simpson

502-852-8019
502-852-4735

Matin Katirai

For IRS Approval Stamp

The following IRB Protocol has been marked as Exempt.
Tracking #: 08.0626
PI: Simpson, David
Title: Equity, Sprawl, and Fire Department Response Times Across the
U.S.
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CURRICULUM VITAE
MATIN KATIRAI
1814 Round Ridge Rd
Louisville, Kentucky 40207
Phone: 502-594-0621
Email: matin.katirai@louisville.edu

EDUCATION

Doctor of Philosophy in Urban and Public Affairs
Expected in spring 2009
School of Urban and Public Affairs, University of Louisville, Louisville, KY
Masters of Public Health
College of Public Health, University of Kentucky, Lexington, KY
January 2004 to July 2005
Geographic Information Systems Application Specialists Certificate
Fleming College, Lindsay, Ontario Canada.
May 1999 to December 1999
Specialized Honors Bachelor of Arts Degree
York University, Toronto, Ontario Canada.
September 1994 to December 1998
Technical Reports

"Malaria Early Warning Systems: Risk Assessment and Vulnerability Mapping for
Nigeria." Prepared by Project Engineering for the National Space Research and
Development Agency (NASDRA) Garki, Abuja. February 2008. Ismaila Odogba &
Matin Katirai
Publications

Now in Press: Large Scale Rooftop Search and Rescue: the experience of Hurricane
Katrina. Matin Katirai and David M. Simpson. International Journal of Mass
Emergencies and Disasters. 2009
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Academic Service
President, Ph.D. Student Association

University of Louisville 2007-2008

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE
August 2005 to Present
Research Associate
Center for Hazard Research and Policy Development, University of Louisville
January 2005 - July 2005
Masters in Public Health Practicum - GIS Public Health Specialist
Kentucky Department of Public Health, Frankfort, KY
January 2004 - January 2005
Graduate Assistant
University of Kentucky Prevention Research Center, Lexington, KY
August 2002 - August 2003
Geographic Information Systems Data Coordinator
Canadian Tire Real Estate, Canadian Tire Corporation, Toronto, Ontario Canada
July 2000 - August 2002
GIS Specialists
Akanda Innovation Inc, Thorn Hill, Ontario, Canada
January 2000 - July 2000
GIS Technician
Summit County Auditor, Akron, OH

Consulting
March 2008
Malaria Vulnerably Assessment of Nigeria
Client: National Space Research and Development Agency (NASDRA)
January 2007
Evaluation of Urban Sprawl and Agriculture in Clark County Indiana
Client: Center for Environmental Policy and Management
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